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While the concept of protecting citizens abroad is a familiar one in public debate and 
international law, the practice of protection is little studied. Two ideas define the way in 
which the protection of citizens abroad is understood. Since the early twentieth century, 
international legal scholarship has contemplated the protection of citizens abroad 
through the decisions of international courts and tribunals. Many legal and non-legal 
measures may be taken to protect a citizen from a violation of international law abroad, 
yet scholars focus their attention narrowly on international legal cases. The second idea 
is that protection is a State enterprise. States may be praised for their interventions on 
behalf of their citizens or lambasted for their inaction. Scholarly analyses focus almost 
exclusively on State behaviour and preferences, without considering how other actors 
may influence, drive or inhibit protection. These framing ideas, international litigation 
as protection and a focus on States as protective actors, obscure other dimensions of 
protecting citizens from violations of international law abroad.  
 
This thesis investigates the nature of participation in the protection of citizens abroad 
and its significance for international law. It explores the actors who drive and deliver 
the protection of nationals, the behaviours that constitute the practice of protection, and 
the motivating factors for protective behaviour. The purpose of the study is to better 
understand the phenomenon of protection. The thesis examines examples of protection 
by Germany, Mexico and Australia. I observe that the protection of citizens abroad is a 
multi-actor phenomenon, where networks of actors form together to produce protective 
outcomes. Where there is an alignment of values and the opportunity to harness 
expertise, networks may form to devise strategies of intervention and perform tasks of 
protection. I propose that, in order to better account for participation in the international 
order, a more complex view of sovereignty is needed. I argue that the protection of 
citizens abroad is best understood through the concept of distributive sovereignty, 
whereby States distribute and delegate their protective functions across a network of 
State and non-State actors.
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
	  
International law characterises the protection of citizens abroad as an exclusively State 
enterprise.1  Ideas of sovereignty, citizenship and State responsibility in international 
law have influenced this trajectory. Yet many international lawyers have come to 
recognise that a focus only on States fails to capture the full suite of activity in the 
international legal order, thereby obscuring the ‘reality of international legal 
participation’, and various modes of protection.2  This thesis investigates the nature of 
participation in the protection of citizens abroad. It explores the actors who drive and 
deliver the protection of nationals, the behaviours that constitute the practice of 
protection, and the motivating factors for protective behaviour.3  The purpose of the 
study is to better understand the phenomenon of protection by examining its 
modalities. It also considers the significance of these practices for international law.  
Public and scholarly focus on States in the protection of citizens abroad has not been 
without reason. The relationship between citizen and State is central to understandings 
of the protection of citizens abroad. Nationality serves as a powerful concept linking an 
individual to the State in a number of legal, political and social ways.4  Moreover, 
citizens are an integral aspect of statehood in international law.5  A national’s treatment 
abroad may affect a State’s interests, including economic or political interests or other 
kinds of values like human rights. States elect which values or interests to pursue by 
protecting nationals who embody those values abroad.  
The contemporary practice of protecting citizens abroad is poorly understood, even 
from an exclusively State-centred perspective.  Protection can be manifested by an 
array of actions, but there are few studies that identify or analyse who participates and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, eg, Edwin Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad: Or The Law of International 
Claims (Banks Law Publishing Company, 1915); John Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection and Human 
Rights: The Draft Articles of the International Law Commission’ (2005) 24 Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 75; James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
2 Robert McCorquodale, ‘Beyond State Sovereignty: The International Legal System and Non-State 
Participants’ (2006) 8 International Law: Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 103, 106.  
3 Note I use the terms ‘citizen’ and ‘national’ interchangeably in this thesis. 
4 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 
2012) 509-510. 
5 Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of 





how. As an area where law, politics and sovereignty collide, many variables influence if, 
how and why a national may receive protection from his or her State of nationality. 
Some of the factors that affect whether or not an intervention will occur include the 
nature of the harm, the locale in which the harm occurs, the character or status of the 
national, and the extent to which the harm relates to State interests. The question of 
whether an individual should be protected is coupled with concern about how a 
national will be protected. Until 1945, the use of force was a legitimate mechanism for 
the protection of nationals abroad.6 However, rules in international law now limit 
efforts of protection to peaceful means.7 A national may receive consular assistance or 
be the beneficiary of diplomatic representations by her State of nationality. Sometimes 
a State brings a legal action in an international court or tribunal to seek a remedy on 
behalf of its citizen.  
The modern enterprise of protecting nationals abroad attracts a wide range of actors. 
Non-State actors, particularly civil society organisations, are now involved. One 
example of the role of non-State actors is human rights advocacy and campaigning by 
civil society organisations.8 Many writers situate the protective behaviour of non-State 
actors in isolation from State action, or do not consider it to be protection at all. 
However, non-State actors can influence when States protect their nationals and the 
kind of strategies that are employed. Non-State actors, such as human rights 
organisations, have even performed functions traditionally belonging to the State, such 
as litigation and making representations on an individual’s behalf.  
The modalities of protection by both State and non-State actors have had little 
academic investigation or analysis. Most scholarly attention has been focused on 
litigation on behalf of nationals before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Scholars 
have primarily shown interest in doctrinal aspects of these cases, rather than the 
broader question of how and why litigation has been used as a tool of protection. The 
nature of doctrinal analysis also has the effect of rendering invisible the participation or 
contribution of non-State actors by focusing only on the narrative of the State parties.  
Finally, little is known about the patterns or strategies of protecting citizens abroad, 
how diplomatic protection is exercised beyond ICJ litigation, the actors that contribute 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Mathias Forteau, ‘Rescuing Nationals Abroad’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of 
Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 947, 954. 
7 See ‘Text of the Draft Articles of Diplomatic Protection,’ in International Law Commission, Report of 
the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th Session, UN GAOR, 61st sess, Supp No 10, 
A/61/10 (1 May - 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 2006) 16 [49] (‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
with Commentaries’ or ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’).  
8 Reprieve, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch each have programmes addressing the 
treatment and protection of individuals abroad. 
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to its practice or why it is exercised at all. International law defines the rules of 
protection, but techniques of protection combine political, diplomatic and legal means. 
Questions exist as to whether new techniques have accompanied the increased 
participation of non-State actors or if States themselves have adapted their responses. 
And while it is clear that law’s role is an important one, the extent of its power as a 
mechanism of authority has escaped scrutiny.  
 
Diplomatic Protection in International Law 
Emer de Vattel presented the protection of citizens abroad as an issue related to the law 
of nations in 1758, characterising it as a right of States.9 He opined that there were 
some kinds of harm against a citizen that were of such a nature that they could be 
considered to be harm against the State itself.10  In this sense, States can choose to 
stand in the place of their nationals to seek a remedy for the harm inflicted by the 
offending foreign State. This concept of transforming individual injury to State injury 
coupled with the ability of States to pursue action on a national’s behalf is referred to as 
the doctrine of diplomatic protection. The proximity of State/citizen interests and 
Vattel’s characterisation of protection as a matter related to the law of nations have 
shaped the way in which protection is regulated in international law.  
Since Vattel’s characterisation of protection, international law has been the main 
vehicle for addressing the protection of citizens abroad. 11   The law of State 
responsibility, the law on the treatment of aliens, the law of diplomatic protection, law 
on nationality, international human rights, and international investment law address 
the protection of citizens.12  The International Law Commission (ILC), a UN body 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Emer de Vattel, Law of Nations (Béla Kapossy and Richard Whatmore trans, Liberty Fund, 2008) [trans 
of: Le Droit Des Gens (first published 1758)]. 
10 For further discussion of Vattel and diplomatic protection see Kate Parlett, The Individual in the 
International Legal System (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 49; M Sornarajah, International Law on 
Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 121.  
11 See, eg, Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, above n 1; Frederick Sherwood Dunn, 
The Protection of Nationals: A Study in the Application of International Law (John Hopkins Press, 1932); 
Alwyn V Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice (Longmans, Green and 
Co, 1938); Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens (Oxford University 
Press, 1967); Richard B Lillich (ed), International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens 
(University Press of Virginia, 1983); Francisco V García-Amador, The Changing Law of International 
Claims (Oceana Publications, 1984); Carmen Tiburcio, The Human Rights of Aliens Under International 
and Comparative Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001); John Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press Online, 
2012); Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli, The Protection of Individuals by Means of Diplomatic Protection: 
Diplomatic Protection as a Human Rights Instrument (PhD Thesis, Leiden University, 2007); 
Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
12 See García-Amador, above n 11; Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, above n 11. 
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established in 1947 for the purpose of codifying and developing international law, 
undertook programmes of study to codify the rules of diplomatic protection.13  The 
ILC’s programme of study concluded in 2006 with the adoption of the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection, which reflect the customary international rules of diplomatic 
protection.14  
The Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection define diplomatic protection as:  
the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful 
settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an 
internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a 
national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility.15 
This definition reveals two features of the legal regime regulating the protection of 
citizens abroad. The first is that responsibility for breaches of international law against 
individuals is invoked between States.16  Second, the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection recognise the right of States to invoke protection in favour of their citizens, 
meaning that there is no obligation on States in international law to intervene if their 
citizens experience a human rights violation abroad.17   States can exercise their right to 
intervene in a number of ways, such as consular assistance, diplomatic representations, 
negotiations, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement and severance of diplomatic 
ties.18  
Definitions and Scope 
Several terms and concepts at the heart of this thesis require definition. The first issue 
is the way in which the protection of nationals abroad is conceived. Most studies on 
protection refer to the legal concept of diplomatic protection in international law. 
However, I approach the protection of citizens abroad as a larger category than the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Statute of the International Law Commission 1947, GA Res 39/39 (18 November 1981) art 1(1). For a 
broader discussion of the ILC’s work on State Responsibility see Crawford, Articles on State 
Responsibility, above n 1; for a discussion of diplomatic protection see John Dugard, ‘Diplomatic 
Protection’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds), The Law of State Responsibility 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 1051. 
14 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 13 [49]. The Draft Articles themselves are 
not binding, however, they refer to and codify customary international law principles, which are binding. 
The Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection also attempted to progressively develop some aspects 
of the law of diplomatic protection beyond the existing rules of customary international law.  
15 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection art 1.  
16 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 25-26.  
17 John Dugard, First Report of the Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, International Law 
Commission, 52nd sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Doc A/CN.4/506 (7 March 2000). There are three 
requirements before a State may intervene: the commission of an internationally wrongful act (a violation 
of international law), the existence of a bond of nationality between the injured individual and the 
intervening State (article 3(1)), and that the individual has exhausted all domestic remedies in the foreign 
State.  
18 Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, above n 11, 27. 
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doctrine of diplomatic protection. The protection of citizens abroad, or ‘protection’ in 
this thesis, refers to a range of legal and non-legal actions by State and non-State actors 
on behalf of a citizen abroad in anticipation of or in response to a breach of 
international law. This definition therefore encompasses a wider range of behaviours 
and actors of which diplomatic protection is a subset. 
Many of the practices this thesis explores fall somewhere along a continuum between 
consular assistance and diplomatic protection. Scholars have traditionally understood 
diplomatic protection as occurring once all domestic remedies in the foreign State have 
been exhausted. Within this view, all actions taken prior to exhaustion, or actions that 
are not taken by a State, do not constitute diplomatic protection. Moreover, the practice 
of diplomatic protection is an invocation of State responsibility, and therefore remedial 
in character. It is rare, except in legal cases, for a State to declare that it is adopting its 
citizen’s injury as its own. So in those circumstances where there is no international 
litigation, how can the behaviour of a State and its actors be identified as diplomatic 
protection? It seems that under the diplomatic protection regime in international law 
all actions taken prior to exhaustion are not protection, or rather that all actions taken 
after exhaustion are protection. Both these positions exclude practices that are 
protective in their intent and nature. This thesis explores these tensions and includes 
consular action within the definition of protection.   
This work is limited to an examination of the protection of natural persons or citizens, 
even though the doctrine of diplomatic protection extends to legal persons. There is 
extensive scholarship on the protection of corporations particularly in international 
investment law.19 Protection in favour of corporations is fundamentally different in 
nature to the protection of individuals, and I only examine injuries against individuals 
falling within international human rights law and breaches of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (1963).20  
Another issue of scope and definition are the terms ‘citizen’ or ‘national.’ This thesis 
relies upon the definition of nationality provided in article 4 of the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection. In accordance with this definition, if a person has acquired 
nationality in accordance with the laws of their State either ‘by birth, descent, 
naturalization, succession of States, or in any other manner, not inconsistent with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See generally Campbell McLachlan, Lawrence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment 
Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2007); Kate Parlett, ‘Diplomatic Protection and the International 
Court of Justice,’ in Christian J Tams and James Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by 
the International Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2013) 87, 104.  
20 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 261 
(entered into force 19 March 1967). 
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international law’ then I have referred to that individual as a citizen or a national of the 
State concerned.21 Articles 3(2) and 8 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
envisage that States may extend diplomatic protection to lawful habitual residents, 
stateless persons and/or refugees. The inclusion of a broader range of potential 
beneficiaries of diplomatic protection in these specific articles is an exercise in 
progressive development of the law and fall outside the scope of this thesis.   
This thesis investigates behaviours and activities of actors beyond the State. The term 
‘non-State actors’ has been criticised by international lawyers for being a negative 
definition in relation to States.22  Some scholars suggest that ‘public’ and ‘private’ actors 
may be a better demarcation.23  Distinctions are drawn in the following chapters 
between the general category of non-State actors and the narrower category of civil 
society organisations. The broader category of non-State actors is used to describe 
individuals, the media, professional associations and academics, whereas I use the term 
civil society organisation to refer in particular to human rights organisations and 
advocacy groups.  
Participation is also a concept that requires some elaboration for the purpose of this 
thesis. There are various conceptions of participation in the international system. The 
right to participate as an actor in international law is traditionally predicated on 
statehood. States occupy a privileged position in international law as ‘subjects’ or the 
bearers of the full suite of rights and obligations in the legal system. All other things 
and entities not capable of bearing international rights and duties fall into the category 
of ‘objects’ of international law.24  This characterisation, sometimes referred to as the 
‘subject/object dichotomy’, ‘legal subjectivity’ or ‘international legal personality’, 
dominates understandings of and practices within the international legal system. For 
example, standing to appear before the ICJ is limited to States.25  In relation to the 
protection of citizens abroad, the structure of diplomatic protection as an inter-State 
action manifests this classical approach.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries art 4, 31.  
22 See, eg, Philip Alston, ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime 
Accommodate Non-State Actors?’ in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 3, 14-19. 
23 Anne Peters, Till Förster and Lucy Koechlin, ‘Towards Non-state Actors as Effective, Legitimate and 
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(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 492, 536. 
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Recent scholarship in international law signals a departure from the classical premise 
of participation in the international legal system.26  James Crawford describes the 
problem of traditional legal subjectivity:  
International law affects everyone but participation in the international law system 
is very unevenly distributed. Traditionally only States were considered subjects of 
international law, but this is no longer true.27  
Since the ICJ decision in the Reparations case, which recognised the possibility that 
non-State actors can bear rights and responsibilities in international law, legal 
scholarship has challenged the ‘subject-object dichotomy’ as the sole basis for 
understanding international legal participation.28  
This study takes as its starting point Rosalyn Higgins’ concept of ‘participation’ in the 
international legal system. 29   In Higgins’ view, international law is a process of 
decision-making. She rejects that only States are subjects of international law and, in 
fact, rejects the subject/object dichotomy as a misnomer.30  Instead, Higgins adopts a 
wide view of participation where there are number of participants in the international 
legal system, who variously possess rights and duties and participate in the process of 
decision-making. She claims that ‘within that process (which is a dynamic not a static 
one) there are a variety of participants, making claims across state lines, with the object 
of maximizing various values.’31  Higgin’s concept of participation in the international 
legal system enables a broader range of actors, behaviours and values to be identified 
and analysed in the international legal order.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, eg, McCorquodale, ‘Beyond State Sovereignty’, above n 2; Robert McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive 
International Legal System’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 477; Higgins, above n 24, 50; 
Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law  (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Parlett, 
The Individual in the International Legal System, above n 10. 
27 James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (The Hague Academy of 
International Law, 2014) 181-82.  
28 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ 
Rep 174. See, eg, Higgins, above n 24, 50; Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal 
Personality: An Inquiry into the History and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser Press, 2004); 
Anthony Carty, ‘International Legal Personality and the End of the Subject: Natural Law and 
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International Law 534.  
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Approaches to the study of international law 
Traditional approaches 
The protection of citizens abroad, and especially diplomatic protection, are most often 
studied within international law’s dominant theoretical and methodological framework: 
legal positivism. Positivism takes as its baseline positive rules regulating State 
behaviour that are based on State consent. The positivist approach centres on States as 
the ultimate generators of law. International law, according to positivists, is a set of 
rules governing relations between States.32  The positivist origins of international law 
have influenced the manner in which international law is studied and understood. 
German jurist, Lassa Oppenheim, characterised international law as a science based on 
the process of establishing, applying and critiquing rules governing the relations of 
States.33  He stated that the primary task in international law is to determine: 
… the existing recognized rules of international law. Whatever we think of the value 
or a recognized rule – whether we approve or condemn it, whether we want to 
retain, abolish, or replace it – we must first of all know whether it is really a 
recognized rule of law at all, and what are its commands.34 
Oppenheim outlined several aspects of the method of international law, including 
establishing the historical origins of rules, criticising rules, preparing rules for 
codification, encouraging the peaceful settlement of disputes between States and, the 
interpretation of the rules in treaty and custom.35  
A focus on rules has dominated the field. Some writers note that, unlike the approach 
taken in international relations, international lawyers avoid causal analysis or 
prediction. 36  Tom Ginsberg and Gregory Shaffer observe that the majority of 
international law scholarship relates to ‘formal law and normative prescription, paying 
special attention to the International Court of Justice.’37  Some scholars critique the 
narrow focus of positivism in international legal scholarship: ‘beneath the surface of 
much scholarship … are a host of unanswered questions about presuppositions, 
conceptions and missions, all of which influence how they undertake their analyses of 
an issue’.38  Hans Morgenthau criticised the positivist approach to international law as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Cf Crawford, Chance, Order, Change, above n 27, 179. Crawford characterises international law as a 
system, not merely rules.  
33 Lassa Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2(2) American 
Journal of International Law 313.  
34 Ibid 315.  
35 Ibid 314-322, 349. 
36 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181, 191. 
37 Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship’ (2012) 
106(1) American Journal of International Law 1, 2. 
38 Steven R Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 291, 291.  
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a ‘juridical pseudo-logic’ which was an ‘artificial makeshift by which a stationary law 
could be reconciled with a moving social reality.’39  Yet, positivism remains central to 
international law as a discipline and a profession.40  While it may not encompass all the 
power, politics and participants of the international legal system, it persists as the 
dominant method for identifying international legal rules. 
Positivism has influenced nearly all scholarly excursions into the protection of citizens 
abroad. The sources of international law, as understood within positivism, have guided 
legal scholars away from studying the practice of protection. International lawyers have 
been concerned classically with identifying or developing rules to regulate the 
behaviour and relations of States. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (the 
‘Statute’) defines the sources of international law as treaties, custom, general principles 
of international law, and the subsidiary sources of judicial decisions and academic 
contributions.41  The rulings of the ICJ, while not a binding source of law in themselves, 
contribute to a corpus of the recognised rules of international law and their 
interpretation.42  By articulating the sources for resolving disputes between States, the 
Statute has also had the influence of directing the inquiry and method of legal 
scholarship to rule-elaboration in international law.43  A doctrinal approach does, of 
course, enable an assessment of State behaviours through the identification of 
customary international law (State practice and opinio juris). However, a 
methodological framework based on identifying doctrine is restricted to the behaviour 
of States alone and therefore cannot address fully the question of participation in the 
protection of citizens abroad. 
Another problem, which is not limited to the area of protection, is the secrecy 
surrounding State practice or conduct. The legal foundation of the protection of citizens 
abroad is State interest. States may be reluctant to release information about the 
existence or content of negotiations or diplomatic representations made on behalf of 
their citizens. States are even more guarded in relation to national security or sensitive 
relationships with other States. In response, many scholars have relied on case law for 
their analyses given its availability and public nature. These sources exclude much of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hans J Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law’ (1940) 34(2) American Journal 
of International Law 260, 270. Note, however, that Morgenthau’s position has been criticised as 
‘simplistically cynical’. See Richard Falk, ‘The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International 
Law – Gaps in Legal Thinking’ (1964) 50(2) Virginia Law Review 231, 233.  
40 Anne Orford, ‘Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law’ (2014) 25(2) European 
Journal of International Law 369, 372.  
41 Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38. 
42 Ibid art 59.  
43 Oppenheim, above n 33, 313.  
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the practice of protection from critical analysis, particularly actions prior to legal 
proceedings.  
The approach in this thesis has been informed by these restraints. I engage with 
frameworks that examine international law and its actors beyond the macro level of 
rules and State behaviour. The thesis is informed by three approaches: network 
theory/nodal governance, practice theory and international legal history.  
 
Networks, nodal governance and practice theory 
What is a network? A network can be defined as ‘a group of people who exchange 
information, contacts, and experience for professional or social purpose’ but also ‘an 
arrangement of intersecting vertical and horizontal lines.’44  A theory of networks can 
be understood as the study of individuals, organisations and institutions, and the lines 
that connect them together in social, political and legal action or purpose. Networks can 
also be understood as a theory for dissecting and reassembling decision-making or the 
implementation of policy between a range of State and non-State actors. 45   The 
motivation behind applying a network-based approach is to enable governance 
processes to be viewed as ‘interactive, fragmented, multidimensional policy-making 
involving a range of state and non-state actors’.46  This inclusion of all actors is 
necessary for a pluralistic view of influence where actors are both subjects and objects 
of regulation.47  One theory of networks is Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT). 
In Latour’s theory, both human and non-human entities are included in analysis 
thereby ‘accounting for the very essence of societies and natures.’48  Latour explains the 
power of the network nicely: ‘[s]trength does not come from concentration, purity and 
unity, but from dissemination, heterogeneity and the careful plaiting of weak ties.’49 
The strength formed in networked connections between actors is not defined by 
geography, but by association.50  This is exemplified in transnational networks of global 
civil society, where actors (individuals and organisations) are associated by common 
goals and value orientations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 3rd edition, 2010) 1193.   
45 Rachel Parker, ‘Networked Governance or Just Networks? Local Governance of the Knowledge 
Economy in Limerick (Ireland) and Karlskrona (Sweden)’ (2007) 55(1) Political Studies 113, 118.  
46 Ibid 116. 
47 John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 23.  
48 Bruno Latour, ‘On Actor-Network Theory: A Few Clarifications’ (1996) 47 Soziale Welt 369, 369.  
49 Ibid 370. 
50 Ibid 371. 
Introduction 
11 
Network theory and nodal governance offer diagnostic models for analysing the 
connections between different actors and entities. Braithwaite and Drahos’ model of 
‘webs of influence’ identifies axes of actors, mechanisms and principles to distil and 
examine different relationships.51  In their work on nodal governance, Burris, Drahos 
and Shearing propose a model for understanding concentrations of power within 
networks in what they refer to as ‘nodes.’52  They note that networks of actors intersect 
and that those intersections or nodes are sites of governance where actors and networks 
can exercise regulatory power.53  Both modes of inquiry, webs of influence and nodal 
governance, recognise the plurality of actors in global governance. The case studies in 
this thesis engage these approaches to disaggregate the State enterprise of protection of 
citizens abroad and to identify how actors are connected, the techniques they use and 
the factors that contribute to their success and participation.  
An advantage of network theory is that it penetrates the inherently ‘macro’ doctrinal 
narrative of international law. The macro doctrinal narrative focuses on State 
responsibility and the rules that govern when States can intervene on behalf of their 
citizens abroad. Moreover, traditional international legal scholarship focuses on formal 
legal connections. The network theory narrative, by contrast, involves an analysis of 
smaller or more specific actors and their contribution to challenging or building 
practice of international law and the protection of citizens in specific instances or 
regions. The actors, processes and values that contribute to the protection of citizens 
abroad become visible through a network lens. 
Based in the discipline of international relations, practice theory similarly examines the 
actions and practices of diplomatic actors.54  Adler and Pouliot argue that a view of 
international relations and world politics through the lens of the practices or 
‘competent performances’ enables a better account of the global system.55  They provide 
definitional parameters for understanding practices through a hierarchy of behaviour, 
action and practice:   
The distinction between behavior and action is the easiest to grasp: action is 
behavior imbued with meaning. Running in the streets aimlessly is mere behavior, 
running after a thief is an action endowed with meaning. Practices, however, are 
patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts and, as such, 
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53 Ibid 39. 
54 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, ‘International Practices’ (2011) 3 International Theory 1. 
55 Ibid 2. 
Chapter 1 
12 
are articulated into specific types of action and are socially developed through 
learning and training… [references omitted].56  
Adler and Pouliot favour an empirical approach to the study of practices, emphasising 
context and language for diagnosing the different levels of behaviour, action and 
practice.57  This thesis examines international and domestic practices of a range of State 
and non-State actors and identifies patterns in protective actions. Together with 
network theory and nodal governance, this methodological orientation of examining 
micro-processes informs the analysis in this thesis on how the behaviour of actors 
contributes to changing practice of the protection of citizens abroad.  
Events, concepts, people 
International legal history is an evolving methodology in international law with 
scholars applying it in different ways.58  Fassbender and Peters note that there are two 
dominant strains of legal history in international law: doctrinal history, which they 
describe as ‘the teachings of important theorists of international law, their development, 
and interaction,’ and diplomatic history (an area they relate to military history) which 
concentrates on States and treaty-making.59  However, Fassbender and Peters criticise 
these dominant approaches, particularly for the manner in which they consider law as a 
‘variable of political and military events.’ 60   Moreover, doctrinal and diplomatic 
histories replicate the classical approach to the protection of citizens abroad, whereby 
scholars treat ‘history’ as the history of rules rather than practice. A more critical 
account of international law’s development and the role of law has emerged in recent 
scholarship. These approaches lend themselves to a new analysis of protection in 
international law.  
Writing on the emergence of history and historiography in international law, Hueck 
recognises that ‘[i]deas in international law are not created in vacuums, but as a result 
of the interaction of various protagonists within the academic, diplomatic, political and 
economic fields’.61  Examples of this approach include Peevers’ analysis of the role of 
law in justifying the use of force or Pearson’s ‘negotiation tracing’ analysis of the civil 
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59 Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, ‘Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Law’ in 
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(Oxford University Press, 2014) 1, 12. 
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society in the Rome Statute negotiations.62  These inquiries report on and analyse a 
negotiation process or series of decisions, providing an account of specific actors and 
the dynamics leading to the outcomes. This kind of international legal history widens 
the scope of activity to be captured and rejects the State as the central unit of analysis.63 
From a methodological perspective, some scholars writing in this area have framed 
inquiries on the history of international law through the prisms of events, concepts and 
people.64  
This study considers the categories of events, concepts and people in past instances of 
protection in order to examine how past instances of protection occurred and who 
participated. Each of the case study chapters provides a narrative of the protection 
‘event’ in the form of the process of decision-making, the narrative of individual 
participation and motivation, and protagonists’ contributions to the development of a 
concept or course of action. In line with newer approaches to international legal history, 
the chapters detail networks, their modes and the nature of their connections. The case 
studies focus on processes or ‘transformation’ rather than the outcomes of legal cases.65 
While this thesis is not formally international legal history, it engages in the method 
and concern of this field for micro-processes and the role of individuals in international 
legal events and concepts.  
 
Micro international law 
The study of international law, with a focus on actors, motivations, power and practice, 
is what I refer to as a ‘micro’ international law approach or methodology.  
A micro international law approach is informed by and, in some ways, is a reaction to 
the idea of macro international law. Macro international law focuses on the behaviours 
of States and international institutions, actors that I will refer to as ‘macro actors.’ 
Many accounts of international law examine macro actors and the rules that govern 
them. However, each of the approaches discussed above are interested in the 
subcutaneous level of international law and global governance: they aim to discover 
what lies under the surface of traditional accounts of international law and politics.   
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With a focus on a wider range of actors, micro international law examines the 
behaviour of the individuals, State sub-units and non-State actors not usually 
accounted for in classical narratives of international law. Apart from a more plural 
approach to actors, micro international law also interrogates the processes that 
contribute to international law and the way in which they shape power distribution in 
the global legal order. An inquiry of this kind is concerned with how the practices, 
motivations, affiliations and values of actors produce and constitute international law.  
Some of the questions this approach may ask include, who are the actors and what are 
their goals? What techniques do they use to pursue their goals? How do actors 
contribute to the development of rules and process? What values do actors attempt to 
embed or challenge in the international system? What networks are these actors a part 
of and what role do their networks play? How is international law invoked or curbed by 
micro actors and how does this affect macro international law? The answers to these 
questions can help to reveal where power resides in international law, as well as inform 
solutions, normative agendas, and ultimately shape the mechanisms used to address 
problems of the global order. 
This thesis then provides a micro international legal account of the protection of 
citizens abroad. Its primary concern, participation, cannot be addressed through 
traditional macro international law methodologies, such as doctrinal legal analysis or 
lawmaking. Instead, I aim to interrogate the nature of participation in the protection of 
citizens abroad through understanding the processes and practices of actors, the 
techniques they employ and their motivations.  
Participation functions as a diagnostic probe for investigating protection. Yet, while this 
thesis examines the nature of participation in relation to the protection of citizens 
abroad, questions emerge about the nature of participation in international law more 
broadly. Debates about who has the right to participate in international law as a subject 
as well as more recent scholarship on how international law can better account for the 
involvement of non-State actors emerge. While existing approaches to participation 
have attempted to accommodate non-State actor participation, this scholarship is 
focused on lawmaking and liability. The case studies in this thesis, however, reveal 
different models of participation, especially through networks. I consider how different 
actors contribute not only to lawmaking and liability, but also to the fulfilment of rights 





This thesis uses several methods including semi-structured open-ended interviews, 
roundtable interviews, documentary analysis, participant observation and doctrinal 
analysis.  
I present a comparative analysis of three national case studies of the protection of 
citizens abroad: Germany, Mexico and Australia. Germany and Mexico each brought 
cases in relation to the treatment of their citizens by the United States before the ICJ. 
Australia considered ICJ litigation as an avenue of protection, but did not institute 
proceedings. 
While I have noted the over-emphasis of the discipline of international law on case law, 
two of the three case studies relate to litigated examples of protection in the ICJ. I 
selected this approach for two reasons. The first reason relates to the use of litigation as 
a last resort for States in dispute resolution. I proceeded on the assumption that States 
and other actors would use other peaceful means, like negotiations, consular and 
diplomatic representations, to resolve their disputes prior to the commencement of 
legal proceedings.66  The two litigated cases provide a rich source of data about the suite 
of non-ICJ measures and the preferences of actors to use those mechanisms. The 
second reason relates to the ‘publicness’ of the cases in the ICJ. I was able to rely on 
publicly available information provided by the parties in the ICJ cases as a foundation 
for making further inquiries into the actors, their motivations and strategies, as well as 
to trace the processes leading to litigation. Moreover, the contentious nature of the 
cases had subsided allowing participants to speak more candidly about their experience 
and views in the interviews.  
Another reason for the selection of Germany, Mexico and Australia was my aim to 
capture a cross-section of global practice. The cases provide examples of State practice 
from the global north and south, as well as civil and common law traditions. There are 
other States, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, which have protection programmes 
related to the rights of migrant workers that could have been considered.67  However, I 
chose cases concerning similar violations for reasons of comparison and limited it to 
three cases in order to make the project achievable as a PhD thesis. 
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67 See for example, Mary Lou L Alcid, ‘NGO-Labor Union Cooperation in the Promotion of the Rights 




Each case study chapter addresses two aspects of the protection of citizens abroad. The 
first aspect considers a historical case and the second explores the domestic settings for 
the protection of citizens abroad in each of those States. The emphasis in the historical 
cases is on pre-litigation measures, not the legal outcomes of the cases. However, I have 
provided brief summaries of the judicial decisions where applicable.  Examination of 
the domestic settings varies in each chapter. For example, more attention is given to 
Mexico’s novel approach given that literature on the Mexican system in English is 
limited. The sections addressing domestic national systems are not intended to provide 
exhaustive descriptions, but rather, provide a context for the historical cases and a 
basis for understanding contemporary practices of protection. Overall, each chapter has 
a different emphasis: the Germany chapter focuses on pre-litigation action, the Mexico 
chapter examines various programmes and policy settings for the protection of 
Mexicans in the United States, and the Australian chapter explores the tensions 
between consular assistance and protection.  
I conducted interviews with approximately 50 participants in the form of semi-
structured open-ended interviews and roundtable discussions. These interviews and 
roundtables occurred in 2013-2014 in Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, United 
States, Mexico and Australia. I interviewed government officials, civil society 
actors/organisations, legal practitioners from the ICJ cases, the second Special 
Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, and academics to understand how the protection 
of citizens abroad was achieved in each case. I also spoke with consulate officials from 
Mexico and Germany and former consular officials from Australia. I interviewed the 
Director of the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program and a senior lawyer from the 
project. I chose to interview persons who were directly involved in the cases, as well as 
those who work on policy and legal issues. I tried to speak directly to lawyers involved 
in the preparation of submissions for the ICJ cases. I interviewed at least one 
government lawyer and one non-government lawyer (i.e. external counsel retained by 
States) from each case. Some States were prepared to provide more information than 
others, as was the case with government departments. I held two government 
roundtables, one with officials from Mexico’s Directorate of Protection and another 
with Consular and Crisis Management Division from the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. As an officer with the Australian government I had access to 
government officials working on protection issues from both the legal and consular 
perspectives in Australia. I was permitted to undertake consular training provided by 
the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. This training comprehensively 
addressed the role of consular officials and the welfare basis of the Australian 
protection system, including a visit to a maximum-security prison facility and a morgue. 
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In light of my affiliation, I interviewed a number of non-government practitioners and 
academics for their perspectives on the work and performance of the Australian 
government, as well as the other States examined, in order to provide a balanced 
analysis. This included interviews with Amnesty International’s International 
Secretariat, Reprieve UK and Australians Detained Abroad. While many of the 
participants were happy to be identified in the thesis, in most instances I have not 
included this information in order to avoid third person identification.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
This study is organised in three parts. Part I (chapters one, two and three) addresses 
historical and theoretical aspects of the protection of citizens abroad and methods for 
studying the practices of international law. Chapter two provides an introduction to the 
origin and development of the legal concept of diplomatic protection in international 
law. The chapter reviews the literature on diplomatic protection, including the legal 
conditions of its application and case law of the ICJ.  It examines the contributions of 
doctrinal and State-centric studies to the narrative of protection. Chapter three 
addresses the relationship between structures of international law and methods for 
examining participation in the global order. It explores how international legal scholars 
have accounted for the involvement of non-State actors in lawmaking and 
accountability, while preserving traditional ideas of sovereignty. This chapter considers 
how network theory can be applied to the protection of citizens abroad and its 
participants.  
Part II (chapters four, five and six) investigates three case studies of protection. 
Chapter four traces the narrative of LaGrand (Germany v United States), a case 
brought before the ICJ in 2001.68  Germany commenced proceedings on behalf of two 
German nationals facing the death penalty in Arizona. Germany based its case against 
the United States on a breach of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as well 
as a claim for diplomatic protection in customary international law.69  This chapter 
focuses on pre-litigation protection and the factors that contributed to the initiation of 
proceedings.  
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Chapter five considers the commencement of another ICJ case, Avena (Mexico v 
United States), based on the same VCCR breach as LaGrand.70  This chapter also 
details Mexico’s programmes for the protection of Mexican citizens in the United States. 
Several programmes embedded in the domestic system of the United States expose the 
changing form of protection as a phenomenon with both global and local expression.  
Chapter six analyses the case of Van Nguyen, a matter that the Australian government 
contemplated taking to the ICJ. Unlike the other two cases this thesis examines, Van 
Nguyen provides an example of when networks of State and non-State actors take 
action separately, but do not merge. The Australian case study exemplifies a protective 
system directed towards non-legal means of protection.  
Part III draws together the practice in the previous chapters and considers its 
significance for international law. Chapter seven analyses modes of engagement in the 
protection of citizens abroad, particularly through networks, and their relationship to 
sovereignty. This chapter revisits scholarship on sovereignty, either as the exclusive 
domain of the State or as a waning aspect of the world order. It explores how polarised 
views of sovereignty detract from understanding the way that complex global and 
transnational issues are dealt with through evolving governance arrangements between 
various actors, institutions and organisations. While some scholarship has taken into 
account the participation of a wider range of actors, it has done so through preserving a 
traditional conception of sovereignty in international law. I argue that in order to better 
account for participation in the international order, a more complex view of sovereignty 
is needed. The protection of citizens abroad is best understood through the concept of 
distributive sovereignty, whereby States distribute and delegate their traditionally 
exclusive protective function across a network of State and non-State actors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





Diplomatic Protection in International Law 
	  
The legal framework that governs diplomatic protection in international law has been 
the primary lens for understanding participation in the protection of citizens abroad. 
From the first expression of the concept by Vattel to work by the Special Rapporteur on 
Diplomatic Protection in 2006, legal scholars construct diplomatic protection as an 
exclusively State enterprise. Studies on protection focus on doctrine developed by 
international courts and tribunals in resolving disputes between States. A broader 
understanding of participation in protection cannot be achieved without addressing the 
development of the legal concept of diplomatic protection and its origin as an inter-
State action in international law. The aim of this chapter is to review the legal 
framework and debates on diplomatic protection to understand how scholars perceive 
participation in protection. Section one considers the history and development of 
diplomatic protection in international law. Section two outlines the current legal 
framework governing diplomatic protection and the application of consular functions 
to the protection of citizens abroad. Section three analyses recent normative debates 
about diplomatic protection, international human rights law and the position of the 
individual in international law.  
 
I. Development of Diplomatic Protection in International Law 
The historical practice of diplomatic protection is rife with controversy. In the 20th 
century, some States perceived diplomatic protection as a political manoeuvre cloaked 
in the language of law, while others touted its practice as the application of an 
international minimum standard.1  Scholars have similarly been divided in capturing 
the essence of diplomatic protection. Earlier scholarship envisages it as an action 
enlivening the interests of States embodied in their citizens, while the more recent 
trend is to conceive of diplomatic protection as an action for the benefit of securing the 
rights of individuals who lack standing in the international order. Needless to say, 
States have been at the heart of the debate.  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




The practice of diplomatic protection emerged from citizens representing the interests 
of the crown in their dealings abroad.2  Diplomatic practice by States in the 18th century 
consisted of reprisals for the torts committed on the subjects of a king abroad, usually 
merchants. Sovereigns intervened on behalf of merchants whose goods were 
appropriated without compensation while in the territory of a foreign State. Diplomatic 
protection functioned as a mechanism to secure a crown’s interests by pursuing rights 
embodied in the activities of travelling citizens.3  
The development of diplomatic protection came with the growth of sovereignty and the 
transition towards a society of States.4  Diplomatic protection, or the international 
minimum standard, was used as a tool by stronger States against weaker States to gain 
regional economic power through the interests vested in their citizens.5  It is also 
relevant that the concept of diplomatic protection developed to include protection of 
both legal and natural persons.6 States could exercise their discretion to intervene on 
behalf of corporations vested with commercial and economic interests.7  Amerasinghe 
notes that:  
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries diplomatic protection was seen as a 
weapon wielded by wealthy nations against the poorer or less developed nations, 
particularly those in the western hemisphere. …diplomatic protection came to be 
associated more generally with a tussle between developed and less developed 
States connected particularly with foreign investment by nationals of developed 
States.8 
The relationship between the United States and some Latin American States provides 
an example of how diplomatic protection was used in this manner. The United States 
invoked diplomatic protection on behalf of United States’ corporations, typically 
mining companies operating in Latin American States, such as Mexico. For a range of 
reasons, Mexico appropriated assets, including land, belonging to companies from the 
United States.9 This prompted intervention by the United States government on behalf 
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3 Kolb, above n 2, 333. 
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of its corporations left without compensation for the forcible acquisitions.10  Mexico 
argued that this policy did not constitute a breach of international law on the basis that 
corporations from the United States were treated on the basis of equality in accordance 
with Mexico’s national standard. 
As a reaction to foreign intervention, Latin American States introduced clauses in 
commercial contracts that limited the rights of foreign corporations to national 
treatment only. These clauses, referred to as ‘Calvo clauses’ or the ‘Calvo doctrine,’ were 
considered to override whatever international standard was being asserted.11  The Calvo 
doctrine was an attempt by Latin American States to limit the rights of aliens to 
national treatment through contractual obligation. In effect, countries like Mexico used 
commercial contracts to force Western companies to waive their rights to bring a claim 
against the host State. 12   The Calvo Clause preserved national treatment as the 
appropriate standard and thereby enabled some States to refute the existence of an 
international minimum standard. This early practice of diplomatic protection created a 
negative perception of the institution. John Dugard reflects that particularly 
Westerners: 
… turned to their national States for protection which sometimes took the form of 
arbitration and sometimes the use of force. Inevitably, the bullying approach 
adopted by the Western Powers to Latin American States in protecting their 
nationals’ interests gave diplomatic protection a bad reputation among developing 
nations.13  
While developing States viewed diplomatic protection as a mechanism of regional and 
domestic economic intervention, the United States claimed it preserved an 
international standard of behaviour.14  Edwin Borchard, a government lawyer from the 
United States, argued that there was an international minimum standard on the 
treatment of aliens to which all countries were obliged to extend to aliens in their 
territory.15  Borchard rejected the Calvo doctrine, claiming that the law of nations 
imposed common standards upon States. He explained: 
The body of international law developed by diplomatic practice and arbitral 
decision, indefinite as it may be, represents the minimum which each state must 
accord the alien whom it admits. Whether called the fundamental, natural, or 
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inherent rights of humanity or of man or of the alien, this minimum has acquired a 
permanent place in the protective ambit of international forums.16 
Borchard argued that the appropriate source of rights was international law, not a 
domestic standard. He rejected Mexico’s claim of national treatment, ultimately 
claiming that ‘[t]he doctrine of equality as the final test of international obligations is 
thus in effect a repudiation of the many decisions of international tribunals which 
establish such obligations as a rule of international law.’ 17  The Latin American 
perspective, however, was that the international minimum standard was a United 
States/European construction designed to enable the United States to gain economic 
power in different regions of the developing world by interfering with the sovereignty of 
other States.  
These historical events are a precursor to what has since evolved into aspects of 
international human rights law and international investment law. International 
investment law has become a lex specialis, influenced by the early practice of 
diplomatic protection.18  These bodies of law have acquired acceptance in the broader 
international legal regime reflected by the panoply of rules and scholarship on those 
subjects.19  
However, despite the antecedents of diplomatic protection as a contested political 
phenomenon, most scholars have focused their attention on the legal conditions of its 
application. The historical context for the development of diplomatic protection 
reinforces that the driving forces of protection and the actors involved are integral to 
understanding when, why, where and how diplomatic protection is invoked in favour of 
a citizen.  
 
Early scholarship 
The first statement of the principle of diplomatic protection, traced to Swiss jurist Emer 
de Vattel in 1758, provided little in the way of rules:  
… Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to protect 
this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter should avenge his wrongs, punish the 
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aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full reparation; since otherwise the 
citizen would not obtain the great end of the civil association, which is safety.20 
Vattel’s statement did not prescribe the circumstances in which a nationality State may 
intervene or the modalities of how a State may protect its citizen. His statement 
established that there is a bond between the citizen and State and that the State’s 
interest may be affected. In his construction of protection in international law, Vattel 
recognised the ability of the State to be indirectly injured by a wrong against its citizen. 
At the time of his writing, the individual did not have standing against foreign States in 
international law and would therefore rely on her State of nationality to bring an action 
pursuing a remedy on her behalf. This transformation of direct individual injury into 
indirect State injury is now referred to as the ‘Vattelian fiction.’  
Edwin Borchard’s monograph The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the 
Law of International Claims clarified the parameters of diplomatic protection by 
outlining rules for its operation and practice in 1915.21  His work unified scholarly 
writing and concepts of the rights of aliens, the international minimum standard and 
the law of international claims. Borchard definitively narrowed the legal scope of 
diplomatic protection as a right of States and did not engage with normative aspects of 
the protective function or the question of whether diplomatic protection possessed any 
obligatory character. While the question to whom the right of diplomatic protection 
belongs is debated even today, Borchard’s classic conception of the principle still stands: 
While tacitly undertaking to abide by local law, a rule supported by principle, 
international practice has given aliens a reserved power, after the vain exhaustion 
of local remedies, to call upon the diplomatic protection of their own government, 
if their rights, as measured not necessarily by the local, but by the international, 
standard have been violated. The citizen abroad has no legal right to require the 
diplomatic protection of his government. Resort to this remedy of diplomatic 
protection is solely a right of the government, the justification and expediency of its 
employment being a matter for the government’s unrestricted discretion.22 
Borchard’s position received approval from the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case in 1924:  
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect 
its subjects when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by 
another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the 
ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to 
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in 
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22 Ibid vi.  
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reality asserting its own right - its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, 
respect for the rules of international law.23 
While there are still arguments in favour of creating a limited obligation in 
international law on States to intervene on behalf of their citizens in certain cases of 
grave violations, the character of diplomatic protection as a right of States remains the 
generally accepted position.24 
The methodological influence of Borchard’s work is significant. Borchard’s 
conceptualisation of diplomatic protection has influenced major scholarship in the area, 
including the approach of relying on case law and arbitral decisions. His work 
identified the practice of the United States and awards of arbitral tribunals as the 
principal sources for his analysis.25  While Borchard discussed examples of protection 
and regional circumstances for its exercise in the context of his time, subsequent 
scholarship focuses on the doctrines he discerned. Part of the canon of writing on 
diplomatic protection, Borchard’s work establishes and reinforces the position of States 
as the exclusive proponents and motivators of protection.  
Coupled with Borchard’s preference for case law, the manner in which he structured his 
study on diplomatic protection around legal relationships has shaped conceptions of 
participation in this area. He examined the three relationships involved in protection: 
the citizen and his/her national State, the alien and the host State, and relations 
between States. This tripartite structure reflects a classical understanding of the 
structure of public international law as a system of rules regulating the relationships of 
States. Yet Borchard’s enumeration of only three relationships limits an analysis of 
diplomatic protection to only two actors: the individual and the State. Even in the 
absence of modern non-State actors like civil society organisations, other actors 
including the Church, corporations and private associations are likely to have 
influenced States in the protection of citizens abroad at the time of Borchard’s writing. 
Of course, Borchard’s aim was not to study protection as a phenomenon, but to 
elaborate a set of rules around its practice.  
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In 1932, Frederick Dunn wrote a monograph on diplomatic protection which differed to 
the doctrinal approach of scholarship on diplomatic protection. Dunn rejected the 
narrowness of previous legal studies. He claimed that by confining their attention 
exclusively to doctrine scholars ‘were obtaining a very incomplete and often inaccurate 
picture of the process by which decisions were actually reached on questions of 
diplomatic protection’.26 Dunn focused on diplomatic protection as a partly legal, partly 
political action that embodied a ‘clash of interests’ and a process of decision-making.27 
He was concerned with the normative power of law and its regulatory influence in the 
decision-making around the protection of citizens abroad.28 In order to address these 
concerns, Dunn claimed that to improve our understanding of diplomatic protection, a 
different methodology was needed:  
The time comes … in all fields of knowledge when, as a result of changing 
conditions, an enlargement of experience, or an improvement in methods of 
inquiry, new ranges of phenomena appear which cannot be accounted for by any 
acceptable hypothesis drawn from the existing conceptual system or readily 
reconciled with any current doctrines.29 
 For Dunn, diplomatic protection is a ‘man-made institution designed for particular 
social ends’.30  His work adopted a much wider lens for examining the protection of 
citizens abroad, particularly by including actions in anticipation of a breach of 
international law, not just remedial actions in response to a wrongful act.31  Subsequent 
scholarship on the protection of citizen abroad has not embraced Dunn’s 
methodological approach, perhaps because he failed to provide a doctrinal contribution 
to the rules of diplomatic protection.  
Almost half a century later, Cuthbert Joseph defined diplomatic protection as an 
institution with doctrinal foundations.32  Following the form established by Borchard, 
Joseph’s definition reinforced the legal character of diplomatic protection by 
positioning it within the overarching framework of State responsibility:  
diplomatic protection can be defined as a procedure for giving effect to State 
responsibility involving breaches of international law arising out of legal injuries to 
the person or property of a State.33  
Joseph examined conditions surrounding the exhaustion of local remedies and 
nationality, thereby consolidating the scholarly trend of rule elaboration. In 
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acknowledging Borchard’s scholarly design of ‘dual classification of persons coming 
within the jurisdiction of a State as nationals and aliens’ Cuthbert’s work provides one 
example of the dominant approach in the study of protection.34  
In his analysis, Joseph explored various aspects of the changing practices between 
members of the Commonwealth, including an analysis of the conclusion of treaties35 
and municipal nationality laws and naturalisation practices.36 While Nationality and 
Diplomatic Protection did explore diplomatic protection, Joseph’s project was more 
concerned with the principle of nationality and its evolution within the Commonwealth 
after the Second World War.37   Notably, however, Joseph rejected Borchard’s postulate 
that the failure of a State to protect its citizens did not attract responsibility in 
international law, citing the European Convention on Human Rights as an example of 
how failure to protect citizens could attract State responsibility.38  While Joseph’s 
methodological approach followed judicially settled cases, he also relied upon treaty 
provisions and legislation to identify the practice and attitudes of States.  
The majority of legal scholars who address the protection of citizens abroad through the 
lens of diplomatic protection have employed similar methods of legal analysis discussed 
earlier. Chittharanjan Amerasinghe, who wrote three monographs on diplomatic 
protection, State responsibility and the exhaustion of local remedies, relied on cases as 
the dominant source of his studies.39  This is exemplified by his reference to article 38 
of the ICJ Statute.40  Even though he considers the practice of States, Amerasinghe 
emphasises judicial decisions for ‘creating or reflecting State practice giving rise to 
customary law and general principles of law, both of which are primary legal sources of 
equal force.’41  However, legal arguments made by States in court proceedings or 
written memorials do not provide a full picture of State practices and motivations.  
Moreover, avoiding examination of the full suite of actions in the protection of citizens 
abroad perpetuates an assumption in the literature that diplomatic protection is most 
frequently exercised and settled through judicial proceedings and that States are the 
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only actors that participate in the process. In fact, due to the sensitivity of diplomatic 
protection, States are more likely to resolve a matter through a negotiation or through 
diplomatic channels than through litigation: 
… the simplest means of settling disputes arising between States, and that to which 
they as a rule resort to before they make use of other means is negotiation. In a 
different sense it also has been noted that negotiation is far the most important of 
the means of settlement, and a great majority of the disputes are settled every day 
by negotiation, without publicity or even attracting the attention of the public.42 
Modern scholarship on the role of consular and diplomatic officials also suggests that 
citizens abroad are most frequently dealt with through ‘consular diplomacy, where 
modern consular services… go hand in hand with (quiet) diplomacy and international 
negotiation.’43  By failing to diversify sources of practice beyond the judgments of 
courts and arbitral tribunals, scholars overlook how diplomatic protection is practised 
and how it has evolved. The protection of citizens abroad, either through the formal 
avenue of diplomatic protection, or by other means, is a hybrid legal/political 
mechanism in a broader international and political order.  
 
Codification by the International Law Commission  
Codification of the customary rules of diplomatic protection formed part of the 
International Law Commission’s agenda from the early 1950s. From this period until 
1995, diplomatic protection was considered within the International Law Commission’s 
broader programme of study on State responsibility.44  The first Special Rapporteur on 
State Responsibility, Francisco García-Amador, considered the treatment of aliens 
within this programme of study.45  
When the second Special Rapporteur for State Responsibility, Roberto Ago, took over 
the study he drew a distinction between the violations of international law (primary 
rules) and the rules related to attribution of liability to States for international wrongs 
(secondary rules).46  Amerasinghe describes secondary rules as ‘rules relating to the 
capacity to espouse or institute claims and to the exhaustion of local remedies.’47  This 
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distinction between primary and secondary rules is the foundation for codification of 
both State responsibility and diplomatic protection by the International Law 
Commission. Both studies were completed based on an examination of the rules on the 
attribution of liability for internationally wrongful acts, rather than violations that 
would give rise to responsibility.  
In 1995 the International Law Commission decided that diplomatic protection would be 
considered as an independent programme of work for codification and progressive 
development.48 There were two Special Rapporteurs on diplomatic protection between 
1995 and 2006. Special Rapporteur Mohamed Bennouna completed two reports but 
did not complete the study due to his appointment as a judge to the International Court 
of Justice. John Dugard, the second Special Rapporteur on diplomatic protection, 
completed the programme of work and prepared a total of seven reports, including 
conclusion of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006.  
The International Law Commission’s Working Group on Diplomatic Protection 
excluded an examination of the nature of the diplomatic protection – either as a right of 
States or individuals – from the study.49  The Special Rapporteur’s reports were 
therefore limited in scope to the traditionally accepted customary international law 
concept of diplomatic protection as the right of States alone.50  The traditional view of 
diplomatic protection as a right of States was accepted by the Special Rapporteur. 
Furthermore, to confine the scope of the study, the Special Rapporteur explicitly 
proposed to the International Law Commission not to ‘seek to extend the scope of the 
draft articles beyond matters normally and traditionally viewed as belonging to the 
nationality of claims and the exhaustion of local remedies.’51  
However, the Special Rapporteur attempted to progressively develop some articles of 
diplomatic protection beyond obligations in customary international law, which were 
ultimately rejected by the International Law Commission.52  The Special Rapporteur 
introduced a limited obligation on States to provide protection in circumstances where 
a breach of a jus cogens norm occurred. Article 4 of the first incarnation of the Draft 
Articles provided that:  
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1. Unless the injured person is able to bring a claim for such injury before a 
competent international court or tribunal, the State of his/her nationality has a 
legal duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person upon 
request, if the injury results from a grave breach of a jus cogens norm attributable 
to another State. 
2. The State of nationality is relieved of this obligation if: 
(a) The exercise of diplomatic protection would seriously endanger the overriding 
interests of the State and/or its people; 
(b) Another State exercises diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person; 
(c) The injured person does not have the effective and dominant nationality of the 
State. 
3. States are obliged to provide in their municipal law for the enforcement of this 
right before a competent domestic court or other independent national authority.53 
The ILC, however, rejected the Special Rapporteur’s proposed progressive development. 
The ILC noted that there was scarce evidence of practice to support such a development 
of the law:  
States had constitutions indicating that the individual did have a right to 
diplomatic protection. Some constitutions contained wording to the effect that the 
State had to protect the legitimate rights of its nationals abroad or that the 
nationals of the State should enjoy protection while residing abroad. He did not, 
however, know whether those rights were enforceable under the municipal law of 
those countries or were simply intended to ensure that a national injured abroad 
had the right of access to the State’s consular officials.54  
The inclusion of draft Article 4 revived a debate on the rights of the individual in 
international law, to be discussed later in this chapter. Scholars have subsequently 
argued that diplomatic protection is a tool to supplement the system of individual 
rights developed in international human rights law under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and other treaties.55 
The International Law Commission’s methods  
The Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection relied upon a number of sources in 
the preparation of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. The reports examined 
evidence of State practice through national constitutions, legislation and domestic 
jurisprudence.56  States were asked to submit examples of their practice to the ILC for 
consideration as part of the study.57  Dugard notes that very few States submitted 
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information regarding their practice on diplomatic protection and some of those that 
did submit information confused the subject with diplomatic immunities.58  
Faced with this limitation, the programme of study on diplomatic protection could not 
address the way in which States and non-State actors contribute to protection or 
consider how other relationships (beyond Borchard’s tripartite structure) may 
influence its practice. The programme of study by the ILC reinforced doctrinal legal 
analysis in international law. This reflects the nature of the ILC as an institution whose 
task it is to identify rules and codify them.59  
	  
II. Legal Framework Governing Diplomatic Protection 
Diplomatic protection is a principle of customary international law. The rules 
governing its practice are contained in various treaties and State practice, with case law 
contributing to ongoing development of the principle. As discussed above, the ILC 
completed its programme of work codifying the rules of diplomatic protection in a non-
binding instrument, the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006).60  This section 
of the chapter will briefly review the rules of diplomatic protection and the instruments 
that regulate its practice. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive review of the 
doctrinal developments of diplomatic protection, which scholars and the ILC have 
already documented comprehensively.61 
 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the Articles on State 
Responsibility 
Two programmes completed by the ILC on diplomatic protection and State 
responsibility reflect the codified customary rules of diplomatic protection in 
international law. Three requirements of admissibility apply before a State can espouse 
or bring a claim on behalf of its citizen through diplomatic protection. The injury must 
be caused by the commission of an internationally wrongful act, the individual must 
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possess the nationality of the intervening State and the individual must have exhausted 
all local remedies.62  
The ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility (2001) define an ‘internationally wrongful 
act’ as an ‘act or omission which is attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of a 
State’s international obligation’.63  Given that States possess different rights and duties 
in accordance with their obligations in treaties and customary international law, the 
wrong alleged must go beyond the threshold of a municipal wrong and must be a 
breach of international law arising from a binding obligation on the State. An example 
that illuminates this distinction is the obligation on a detaining State to inform an alien 
or foreign national in its custody that he or she is entitled to contact their national 
consulate.64  This obligation is a treaty obligation owed between States under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and, therefore, failure to comply with this 
requirement is a breach of international law giving rise to responsibility or liability.  
Article 44 of the Articles on State Responsibility sets out general requirements of 
admissibility applicable to all invocations of liability between States, including 
diplomatic protection:  
The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if:  
(a) the claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating to the 
nationality of claims; 
(b) the claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and 
any available and effective local remedy has not been exhausted.65 
Articles 5(1) and 14 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection mimic those in the 
Articles on State Responsibility on nationality and exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
Article 5(1) states that:  
A State is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who was 
a national of that State continuously from the date of injury to the date of the 
official presentation of the claim. Continuity is presumed if that nationality existed 
at both these dates.66  
The second requirement of admissibility is that the individual who is the subject of the 
claim must possess the nationality of the intervening State. Nationality is a domestic 
matter for States to determine, however there are rules in relation to how the 
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nationality requirement must be satisfied in a claim of diplomatic protection. 67 
Amerasinghe has described the ‘usual form’ of the requirement as the continuous 
nationality rule, namely that the individual must possess nationality of the intervening 
State from the point of injury to the point of judicial determination of a matter.68  Both 
Amerasinghe69 and Dugard70 have relied on the Kren case to demonstrate the rule: 
It is a well settled principle of international law that to justify diplomatic espousal, 
a claim must be national in origin; that it must, in its inception, belong to those to 
whom the state owes protection and from whom it is owed allegiance (Borchard, 
The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, p. 666). Further, although the 
national character will attach to a claim belonging to a citizen of a state at its 
inception, the 
claim ordinarily must continue to be national at the time of its presentation, by the 
weight of authority (Borchard, supra, p. 666), and there is a general agreement that 
it have a continuity of nationality until it is filed (Feller, The Mexican Claims 
Commission, p. 96).71 
While the claim itself must be a national claim, the nature and quality of nationality 
required to meet this condition has been a topic of concern for legal scholars.72  The 
issue of nationality was brought before the ICJ in Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v 
Guatemala).73  The Court in Nottebohm defined nationality as ‘a legal bond having as 
its basis a social fact of attachment, an effective connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.’74  In this case 
the ICJ held that the individual must display a ‘genuine link’ of nationality.75  Debates 
have occurred as to whether or not the test in Nottebohm of ‘genuine link’ or ‘effective 
nationality’ ought to apply as general principles of international law.76  Some scholars 
have concluded that the rule in Nottebohm is not a general principle, but rather reflects 
the particular circumstances of the case.77  The ILC also limited the application of the 
Nottebohm judgment to its facts and did not recognise the requirement of a genuine 
link of nationality.78  For legal persons, the issue of nationality is determined by the 
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place of incorporation and registration rather than by the nationality of the 
shareholders.79 
Finally, the injured individual must exhaust all local remedies prior to his or her State 
of nationality espousing a claim. Article 14 of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection sets out the conditions of the rule and defines the remedies individuals must 
exhaust:  
(1) A State may not present an international claim in respect of an injury to a 
national or other person referred to in draft article 8 before the injured person has, 
subject to draft article 15, exhausted all local remedies.  
(2) ‘Local remedies’ means legal remedies which are open to the injured person 
before the judicial or administrative courts or bodies, whether ordinary or special, 
of the State alleged to be responsible for causing the injury.80  
Article 14, above, reflects the accepted position in international law discussed by the 
ICJ in the Interhandel case:  
The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings 
may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law; the rule 
has been generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its 
national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in 
violation of international law. Before resort may be had to an international court in 
such a situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation 
occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the 
framework of its own domestic legal system.81  
Dugard noted that this requirement presented the least controversy in the ILC’s 
codification process.82  Once the requirements of admissibility have been met, States 
may invoke or exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a citizen through a range of 
actions. Some of these protective measures include consular action, negotiation, 
mediation, judicial and arbitral proceedings, reprisals, severance of diplomatic 
relations and economic pressure.83 
In accordance with the rules of diplomatic protection, the categorisation of whether an 
action is deemed to be protection hinges on the exhaustion of domestic remedies. An 
action only becomes diplomatic protection once the injured individual exhausts all 
domestic remedies available in the foreign State. This approach creates a number of 
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problems. The first of these problems is that the characterisation of the same action 
before and after the exhaustion of domestic remedies would change by virtue of 
exhaustion occurring. For example, the actions of a consular officer making 
representations on behalf of a detained national before the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies would be classified as consular assistance. But does the classification of the 
same action change to diplomatic protection when it occurs after the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies?  
Some scholars have answered this question by distinguishing between preventative and 
remedial action. Annemarieke Vermeer-Künzli argues that consular assistance is 
preventative in nature, while diplomatic protection is remedial.84  Others have instead 
distinguished between different forms of consular assistance. Maaike Okano-Heijmans, 
for example, identifies that there are three forms of the consular function: documentary 
services, individual assistance, and crisis in foreign lands.85  Jan Wouters, Sanderijn 
Duquet and Katrien Meuwissen in turn draw a distinction between assistance and 
protection on the one hand, and administrative and legal functions on the other.86 
None of these classifications fully correspond with the practice of protection or the 
problem of exhaustion. Most scholars acknowledge a level of consular function that is 
administrative or facilitative in nature. However, there seem to be levels of protective 
action at the consular level that have not fully been taken into account within existing 
categories.  
 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations  
Some aspects of the protection of citizens abroad, such as consular assistance, are 
found in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.87  Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
refers to functions of diplomatic missions:  
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1. (b)  protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its 
nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; … 
2. Nothing in the present Convention shall be construed as preventing the 
performance of consular functions by a diplomatic mission.88 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations outlines several consular functions. 
Article 5 states:  
Consular functions consist in:  
(a) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its 
nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by 
international law; … 
(e) helping and assisting nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, of the 
sending State; … 
(g) safeguarding the interests of nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, 
of the sending States in cases of succession mortis causa in the territory of the 
receiving State, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State;  
(h) safeguarding, within the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State, the interests of minors and other persons lacking full capacity who 
are nationals of the sending State, particularly where any guardianship or 
trusteeship is required with respect to such persons.89 
The two Conventions reflect a historical divide in the nature and purpose of consular 
and diplomatic functions. Diplomatic functions include commencing or defending legal 
actions on behalf of the sending State. The consular function, however, is described as 
having no political or representational character.90  Wouters, Duquet and Meuwissen 
have pointed out that the networks of actors connected to each of these functions also 
differs. They argue that the exercise of diplomatic functions are traditionally 
coordinated with the central government of the sending State, whereas consular 
functions are performed through contact with local actors, such as police and prisons.91  
In the protection of citizens abroad this differentiation between consular and 
diplomatic functions is not always reflected in practice. Luke Lee and John Quigley 
argue that separating the consular and diplomatic functions can at times be 
‘impractical’.92  In a similar vein Wouters, Duquet and Meuwissen observe that the lack 
of specificity in the VCCR and VCDR lends itself to agents performing consular and 
diplomatic functions interchangeably.93  Coupled with these observations, the nature of 
the protection of citizens abroad presents a number of challenges to the traditional 
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model of consular and diplomatic functions envisaged by the Conventions. For example, 
individual cases may attract more media attention, putting pressure on States to face 
the changing expectations of their public to provide increased responses, including 
consular, diplomatic and political action. The combination of politicised consular 
services and a shift from the representation of specific interests to the representation of 
the general public’s welfare abroad has meant that consular cases may receive 
diplomatic attention depending on the circumstances.94  Some scholars argue that the 
protection of citizens abroad has catalysed a new form of service called ‘consular 
diplomacy’ whereby issues faced by citizens abroad straddle consular and diplomatic 
functions.95  
One area of protection that blurs the division between consular and diplomatic action 
further is the detention of nationals. Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations has been the subject of litigation in the International Court of 
Justice on several occasions (discussed further in chapters four and five). It states that:  
(b) [I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular 
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody 
pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to 
the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be 
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform 
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph… .96 
This provision of the VCCR creates a number of interrelated rights for individuals and 
States. In cases when foreign nationals are detained in custody, the individual is 
entitled to be informed of his or her right to consular assistance and to communicate 
with his or her consulate, and the host State is obliged to notify the State of nationality 
of the detention should this be requested by the individual.97  
Apart from the guidance provided in article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, the manner and content of protection of nationals is not prescribed. The 
interests at stake, situation of the individual, bilateral relationship, resources of the 
State of nationality and the political pressure on the State to intervene are factors that 
influence the shape of an intervention. Taking into account these factors, the treaty 
provisions above were drafted in a manner to allow States to perform the protective 
function, in its consular, diplomatic or hybrid form, in a variety of ways. For example, a 
telephone call or visits to a detained national are forms of consular assistance. Lee and 
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Quigley note that consular assistance can range from attending to the welfare of 
detained nationals, the provision of a list of local lawyers, or even a fully funded 
defence in the case of those facing the death penalty.98  
States can exercise their discretion as to which approach to use in each case. However, 
the content of protection in the consular and diplomatic forms, while nebulous, are 
subject to greater public scrutiny and increasing human rights discourse. Some States 
such as Germany have constitutional and legislative provisions that enshrine the right 
to consular assistance for their nationals abroad.99  There are other States that have 
faced pressure to follow Germany’s model through creating a right, or at least a 
legitimate expectation of consular assistance for nationals abroad that could be tested 
in a court in the citizen’s State of nationality.100 
The question of the existence and extent of an obligation to assist or protect a national 
has come before domestic courts. The detention of foreign nationals, particularly by the 
United States in Guantánamo Bay, prompted a number of cases in which individuals 
asserted that they were entitled to protection by their State of nationality.101  In the case 
of Abassi, a British national detained at Guantánamo Bay claimed that the United 
Kingdom was obliged to ‘respond positively’ to his request for assistance.102  The 
England and Wales Court of Appeal held that there was no obligation on the 
government of the United Kingdom to make specific representations on behalf of the 
detained individual, but that there was a legitimate expectation that the government 
would consider the request.103  This view seems to resonate with scholars who argue 
there is a duty, albeit a general one, in which State discretion determines the content of 
assistance and individuals cannot demand or request specific action.104 
The relationship between protection and the consular function of States is in constant 
flux. This is exemplified by the changes in participation in the consular function. States 
are enlisting the assistance of other actors to help with the growing political pressure. 
For example, Mexico established a network of lawyers in the United States, and the 
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United Kingdom seeks advice from a committee of external lawyers who assist the local 
counsel of detained nationals.105  Maaike Okano-Heijmans identifies this development 
through three broader trends in consular affairs: network diplomacy (more actors), 
consular diplomacy (where consular and diplomatic services for citizens are combined) 
and public diplomacy (increasing accountability to mass publics in national and 
international constituencies).106  However, there is little that addresses the role of law 
or its prevalence in regimes of protection or its relationship with diplomatic protection 
within this framework. Okano-Heijman’s analysis helps to disclose the pressures on 
States and the direction of consular services, but does not reveal how these 
developments are connected to the institution of diplomatic protection or the 
contemporary practice of protection generally.  
While there may be general agreement about administrative consular functions such as 
the provision of visas and minor assistance, the content of the protective function as 
embodied by consular and diplomatic action, may be contested. For example, 
Amerasinghe contends that actions by both consular and diplomatic officials prior to a 
violation do not constitute diplomatic protection.107  Similarly, ILC Special Rapporteur 
on Diplomatic Protection argued that actions taken prior to the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, usually consular assistance, are not diplomatic protection.108  These two 
positions represent the current views in legal scholarship on the protection of citizens 
abroad. While the settled position excludes certain actions from being classified as 
diplomatic protection, it is clear that there is a broader category of protective behaviour 
of which diplomatic protection is a subset. Dunn premised his work on a definition of 
diplomatic protection that encompassed: 
… all cases of official representation by one government on behalf of its citizens or 
their property interests within the jurisdiction of another, for the purpose, either of 
preventing some threatened injury in violation of international law, or of obtaining 
redress for such injuries after they have been sustained.109  
This wider view of what constitutes action for the purpose of protection is better 
aligned with the complexities and challenges of consular and diplomatic functions 
today. Moreover, taking Dunn’s wider definition as a baseline, it is possible for legal 
scholars to capture a wider suite of activity in the protection of citizens abroad.  
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Other instruments 
Bilateral treaties or memorandums of understanding may also govern consular and 
diplomatic relations between States. In practice, such agreements and arrangements 
supplement provisions in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Treaties and 
other legally binding agreements may contain international obligations which, when 
breached, may constitute an internationally wrongful act giving rise to the right to 
invoke diplomatic protection. For example, the United States has over fifty bilateral 
conventions and less than treaty-status documents regulating consular relations and 
providing additional details on the treatment of United States’ nationals abroad.110  One 
such treaty between the United States and Hong Kong stipulates a number of 
additional time requirements for notification, timeframes for visitation, and the 
provision of legal representation, which are not specified in the VCCR.111  
In 1985, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution titled the Declaration of 
Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Countries in Which They 
Live.112  This resolution, while non-binding in nature, describes the State right in article 
36(1) of the VCCR of an individual’s right to make contact with her State of nationality’s 
consulate.  
These other instruments form part of the complex regulatory framework of diplomatic 
protection in international law. While some of them may be non-binding, they express 
regulatory force by shaping the practice and character of diplomatic protection. 
Bilateral treaties and instruments of less than treaty status can also guide and develop 
custom in the practice of diplomatic protection and consular relations at regional or 
bilateral levels.  
 
III. Diplomatic Protection and International Human Rights Law 
 The Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection: a human rights 
agenda 
Concern about the status of the individual in the international legal order has been 
closely linked to debates about diplomatic protection and State responses to human 
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rights violations.113  At the outset of the codification effort, the Special Rapporteur on 
Diplomatic Protection expressed doubt about the ability of individuals to achieve a 
remedy for wrongdoing by States in international law.114  The Special Rapporteur 
acknowledged the changing role of the individual in international law, marked by 
access to complaints mechanisms to enforce human rights.115  However, despite these 
changes in standing, the Special Rapporteur observed the tendency of some scholars to 
overstate this development.116  In the absence of enforceable remedial mechanisms, he 
sought to secure the place of diplomatic protection as a mechanism in international law 
for protecting individual human rights. The Special Rapporteur stated that: 
Although individuals today enjoy more international remedies for the protection of 
their rights than ever before, diplomatic protection remains an important weapon 
in the arsenal of human rights protection. As long as the State remains the 
dominant actor in international relations, the espousal of claims by States for the 
violation of the rights of their nationals remains the most effective remedy for the 
promotion of human rights.117 
The Special Rapporteur’s reports cast diplomatic protection as a necessary, albeit 
under-utilised, mechanism of human rights observance.118  In his first report to the ILC, 
the Special Rapporteur rejected claims that diplomatic protection had become obsolete 
or a relic of past practice and argued that it offers the ‘most effective remedy’ for the 
advancement of human rights.119  
The ILC programme of study and the Special Rapporteur’s characterisation of 
diplomatic protection as a human rights instrument triggered a revival of scholarship 
on protection. Many scholars, including Amerasinghe, Vermeer-Künzli, Craig Forcese, 
Natalie Klein and Lise Barry have followed Dugard’s lead.120  Dugard’s reports changed 
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discourse related to diplomatic protection by modernising the language as it relates to 
human rights. Instead of dealing with ‘international minimum standard’ and ‘law on 
aliens’ Dugard shifted the debate towards international human rights and status of the 
individual in international law.  
 
The individual in international law 
The capacity of the individual to seek and receive a remedy in international forums has 
changed over time. As discussed in chapter one, within the framework of international 
law as a system of ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ only States possess rights and duties within 
this dichotomy. Individuals fall within the category of ‘objects’ of international law, a 
situation in which they traditionally do not have standing in the international order. 
Rosalyn Higgins notes that scholars, particularly those from the positivist tradition, 
have received this construction with ‘uncritical acceptance.’121   However, the position of 
the individual in international law has enlarged. The individual now bears some limited 
rights and obligations in the international legal system.122   Robert Kolb notes that:  
The legal regime protecting the individual (or sanctioning him, which is but 
another aspect of a will to protect) has been considerably strengthened. Haphazard 
and punctual institutions of the past have been transformed in ever-growing and 
fully fledged regimes of protection.123  
The regimes of protection Kolb refers to are various individual complaints mechanisms 
under treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 
(‘ICCPR’).124  The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (‘First Optional Protocol’) 
creates a mechanism for individuals to make complaints against States Parties for 
breaches of the ICCPR.125  The treaty body responsible for the ICCPR, the Human 
Rights Committee, provides ‘views’ to the State party alleged to have committed the 
violation asking the State to provide the aggrieved individual with a remedy. 
Even though these mechanisms resemble a form of standing for individuals to bring 
actions against States for wrongdoing, their scope is limited and States have questioned 
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the binding nature of the Human Rights Committee’s views.126  Moreover, the Human 
Rights Committee is inundated with complaints, affecting the turnaround time in 
which views are issued and leaving individuals without a remedy for long periods. From 
a jurisdictional perspective, complaints may only be lodged against States that are 
parties to both the originating treaty (for example the ICCPR) and the protocol 
establishing the mechanism. Klein recognises the vulnerable position of individuals 
detained abroad, particularly the ‘limited means of their own to enforce their rights.’127 
Vermeer-Kunzli echoes this issue:  
Those who believe that individuals have complete and full agency under 
international law will reject the legal fiction in diplomatic protection (and say in 
fact that it never existed and that the Court in Mavrommatis was wrong), while 
those who consider the state as the primary actor in the international field and who 
reject to a large extent the individual as an entity with international legal 
personality will maintain the fiction as a desirable, and necessary, tool for the 
protection of individual rights.128 
This type of scholarly intervention, however, assumes that States do not protect their 
citizens abroad, or at the very least, do not consistently exercise diplomatic protection 
in favour of their citizens.  
Modern scholarship that addresses the intersection of protection and human rights of 
citizens abroad has been predominantly normative. Prompted by Dugard’s 
characterisation of diplomatic protection as instrumental to human rights, many 
protection scholars have engaged in debates about how infrequently States exercise 
diplomatic protection in favour of their citizens and how they ought to exercise it more 
often. For example, Klein and Barry analyse the situation of Australian citizen David 
Hicks, an Australian citizen detained at Guantánamo Bay. 129   Forcese similarly 
contemplates the situation of Canadian dual nationals.130  Ben Saul examines legal 
frameworks for the protection of journalists reporting on armed conflict.131  These 
scholars conceive of diplomatic protection as a mechanism that favours the individual 
in international law by creating an avenue for redress. This argument also places the 
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individual at the centre of protection and diplomatic protection within the broader 
international human rights system.132  
The normative stance of this scholarship provides an important vantage point for 
understanding the potential of diplomatic protection as an instrument for the benefit of 
individuals. It focuses on the emancipatory capacity of State action and the role of 
States in bringing actions of behalf of individuals who do not have standing in 
traditional international legal forums. The analysis of State interventions in this 
scholarship is largely based on legal cases and an analysis of the work of the Special 
Rapporteur. However, many of these scholars continue to advocate normatively 
through the rules of admissibility, rather than considering how States invoke their right 
to diplomatic protection, how other actors may assist States to protect their citizens and 
how the framework of diplomatic protection fits within this broader practice. These 
approaches to the protection of citizens abroad replicate methodological preferences 
for case law and infrequently consider non-legal avenues for protecting citizens abroad.  
	   	  
The human rights turn in the International Court of Justice 
A number of cases have been brought before the ICJ and its predecessor, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, relating to claims of diplomatic protection. 
Since 1998, the ICJ has heard four cases of diplomatic protection in relation to 
individual human right violations.133  Three of those cases, Breard, LaGrand and 
Avena, concerned the application of the VCCR. 
In all three cases the United States was alleged to have breached the dual requirement 
under the Vienna Convention to inform individuals of their right to contact their 
consulate and to provide consular notification to the States that their citizens were 
being held in the custody of the United States.134   The first of the cases, Breard, was an 
action commenced by Paraguay against the United States. Breard was a Paraguayan 
national who had not been informed of his right to contact the Paraguayan consulate 
after being arrested for rape and murder. He appealed his conviction within the United 
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States, but failed to succeed. The Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes (1963) establishes that should a dispute arise in relation to the 
interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention, the ICJ has jurisdiction to 
resolve it.135   Paraguay instituted proceedings in the ICJ on 3 April 1998 and applied 
for provisional measures to ensure that Mr Breard was not executed prior to the merits 
of the case being heard.136   The ICJ issued an order for provisional measures on 9 April 
1998, however, on 10 November 1998 Paraguay applied to the Court to discontinue the 
case, before the matter proceeded to the merits stage.137  
LaGrand and Avena also concerned a breach of article 36 of the VCCR. The United 
States detained nationals from Germany and Mexico for breaches of domestic criminal 
law, but failed to inform the foreign nationals of their right to contact their consulates 
and notify their national States of their custody.138   The individuals in each case were 
convicted and sentenced to death without the benefit of consular assistance, which 
could have been provided had the United States notified the foreign States of the 
detention of their nationals. In separate actions Germany and Mexico initiated 
proceedings in the ICJ against the United States. 
In these cases the Court gave a wider interpretation of the rights contained in the VCCR, 
which is considered to codify aspects of diplomatic protection. In LaGrand, the ICJ 
held that individuals had a right to consular assistance under the VCCR.139   This was a 
controversial ruling, particularly given that the VCCR is a treaty understood to create 
binding obligations between States, rather than creating rights for individuals. In 
Avena, the Court expanded on its interpretation of the requirement to inform and 
notify ‘without delay’ contained in article 36 of the VCCR. In both cases (discussed in 
further detail in chapters four and five), the United States argued that the claims of 
diplomatic protection were misplaced given that the disputes arose in relation to the 
VCCR, not the customary international principle of diplomatic protection. 
These three cases marked a shift in the way that States used their discretion to 
intervene on behalf of their citizens abroad. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, 
historically States instituted proceedings before the ICJ to protect economic interests, 
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yet these three cases each addressed human rights concerns, specifically the application 
of the death penalty. Even though all the cases related to a technical breach of the 
VCCR, some scholars understood these cases as human rights actions, using the 
mechanism of diplomatic protection as an avenue of redress. Enrico Milano describes 
this change in the nature of the cases brought before the ICJ as a ‘humanisation’ of 
diplomatic protection:  
The recent jurisprudence, in particular that on the VCCR, concerns instead injuries 
committed upon individual rights of other nature, which more most clearly 
resemble what we tend to conceive as human rights. The link between human right, 
individual rights and diplomatic protection has been rendered concrete mostly due 
to the creative litigating strategies of the applicant states, which have ‘dragged’ the 
Court into a new field, rather than a progressive attitude of the Court itself. 140 
While Milano and others consider the recent cases before the ICJ as part of a new turn 
in the practice of diplomatic protection towards human rights, this optimism may 
overstate reality. In both LaGrand and Avena the Court decided that questions of 
diplomatic protection did not require redress given that the primary issue of the VCCR 
breach was resolved. While the cases do mark a novel advance in the way that States 
protect their nationals, Milano overlooks the manner in which the creative litigation 
strategies were generated and who formulated them.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Legal scholars have understood diplomatic protection and the protection of citizens as 
the domain of States. The structure of international law as a system of States has 
contributed to the manner in which diplomatic protection has developed as an inter-
State action in international law. This chapter has argued that the protection of citizens 
abroad is more than a set of rules, and its practice is more complex than current 
literature suggests. Underpinned by State interest, the protection of citizens abroad has 
attracted a broader range of actors to its practice, each of whom may challenge or 
confirm the centrality of States in some way. Moreover, as consular and diplomatic 
functions merge, action taken in anticipation of a breach of international law and prior 
to the exhaustion of domestic remedies is increasing. In a globalised world where there 
are many actors in the international system, this narrow State-centric approach tells us 
little about how international rights and obligations are performed and resisted, or who 
participates, motivates and inhibits the protection of citizens abroad. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Milano, above n 113, 138.  
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Chapter 3  
Participation in the International Legal System  
	  
In the previous chapter I explored the traditional approach of studies on the protection 
of citizens abroad, which focus on State action and formal sources of law. Studies on the 
protection of citizens abroad have focused on the State as a single entity, without fully 
considering how different parts of the State may motivate or inhibit protection. 
International legal scholarship has also explored the participation of non-State actors 
in a range of areas, but has yet to consider how they participate in and influence the 
protection of citizens abroad. The aim of this chapter is to consider scholarship on 
participation in the international legal system and to outline a framework for 
investigating participation in the protection of citizens abroad in the following case 
studies. First, the chapter outlines approaches in international legal scholarship to the 
study of State, non-state actors and shared participation. The second section of the 
chapter considers how network theories shed light on the relationship between State 
and non-State actors.   
	  
I. International Law Perspectives on Participation 
Several scholars have contemplated how to account for the growing number of actors 
and their influence in the international legal system in the absence of a cohesive theory 
of legal personality in international law.1  Some focus their attention on the position of 
the individual in international law, the role of civil society organisations or 
international organisations, and the involvement of the corporation.2  An account that 
includes all these actors and supplements traditional legal subjectivity is Rosalyn 
Higgins’ theory of participation in international law.3  According to Higgins, how actors 
are actually involved in the processes and decisions of international law is the litmus 
test of participation, not their formal status. Her approach acknowledges that States are 
still central, but not the sole actors in the system.4  Similarly, James Crawford refers to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, eg, Janne Elisabeth Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the 
History and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser Press, 2004); Roland Portmann, Legal Personality 
in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
2 Samantha Besson, ‘The Authority of International Law: Lifting the State Veil’ (2009) 31(3) Sydney Law 
Review 343, 348. 
3 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 39-50. 
4 Ibid 39. 
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the theory of exclusive State participation in international law as a ‘myth’ that has been 
replaced with ‘… an open casting call, in which the legal order assigns roles for states, 
entities and individuals on the stage based largely on performance, and where status is 
only a prima facie criterion.’5  Robert McCorquodale maps an inclusive international 
legal system through the prism of the UN values and obligations.6  Despite agreement 
among these scholars that a wider lens for viewing participation is needed, the concept 
and conditions for participation in the global order remain unsettled.  
In debates about participation, many of the same questions emerge: what are the rights 
and responsibilities of various participants and how can they be established? Which 
behaviours (of which participants) will the development of international law be based 
upon? Or put another way, who has the capacity to make international law? Questions 
on legal subjectivity or personality levitate towards a reappraisal of the rules related to 
the bearing of rights and responsibilities. While these questions are critical to the 
practical operation of international law, they narrowly construe participation. These 
kinds of concerns tend to fall into a macro approach to international law focusing on 
formal rules and their development. This tension is exemplified by Crawford’s response 
to the minimisation of formal status. While Crawford agrees that States are no longer 
the only subjects, he contends that Higgins’ account only partially captures the 
challenge of participation in international law: 
if we say, with Rosalyn Higgins, that the question is not one of formal personality 
but of actual participation, we may seem to capture an element of the crowded 
international scene, but at the expense of another; for how far we can participate 
may well be affected by issues of status – whether one is eligible to chair the 
drafting committee, or entitled to sit in the delegates’ lounge, or none of the above. 
In practice, issues of status do not go away… .7  
This debate reveals a friction between the reality of plural participation and the 
conditionality of participation. Crawford ultimately returns to the rules to resolve the 
discomfort, by positing that statehood continues to be the benchmark for participation 
and that no credible alternative exists.8  This phenomenon of returning to the State to 
understand plural participation in international law reproduces the State-centricity 
that a broader account of participation is trying to achieve. Susan Marks observes that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 James Crawford, ‘Foreword’ in Roland Portmann, Legal Personality in International Law  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) xiv. 
6 Robert McCorquodale, ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 477. 
7 Crawford, ‘Foreword’, above n 5, xiii.  
8 James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law (The Hague Academy of 
International Law, 2014) 181. 
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arguments about State-centrism often reinforce the centrality of States as ‘the central 
problematic with respect to which analysis and policy must be formulated.’9  
Debates on the conditions of participation presuppose that other actors or participants 
will engage in international law in the same way as States. These concerns also assume 
that formal status is the only manner in which actors can influence the system or shape 
legal outcomes. A micro international law approach can function as a corrective to 
these assumptions by focusing on how actors overcome or capitalise on a lack of formal 
status to achieve their goals. However before turning to these issues, some specific 
approaches to participation of State and non-State actors in international law must be 
addressed.  
 
State participation in international law  
Each State engages with international law differently. Moreover, different parts of each 
State engage with international law differently. States, however, are considered 
indivisible entities in international law.10  A traditional view of the State as a monolithic 
entity has subsisted across a range of areas in international legal practice, including the 
protection of citizens abroad. Understanding the State as comprising many participants, 
each with their own agenda, values and modalities, can enable a richer account of the 
actors who generate and perform protection. This disaggregated approach can also 
enhance an analysis of nodes of power and generators of action. This section considers 
two models that recognise the State as being constituted by multiple actors and units in 
international law: transgovernmentalism and functionalism.11 
Functionalism in international law can be described in several ways.12   Some argue that 
as a theory it investigates ‘the interrelations among the elements making up the entire 
social system’.13  Others, such as Hans Morgenthau, posit that it is a theory or method 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Susan Marks, ‘State-Centrism, International Law and the Anxieties of Influence’ (2006) 19(2) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 339, 342. 
10 Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of 
American States, opened for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 
1934) art 2.  
11 Douglas M Johnston, ‘Functionalism in the Theory of International Law’ (1988) 26 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 3; Karen Knop, ‘Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in 
International Law’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 293; Christoph Schreuer, 
‘The Waning of the Sovereign State: Towards a New Paradigm for International Law?’ (1993) 4 
European Journal of International Law 447. 
12 Functionalism is not limited to international legal scholarship. Other disciplines including social 
science and political science use this concept. See, eg, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984) 85.  
13 Johnston, above n 11, 18.  
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for analysing the relationship between social forces and international law.14  Martti 
Koskenniemi describes ‘functionalist doctrine’ as a way of studying international law as 
a response to changing social needs.15  Some scholars suggest that it emerged as a 
response to the fetishisation of sovereignty in international legal scholarship. 16  One of 
those scholars, Karen Knop, argues that power relations between different entities in 
the international system are structurally overlooked: ‘international law has ignored 
what is actually happening in the international legal community, who the actors really 
are, and what each one does’.17  Functionalists emphasise the need to examine the 
realities of the system empirically.18  The process of revealing the actors involved in 
international law phenomena provides what Knop refers to as an ‘empirical corrective’ 
to the traditionally inflexible inter-State relations framework of international law.19  
Functionalism’s empirical concerns also extend to the way in which the State is 
conceptualised and understood as an actor. Functionalists argue that all parts of the 
international system ought to be taken into account, including the organs of a State. 
Second, functionalism is interested in the function of actors and entities, rather than 
their status or categorisation in international law. Christoph Schreuer explains:  
Rather than grope for the seat of sovereignty, we should adjust our intellectual 
framework to a multi-layered reality consisting of a variety of authoritative 
structures. Under this functionalist approach what matters is not the formal status 
of a participant (province, state international organization) but its actual or 
preferable exercise of functions.20  
Adopting the language of ‘participants’ in the international system, Schreuer moves 
beyond the sovereign veil and observes that there are many authoritative structures 
internal and external to the State. Schreurer and other functionalists criticise the 
dominance of the sovereign model of participation and argue that it obscures activities 
and their nature in the international system. In the functionalist account, a focus on 
participation through function reveals the interdependencies and relationships 
between State and non-State actors.21  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hans J Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law’ (1940) 34(2) American Journal 
of International Law 260, 275.  
15 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument  
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) 523. 
16 Knop, above n 11, 335. It should be noted that functionalism as a concept was borrowed from the social 
sciences.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Morgenthau, above n 14, 260; Koskenniemi, above n 15, 523. 
19 Knop, above n 11, 335.  
20 Schreuer, above n 11, 453. 
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Another theory that disaggregates the State is transgovernmentalism.22  Anne-Marie 
Slaughter’s theory of transgovernmentalism draws on the work of regulatory theorists, 
sociologists and political scientists to disassemble the State and to identify networks of 
decision-making in international law. Slaughter’s model of global order focuses on the 
networks established between government counterparts across national borders. She 
investigates relationships between government agencies – describing connections as 
‘government networks’ and the product of these relationships more broadly as the 
theory of ‘transgovernmentalism.’23  The intention of this disaggregation is to identify 
connections between actors that would otherwise go unseen in the classical 
international law model of States. Slaughter instructs her reader on how to better view 
the world through transgovernmental neworks: 
Stop imagining the international system as a system of states – unitary entities like 
billiard balls or black boxes – subject to rules created by international institutions 
that are apart from, “above” these states. Start thinking about a world of 
governments, with all the different institutions that perform the basic functions of 
governments – legislation, adjudication, implementation – interactions both with 
each other domestically and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts. 
States still exist in this world; indeed, they are crucial actors.24  
Slaughter asserts that relying on the State as an exclusive unit of analysis inhibits our 
understanding of global governance and the way that international law develops. She 
proposes that within the networks established between government counterparts 
across national borders decision-making and concentrations of power occur.  
Slaughter observes vertical and horizontal networks in the international system. The 
vertical order refers to the connections that occur between State units and 
supranational organisations or institutions. The horizontal order refers to the 
connections directly between government agencies and their counterparts in other 
States. Horizontal networks include executive, judicial and legislative networks running 
at the sub-State level. Within the horizontal networks there are ‘direct interactions 
across sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by 
the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments.’25  For example, 
foreign ministries in different countries may exchange information and set standards 
for consular practice without executive approval. According to Slaughter, the objectives 
and function of these networks varies. 26   Transgovernmental networks can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
23 Ibid 145.  
24 Ibid 5.  
25 Ibid 10. 
26 Ibid 145.  
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characterised as information networks, harmonisation networks, coordination 
networks and enforcement networks, based on their function.27 
Transgovernmentalism and the networks Slaughter describes can be understood as a 
map for tracing forms of international cooperation. Kal Raustiala observes the 
coordinating value of transgovernmental networks:  
The state is instead disaggregating for purposes of cooperation: domestic officials 
are reaching out to their foreign counterparts regularly and directly through 
networks, rather than through state-to-state negotiation of the kind that dominated 
20th century cooperation. This notion of ‘disaggregated sovereignty’ is at the center 
of transgovernmental theory.28 
Raustiala and Slaughter emphasise the role of networks as vehicles for information 
exchange and the coordination of activity among disaggregated parts of States. The 
benefit of trangovernmentalism is that it provides a framework for unveiling the 
connections shared by sub-units of State actors between different States. It also 
identifies a broader range of government actors and their connections than the 
traditionally monolithic State-centred model. Transgovernmental networks can also, at 
least in part, explain global cooperation in relation to transnational problems.  
However, transgovernmentalism has limitations. How the State is disaggregated and 
who is included and excluded in this exercise has consequences for how we characterise 
global governance and explain actions by States and non-States alike. In rethinking 
State participation, it illuminates the risk that disaggregation can lead to reaggregation 
of the State in a number of ways. This intellectual process could result in groupings 
along function, subject matter, level (local, national, regional, international), geography, 
membership composition or structure. Transgovernmentalism does not challenge the 
nature of the State, but only seeks to break it into parts that can be reaggregated as a 
whole, thereby preserving classic conceptions of sovereignty and participation in 
international law.  
This theory also maintains State sovereignty by conceiving of networks as State-only 
networks. In this sense, transgovernmentalism remains a fundamentally State-centric a 
model for understanding participation in the international legal order. Slaughter does 
not adequately address the role of non-State actors in the international system. 
Transgovernmentalism recognises the existence of non-State actors, but it does not go 
beyond placing them as a phenomenon outside of the networks formed between State 
agencies where, in Slaughter’s view, power is generated and exerted. In this 
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28 Kal Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation’ (2002) 43 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 1, 10-11.  
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characterisation of participation in the international system, non-State actors have 
their own separate networks that interact with transnational State networks. However, 
even this limited acknowledgement replicates an emphasis on the State, with non-State 
actors on the periphery. What the transgovernmental model cannot achieve is an 
explanation of how different actors (State and non-State) employ modes of influence 
and how they interact with one another, sometimes within the same network, to 
achieve their goals.  
Both transgovernmentalism and functionalism exemplify alternative approaches in 
international legal thinking on the composition of the State. Unveiling sovereign 
structure is the first step to understanding where power resides within the State and 
how the activities related to international law are propelled and hindered. The 
transgovernmentalism and functionalism approaches recognise, even if it is in a 
minimalist way, the existence of actors beyond formal State structures. A functionalist 
outlook in particular can help to identify how interdependencies between State and 
non-State actors evolve. In order to understand participation in the protection of 
citizens abroad beyond the classical State-centred model, an account of non-State 
actors also needs to be considered. 
 
Non-State actor participation in international law 
There is a cacophony of voices addressing the nature and role of non-State actors in 
international law. Writers have considered the repercussions of the presence and 
participation of non-State actors in customary international law, human rights 
compliance, the creation of norms and the capacity of States to exercise their 
sovereignty.29  This section will consider some of these approaches within international 
legal scholarship on the role of non-State actors in international law, with an emphasis 
on civil society organisations.  
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Non-State actors fall outside formal State structures. These entities may include 
corporations, professional associations, armed groups and civil society. However, the 
concept may also include other private and public actors, such as religious bodies, the 
media, individuals, families and universities. Some scholars have made a distinction 
between economic and civil non-state actors, defining civil non-state actors as ‘non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), charities, trusts, foundations, advocacy groups 
and national and international non-state associations.’30 
Legal scholars have been concerned with the standing of non-State actors within the 
matrix of subjects and objects of international law discussed earlier in this chapter.31 
Non-State actors have narrow parameters for appearing before international courts and 
tribunals (if at all) and their practice does not formally contribute to the development 
of international law under the sources of law in the ICJ Statute, with the exception of 
the teachings of eminent publicists.32  Math Noortmann observes the preoccupation of 
categorising different kinds of participants, particularly as they relate to issues of 
responsibility and legitimacy. Noortmann identifies the legal status of non-State actors, 
their legitimacy in the system, the extent and content of their personality, and the legal 
character of agreements entered into with States as the issues of greatest concern to 
international legal scholars.33  Marks, however, classifies the concerns by theme: she 
characterises the two concerns of international legal scholars as regulation of non-State 
actors (armed groups for example) and inclusion of non-State actors (activists and civil 
society) in norm-making and enforcement.34  These approaches, whether based on 
theme or on principle, consider the role of non-State actors within a State-based system. 
They attempt to analyse the impact of non-State actor behaviour on the State or on 
classical State processes (such as treaty negotiations).  
Civil society organisations are one group of non-State actors whose participation in the 
international legal system has received different forms of legitimacy. Alan Boyle and 
Christine Chinkin have noted that the UN Charter fails to define what constitutes a civil 
society organisation. Along with other writers, such as Philip Alston, Boyle and Chinkin 
recognise that these kinds of actors are defined in the negative, ‘through what they are 
not: they are not established by a government or by intergovernmental agreement and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Bridget M Hutter, ‘The Role of Non-state Actors in Regulation’ (2006) Centre for Analysis of Risk and 
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31 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Conclusion: Return on the Legal Status of NGOs and on the Methodological 
Problems that Arise for Legal Scholarship’ in Pierre-Marie Dupuy and Luisa Vierucci (eds), NGOs in 
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their resources should come primarily from voluntary contributions’.35  Holly Cullen 
and Karen Morrow have broadly defined civil society to include ‘public organisations, 
which are not State organisations: the media, educational institutions, religious bodies 
and voluntary associations’. 36   Mary Kaldor, however, considers the nature of 
participation for individuals as the defining feature of civil society.37  Kaldor defines 
civil society as a process 
through which individuals negotiate, argue, struggle against or agree with each 
other and with centres of political and economic authority. Through voluntary 
associations, movements, parties, unions, the individual is able to act publicly.38  
Another identifying characteristic of civil society organisations is the nature of their 
pursuits. Oscar Schachter notes that while many civil society organisations can be 
understood as striving for higher order or community values, they can also be ‘uncivil’ 
in their objectives.39 Schachter critiqued approaches to civil society that obscure their 
diversity and the conflict of different interests they engage.40  
Civil society organisations have gained a bigger profile in international law and its 
institutions since the early 1900s. 41  Increased participation by civil society 
organisations in multilateral negotiations and forums has had an impact on the 
dynamics of international law and political affairs. Some scholars, like Boyle and 
Chinkin, advance the claim that civil society organisations participate in the 
enforcement of international law through naming and shaming States for poor 
compliance with treaty obligations and by participating in treaty-monitoring 
processes.42  Civil society participation in treaty negotiations has also increased. Civil 
society actors can put forward negotiating positions, draft text and design monitoring 
mechanisms to influence the outcome of a negotiation.43  Advocacy and litigation have 
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been important tools for civil society to shape norms, contribute to law-making and to 
drive specific values, particularly human rights values. Civil society organisations have 
also assumed representational responsibilities on behalf of individuals in various 
judicial and non-judicial settings, including before international human rights treaty 
bodies, international courts and tribunals and within domestic systems.44 Participation 
by civil society actors has contributed to shaping the content and the processes of 
international law without the formal status States possess.45  
There is a tension between the participation of non-State actors in international law 
more broadly and the implications that their inclusion in the international legal system 
has on sovereignty. Some schools of thought in international legal scholarship equate 
the increased participation and influence of civil society actors with the demise of State 
centrality.46 For example, Schachter argued that the increased participation of non-
State actors affects the relevance of States, while some argue that it remains highly 
controversial.47 Scholars contemplate whether non-State actor participation creates 
vacuums of legitimacy in the international legal order through a democratic deficit.48 
Others, such as Luigi Condorelli and Antonio Cassese, have tried to capture changes in 
participation as an affirmation of State sovereignty. They observe the shift in the shape 
of sovereignty in international law:  
Although the limits to the sovereignty of states are increasingly growing in quantity 
and depth, partly in consequence of delegations of authority to supranational 
institutions and agencies, it remains true in substance that those growing limits 
still ultimately arise from the choice of the states: the choice to bind themselves, the 
sovereign choice to accept limits to their sovereignty. The overall logic of the 
phenomenon does not, therefore, appear to be that of expropriation of state 
competencies, but rather that of assignment, transfer, or delegation.49 
Condorelli and Cassese preserve the concept of State sovereignty by showing that any 
change or limit to State power flows from State consent. In the quote above, they 
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describe sovereign power with the same characteristics as the concept of energy in 
physics: it can only be transferred or converted, but never created or destroyed. This 
suggests that there is a certain immutable character to sovereignty, no matter how it is 
expressed or by whom. Condorelli and Cassese also contemplate that the sovereignty of 
States, State power and function, can be assigned, transferred or delegated. In their list, 
Condorelli and Cassese omit the idea that State and non-State actors may also share 
powers and functions.  
Studies by legal scholars largely focus on understanding the impact of non-State actor 
involvement on the State-based system of international law and the way in which wider 
participation can erode State sovereignty. However, the content of relationships 
between State and non-State actors can shape the course of international law and its 
practice. Moreover, the relationships between those actors vary. Condorelli and 
Cassese’s concern for the delegation and distribution of power is an idea that warrants 
further attention, particularly as it relates to the relationship between State and non-
State actors. Where one relationship or activity may diminish sovereign power, another 
may enhance it. The anxiety of diminishing State power can inhibit a diagnosis of the 
advantages States gain through their relationships with non-State actors, and vice versa.  
	  
Shared participation: State and non-State actors in international law 
International legal scholarship has plotted the relationship between State and non-
State actors narrowly. As discussed in the last section, some scholarship has 
conceptualised non-State actor involvement in international law as diminishing the 
traditional sovereign model.50  Others have traced the relationship as part of broader 
change in lawmaking and governance.51  Some frame the relationship between actors 
within the lens of accountability.52  This section explores how legal scholars have 
understood and explained joint participation of State and non-State actors in 
international law with a focus on lawmaking and liability.  
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In the absence of a global legislative authority, lawmaking in international law is linked 
to legal personality.53  The competence to make international law (creating new rules 
and repealing others), either through treaty or custom, is limited to States as subjects of 
international law.54  State consent is therefore the basis of all rules in the international 
legal system. From this viewpoint, the involvement of any additional actors in 
lawmaking processes derogates from the centrality of State-consent and, ultimately, 
States themselves.  
Newer definitions of lawmaking encompass a wider range of behaviours and outputs. 
For example, some scholars have conceptualised lawmaking as ‘norm-setting or public 
policy-making by public authorities.’55  By enlarging the definition of lawmaking, there 
has been greater scope to include and analyse the contributions of non-State actors in 
processes of norm development and rule creation.56  Anne Peters et al. observe that 
academic engagement with the novel contributions of non-State actors to lawmaking 
processes is virtually non-existent.57  
Emerging thought in international legal scholarship provides a more pluralistic account 
of what international law is, how it is made and by whom.58 Pauwelyn, Wessel and 
Wouters examine changes in the techniques and products of lawmaking in the global 
order, identifying the development of ‘informal international law.’ Informal 
international lawmaking is characterised by three trends.59  First, Pauwelyn et al. 
contend that formal international lawmaking is in demise. They argue that the output 
of international law of treaties and other formal sources, has been superseded by the 
‘preference of states for informal arrangements’ and normative instruments.60 Second, 
Pauwelyn et al. identify that the processes of informal lawmaking are more likely to be 
characterised by networked processes, rather than formal treaty-based process or 
forums. The final development is that the actors involved in informal lawmaking are 
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not limited to the classic subjects of international law.61  The informal international law 
project is not concerned with the status of the norms or standards being developed as 
either binding or non-binding, but instead with the legitimacy and accountability of the 
actors and processes.62  
Another perspective on the relationship between States and non-State actors is the 
presence of liability. Two common issues of concern in the area of liability are whether 
the State can be made liable for non-State behaviour and whether non-State actors bear 
responsibility in international law and can therefore be held accountable for breaches 
of international obligations. Examples of these concerns include scholarship that 
addresses the use of private security companies in armed conflict,63 the responsibility of 
corporations 64  and the responsibility of non-State armed groups for breaches of 
international humanitarian law.65 Concern for liability or responsibility in international 
law generally flows from the framework for attributing liability and State responsibility. 
This framework, codified in the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, poses several 
problems as they relate to plural participation. The first is that the ILC’s programme of 
study and subsequent codification did not aim to diagnose the behaviour of non-State 
actors, only States. Second, the Articles on State Responsibility recognise the State as a 
unitary entity, with some limited recognition for constitutive State actors.66  
This framework has influenced the approach of scholars, whereby they focus on fitting 
the behaviour of non-State actors into structures that govern the behaviour of States. 
The Articles on State Responsibility provide some scope to hold non-State actors 
responsible for internationally wrongful acts. However, the traditional framework of 
State responsibility is too limited and ‘cannot adequately regulate, and ensure 
accountability for, non-state actors acting in conjunction with states.’ 67  Jean 
d’Aspremont et al. reject the Articles on State Responsibility as the exclusive lens for 
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understanding how State and non-State actors may jointly cause harmful conduct in 
international law. 68  In their argument, they note that the Articles on State 
Responsibility do not (and cannot) fully address the behaviour of non-State actors, nor 
does the conceptual framework of the Articles on State Responsibility deal with shared 
responsibility between State and non-State actors. They observe that classical 
approaches to liability in international law isolate the actions of State and non-State 
actors from one another.69  
How have scholars envisaged a relationship of shared liability between State and non-
State actors? There is some scholarship that considers how State and non-State actors 
can be held responsible jointly for harmful actions in international law. This form of 
plural participation is referred to as ‘shared responsibility’ in international law.70 
D’Aspremont et al. define shared responsibility as a situation where both State and 
non-State actors are ‘held accountable for a certain conduct without this conduct 
necessarily giving rise to responsibility in the formal and breach-based understanding 
of the term in international law.’ 71   In their account of shared responsibility, 
d’Aspremont et al. acknowledge the complexity of multi-actor conduct in international 
law: 
… the impugned forms of conduct of non-state actors – whether or not constituting 
a breach of their obligations – have proved to be complex and composite practices 
as they often involve the contribution or participation of other actors, including 
states (and international organisations). Impugned actions by non-state actors 
rarely fall short of any state (or international organisation’s) involvement.72 
This characterisation of participation envisages composite or plural practices as a 
reality of liability in international law. The idea of shared responsibility, however, is 
still largely confined to harmful conduct or breaches of international law. The 
multiplicity of participants or ‘composite practices’ that d’Aspremont et al. describe 
have not been considered in relation to the fulfilment of rights or duties in international 
law.  
Accountability and compliance prevail as the dominant lenses for viewing the 
relationship between State and non-State actors in the shared responsibility approach. 
Despite this limitation, d’Aspremont et al. provide a useful typology of shared action 
between State and non-State actors, which may be used to understand and explain 
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relationships between actors in the protection of citizens abroad. The typology of 
shared action foresees three tiers: joint action, concurrent action (where by actors aid 
and assist one another) and cumulative action (where different actors take up action 
but do not coordinate).73  While this perspective on shared action in international law 
focuses on networks of harm, it is possible to apply this framework to other kinds of 
activities in international law including the fulfilment of rights and duties.  
International law has yet to attend to the relationship between State and non-State 
actors beyond the prism of harm, liability or lawmaking. Actors do not only cause harm 
jointly, they also pursue and fulfil other kinds of rights and obligations jointly. For 
example, the protection of citizens abroad is not a violation or a breach, but a right in 
international law. Actors can participate in preventing harm, fulfilling a legal obligation 
or pursuing a remedy on behalf of an injured citizen. In the protection of citizens 
abroad, neither lawmaking nor accountability explain the content of the relationship 
between State and non-State actors or their participation in protection. It is therefore 
useful to go beyond international legal scholarship to explain how State and non-State 
actors connect and interact.  
	  
II. Governance and Networks in International Law 
Various disciplines use network theories to investigate the connections between 
different actors in order to better understand the driving forces of law, regulation and 
governance.74  A study of networks can disaggregate the State into its composite actors, 
recognise the participation of actors outside of formal State structures and analyse the 
relationships between them. In addition to identifying the existence and nature of 
connections between actors, a network approach also diagnoses the modalities, values 
and techniques of networked action. This section will outline theories of networks and 
nodal governance and how they have been applied to international law. It establishes 
frameworks that can be applied to and assist in the understanding the protection of 
citizens abroad.  
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Networks, regulation and governance 
Networks offer a model for understanding the connections between actors. Governance 
and regulatory scholars have shown particular interest in networks as forms of 
regulation. John Braithwaite and Christine Parker define regulation broadly: 
Regulation can mean more than just the enforcement of legal rules. … On the 
broadest reading, regulation means even more than that. Much regulation is 
accomplished without recourse to rules of any kind. It is secured by organizing 
economic incentives to steer business behaviour, by moral suasion, by shaming, 
and even by architecture. On this broadest view, regulation means influencing the 
flow of events.75 
Braithwaite argues that the way the world is regulated and power is harnessed has 
shifted away from a Statist order.76  Bridget Hutter explains that this change has its 
source in the participation of non-State actors:  
Contemporaneous with the changing fashions of state regulation has been a 
broadening conceptualisation of regulation. The growing recognition of the limits 
of public law approaches to regulation led governments and regulatory scholars to 
turn their attention to alternative methods and sources of regulation. So regulation 
is no longer regarded as the exclusive domain of the state and governments and the 
role of non-state actors in regulation is now widely acknowledged.77  
A governance lens, at the most general level, enables us to view social, legal and 
political phenomena through a range of actors and their connections. There are 
multiple modes of governance and as many theories to match, including good 
governance, networked governance, corporate governance and governance without 
government.78  Some governance scholars suggest that the State, or what they describe 
as ‘formal government,’ does not occupy a more privileged position than other actors, 
but rather ‘is merely one – albeit an important – actor among many others.’79  In his 
study on network power, Manuel Castells suggests that, ‘even the most powerful states, 
have some power (mainly destructive), but not all the power’.80  These scholars suggest 
that traditional State power exercised through coercion, command and control has 
been superseded by a more nuanced expression of power through cooperation and 
alliance formation within networks.81  Common to all the modes of governance is an 
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underlying assumption that governance is pluricentric rather than unicentric and that 
networks emerge as an important organising framework for relationships between 
different actors.82  
What can network theory show us about the relationship of State and non-State actors? 
Scholars outside international legal scholarship have traced patterns of delegation, 
assignment and coordination between State and non-State actors in a range of areas.83 
Hutter notes that ‘States are delegating or relinquishing some of their functions to 
other actors on the sub-State level as well as on the inter-State level’.84  This kind of 
delegation can occur directly, indirectly, explicitly or implicitly. One example of this 
indirect delegation is the regulatory function that non-State actors, such as human 
rights global civil society organisations, can perform by setting standards or raising 
moral concerns on issues such as the death penalty and due process. Civil society 
campaigns are freer to express popular views, or demand the application of 
international human rights law standards, which due to comity and the constraints of 
non-interference in international law, States may be unable to express publicly. 
Particularly in international human rights law advocacy, civil society and public lawyers 
‘contribute to the information gathering, standard setting and behaviour modification 
aspects of regulatory control.’85  This is consistent with Hutter’s observation that 
‘[n]on-state regulation may have a strong normative dimension which may help the 
behaviour modification aspects of regulation. These centre on industry morality and 
institutionalising responsibility… .’86  States may benefit from situations when non-
State actors perform traditional State functions (like representations, advocacy, 
mobilisation and litigation). These exchanges between State and non-State actors are 
typically overlooked in analyses of the protection of citizens abroad. States can and 
often do ‘co-opt’ actions by non-State actors like civil society or lawyers to fill the gaps 
in protection that they are not able to fill due to political constraints.87 
There are many models of networks and networked governance. Two such models are 
webs of influence and nodal governance.88  The webs of influence theory developed by 
John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos elaborates an analytical framework for 
understanding different kind of networks and how they operate. The framework relies 
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on three analytical tools: the actors that participate, the principles they pursue and the 
mechanisms that they use to achieve their aims.89  Braithwaite and Drahos explain that 
‘globalization of regulation never occurs on the basis of a single mechanism, no matter 
how powerful’.90  The ‘webs of influence’ framework approaches the regulation of 
business as a contest of principles within competing networks of actors. The networks 
in business regulation, or ‘webs’ as they refer to them in their study, can be 
characterised in different ways. Some networks prove to be of webs of influence and 
while others are webs of coercion. These webs employ different techniques, including 
manipulating technical standards, setting agendas and mobilising other actors to 
achieve aims.  
Some networks are more powerful than others and some actors in each network 
operate in clusters of location or modality. These clusters are referred to as ‘nodes’ and 
can express regulatory power. Nodes are the sites of governance where ‘knowledge, 
capacity and resources are mobilized.’91  Braithwaite defines nodes as ‘a point in time 
and space where a cluster of actors collaborate to mobilize pooled resources to tie 
together strands in … networks of power’.92  Castells explains that the exercise of 
control in networks is contingent on two mechanisms of power.93  The first is the ability 
to constitute or form a network, including programming (or reprogramming) its 
objectives. The second mechanism for exercising power is the ability to coordinate 
other networks to form cooperative efforts or strategies. He describes these 
mechanisms as ‘programming’ and ‘switching.’94  Burris, Drahos and Shearing explain 
that this kind of power is exemplified in their model of nodal governance, another 
framework for explaining networks.  
Burris et al. define nodal governance as ‘an elaboration of contemporary network 
theory that explains how a variety of actors operating within social systems interact 
along networks to govern the systems they inhabit’.95  Nodal governance endorses the 
view that particular nodes are endowed with the power to ‘manage and change the 
course of events’.96  To develop this theory, Burris, Drahos and Shearing frame nodal 
governance within complex systems theory – a Hayekian concept that claims that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Braithwaite and Drahos, above n 74, 15. 
90 Ibid 13. 
91 Burris, Drahos and Shearing, above n 88, 37. 
92 Braithwaite, above n 76, 300.  
93 Castells, above n 80, 776.  
94 Ibid.  
95 Burris, Drahos and Shearing, above n 88, 33.  
96 Ibid 33.  
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outcomes emerge from adaptive responses of the actors to their environment and not 
always from their intentions.97  Burris, Drahos and Shearing state that:  
Outcomes are produced by the complex interaction of what people do, how they 
relate to one another, the institutions, technologies and mentalities they deploy, 
their biological equipment and the conditions and stimuli from the larger physical 
and social environment in which they operate.98  
Mentalities, technologies, resources and institutions are another set of analytical tools 
for examining networks, their character and their power.99  Burris et al. define these 
diagnostic probes:  
a way of thinking (mentalities) about the matters that the node has emerged to 
govern; a set of methods (technologies) for exerting influence over the course of 
events at issue; [r]esources to support the operation of the node and the exertion of 
influence; and a structure that enables the directed mobilization of resources, 
mentalities and technologies over time (institutions).100 
It is clear that there is some overlap between webs of influence and nodal governance, 
particularly in the diagnostic probes of each theory. Where, for example, one particular 
tool of power may be described as a ‘mechanism’ in webs of influence, it can also be 
characterised as a ‘technology’ in nodal governance.  
Networks and regulatory perspectives have made their way into some analyses of 
international law. Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking apply a regulatory lens in 
their work on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). They argue that by viewing 
international processes or instruments through the lens of regulation one can draw 
attention to the goals embedded in the process and the devices actors deploy to achieve 
those objectives. 101   Noting that the UPR is a political process examining the 
implementation of law, Charlesworth and Larking emphasise how a regulatory lens can 
explain the complex relationship between law and politics:  
Using a regulatory lens … brings the social and political power that the process 
exerts into focus, without assuming that the power is effective in relation to the 
explicit aims… [s]uch an analysis encourages rich description as well as critique in 
respect of the power relations at play.102 
In the context of the protection of citizens abroad there are comparative power 
relations at play. There are regional and international politics between States, the 
nature of the individual and the breach alleged, ideas of citizenship, international 
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human rights law standards, the limits of traditional Westphalian sovereignty, the 
attempts of civil society to influence States and the limits to the resources of the actors. 
Actors such as civil society, courts, corporations, universities, lawyers, politicians, 
governmental departments/agencies and international institutions like the ILC are 
involved in the decision-making and outcomes related to the protection of an individual 
abroad. Some of them form networks of standard-setting and behaviour modification, 
some are norm entrepreneurs pursuing changes in policy, while others form networks 
to disable action or change. One example is the role of the ILC’s Special Rapporteur for 
Diplomatic Protection, discussed in chapter two. Since his reports on the codification of 
diplomatic protection, there has been an increase in scholarship on the relationship 
between diplomatic protection and human rights, demonstrating the normative 
influence of the law (in this instance, codification) as a mechanism by the Special 
Rapporteur and the ILC, functioning as a norm entrepreneur and a regulatory node.  
	  
III. Participation, Networks and the Protection of Citizens Abroad 
Since the canonical academic contributions on diplomatic protection in the early 
twentieth century, the presence and participation of non-state actors and entities in 
international law has proliferated. Civil society organisations in particular can influence 
the direction and outcomes in international law despite their lack of formal status as 
subjects of international law. How do these developments apply to the protection of 
citizens abroad?  
Higgins’ model of participation in international law is a starting point for 
understanding multi-actor action in the protection of citizens abroad, but network 
theory supplements her approach by providing the framework for analysing that 
participation. The following chapters investigate what networks exist in the protection 
of citizens abroad, as well as the characteristics and functions of those networks. If 
networks are a significant part of the protection of citizens abroad, two concerns 
emerge. The first is why networks have emerged in this area of international law 
(especially since it has historically been characterised as a State enterprise) and the 
second is how they shape interventions on behalf of citizens. How do networks facilitate 
and inhibit action? How do different modes of participation by different actors 
influence the phenomenon of protection in international law? By addressing these 
questions, I hope to sketch a picture of the nature of participation in the protection of 
citizens abroad, which includes multiple actors from within the State and beyond.  
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The activities of civil society organisations in the protection of citizens abroad are of 
specific interest. Compared with the authority of the State, which is based on its legal 
character, civil society organisations garner influence through their moral authority.103  
Civil society actors aim to influence States with higher-order values including human 
rights, women’s rights and environmentalism.104  In the absence of an international 
legal obligation on States to intervene on behalf of their citizens, the moral authority of 
civil society becomes an important tool for generating action. Civil society actors can 
attract attention to values like citizenship, the death penalty and human rights to put 
moral pressure on governments to take action. Civil society organisations also take 
advantage of their transnational character and presence to pursue morally founded 
globalised agendas.105  
Whereas States are faced with political, legal and physical limitations to their 
interventions, civil society organisations are not restricted by comity and international 
law prohibiting interference with territorial and political sovereignty. 106  These 
organisations also have greater scope for soft intervention, ‘[b]eing autonomous and 
nimble, NGOs can travel to trouble spots where governments and IOs fear to go or are 
slow to reach’.107  The fluidity and mobility of civil society coupled with some moral 
distance from matters of strict national interest creates a transnationalism which has 
‘served as a source of strength for NGOs in their various interactions with governments. 
NGOs act as a solvent against the strictures of sovereignty’.108  An example of this 
political and physical agility is the Amnesty International Individuals at Risk campaign 
(previously named ‘Human Rights Defenders’). Amnesty International campaigns on 
behalf of individuals experiencing human rights abuses or advocates who have been 
imprisoned for political purposes. One technique that the Individuals At Risk campaign 
uses is mobilisation: ‘[i]nformation is gathered daily and sent out to thousands of 
people who immediately compose letters, emails, and faxes to government officials or 
others with the power to halt the abuse’. 109   Non-State actors and civil society 
organisations are able to employ techniques that are not available to States and can rely 
on global networks of actors to mount interventions on behalf of individuals 
experiencing human rights violations.   
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Civil society can also be limited in what it can achieve. While informality serves as a 
mechanism or technique of flexibility for some civil society organisations, it is equally 
the case that the benefits of formal status belonging to States are often out of reach. 
One such benefit is that States and their agents benefit from diplomatic privileges and 
immunities in their interactions with other States, whereas civil society organisations 
and their officers do not. Civil society organisations do not have the same rights as 
States under international law to have consular access and to provide consular services 
to nationals (discussed in chapter two). States also have the capacity to bring inter-
State actions with binding judgments in international courts and tribunals, and which 
can attract global attention.110 Formal status as a State may also allow an audience with 
host governments that civil society organisations may not have.  
In this respect, there are limitations and benefits of formal and informal status attached 
to action by State and non-State actors. The case studies in this thesis explore how 
multi-actor networks can overcome and exploit some of these limitations to achieve 
effective interventions on behalf of nationals abroad.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
The State is central in international law, however, international legal scholarship has 
focused on specific aspects of the concept of the State and the idea of sovereignty that 
accompanies it.111   There is an array of legal thought that examines the identities and 
activities of non-State actors, yet there are few writers that contemplate different 
manifestations of the State from an international law perspective. 112   Part of 
understanding networks and their operation in international law is to consider their 
influence on the State as an entity. As public-private partnerships and multi-actor 
action grow, do the activities, objective and values of these networks reshape the State? 
While most scholarship has focused internally on State organs, or on the influence of 
non-State actors on law-making and international processes, I focus on the gap in 
scholarship addressing the interaction of non-State actors with State actors in the 
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execution of international legal rights and duties.  As Condorelli and Cassese suggest, 
the transfer, assignment and delegation of State competencies are a reality of 
international law. 113    The following chapters consider how this reality of plural 
participation manifests itself in the protection of citizens abroad and how a range of 
actors fulfil and deny the promise of protection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






In 1999 Germany commenced proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
against the United States for breaches of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
while also invoking its right of diplomatic protection in customary international law.1 
The case was brought on behalf of two German citizens, brothers Karl and Walter 
LaGrand, who were sentenced to death in the United States. Strangely, although the 
brothers had both been executed prior to the merits of the case being heard, Germany 
proceeded with its action in the ICJ. The aim of this chapter is to explore how State and 
non-State actors can participate in the generation of a legal case. Section one outlines 
the background to the legal proceedings and some legal aspects of the ICJ’s ruling. 
Section two of the chapter traces the processes leading to multi-actor participation in 
the intervention on behalf of the LaGrand brothers. Part three examines how and why 
Germany intervened using legal proceedings in the ICJ on behalf of two men who knew 
little of their national connection and had been convicted of serious violent crimes.  
	  
I. Background to the LaGrand case 
The arrest, conviction and death sentences of the LaGrand brothers in the United 
States, both born in Germany but possessing no other connection to their birthplace, 
led to a contentious case before the ICJ.  
Progeny of a German woman, Karl and Walter LaGrand moved from Germany to the 
United States as young children. Unbeknownst to them, they never acquired citizenship 
during their residence in the United States. An American serviceman (their mother’s 
partner at the time of their emigration from Germany) adopted the brothers and gave 
them the surname name LaGrand. In January 1982 Walter and Karl LaGrand 
committed a bank robbery in Arizona. They killed one person and inflicted serious 
injuries on another. At the time of their arrest they informed police that they were 
Americans, on the assumption that they had been naturalised. Karl and Walter 
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LaGrand were convicted of armed robbery and murder by an Arizona court and were 
sentenced to death. The LaGrands appealed their sentences from 1987 until 1998.2  
It is not clear at what stage in the United States’ criminal proceedings the revelation 
about their German nationality occurred. In its judgment the International Court of 
Justice noted that:  
Although they lived in the United States for most of their lives, and became the 
adoptive children of a United States national, they remained at all times German 
nationals, and never acquired the nationality of the United States. However, the 
United States has emphasized that both had the demeanour and speech of 
Americans rather than Germans, that neither was known to have spoken German, 
and that they appeared in all respects to be native citizens of the United States.3  
At some point during their custody they met another German incarcerated in the same 
facility who informed the brothers that an official from the German consulate had 
visited him and provided some support during his criminal proceedings.4  Once the 
LaGrand brothers contacted their consulate, Germany began the process of making 
representations on their behalf. Germany intervened through a series of political and 
diplomatic measures, including representations at their appeals and at every level of 
the political and legal system of the United States.5  
Germany and legal counsel for the brothers attempted to raise the breach of the VCCR 
obligations during the appeals proceedings in Arizona. Under Arizona’s criminal law 
however, the doctrine of ‘procedural default’ prevented the presentation of any new 
legal grounds on appeal that a defendant had not previously raised. The practical 
impact of this procedural rule was that the issue of consular notification could not be 
relied upon as a ground for appeal because the LaGrands had not raised it in their 
trials.6  It became clear that Germany’s diplomatic and political efforts had failed when 
Karl LaGrand was executed on 24 February 1999. 
 
LaGrand (Germany v United States)  
Once domestic remedies in the United States had been exhausted, Germany 
commenced legal proceedings in the ICJ. Germany filed for provisional measures in the 
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3 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 475. 
4 Interview with Germany’s Legal Counsel #1 in LaGrand (The Hague, June 2013).  
5 This includes an application in the United States Supreme Court for an injunction against the execution 
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Germany et al v United States et al, 526 US 111 (1999). 
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ICJ to prevent the execution of the second brother, Walter LaGrand, who was 
scheduled to be executed on 3 March 1999. The Court granted provisional measures on 
2 March 1999, but Walter LaGrand was executed the next day.7  Despite the execution 
of both Karl and Walter LaGrand prior to the merits stage of the case, Germany 
proceeded with its action against the United States.  
Germany based its case against the United States on two grounds: a breach of the VCCR 
and its right of diplomatic protection. The primary goal of the VCCR is to provide an 
‘international convention on consular relations, privileges and immunities,’ while also 
contributing ‘to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of 
their differing constitutional and social systems.’8  As discussed in chapter two, there 
are a number of obligations flowing from article 36(1) of the VCCR. Some of those 
obligations include the duty on States to inform foreign nationals of their right to have 
consular access, and to notify other States when their nationals come into their custody. 
These obligations facilitate States to provide consular assistance to their nationals and 
make representations about the conditions of their custody to the detaining State if 
needed.9  
In its claim before the ICJ, Germany argued that the LaGrand brothers had not been 
informed of their right to contact the German consulate without delay and that the 
German consulate was not notified of their custody once the United States authorities 
realised that the brothers were German nationals. The United States government 
acknowledged that it had failed to notify Germany that the LaGrands were in its 
custody and issued a formal apology in relation to the breach.10  However, Germany 
argued that if it had received consular notification of the LaGrands’ detention without 
delay, it could have provided the brothers with assistance in their proceedings, leading 
to the possibility of an outcome less than the death penalty.11 
Germany made several arguments in addition to the alleged violation of article 36. It 
also argued that the failure of the United States to fulfil its obligations under the VCCR 
amounted to a breach of an individual right under article 36 – a right to consular 
assistance.12  Germany also alleged violations of its right in customary international law 
to diplomatic protection.13  Germany invoked its right in customary international law to 
diplomatic protection based on the alleged injury to its citizens. In its memorial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Provisional Measures) [1999] ICJ Rep 9. 
8 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations preamble paragraph 3.  
9 Ibid art 36(1)(b).  
10 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 473.  
11 LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 491.  
12 Ibid 481. 
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Germany claimed that the United States had ‘injured Germany indirectly through its 
failure to accord to German nationals in the United States the treatment to which they 
were entitled under international law.’14  By pleading diplomatic protection, Germany 
adopted the injury against the LaGrand brothers as its own. The United States rejected 
these grounds and argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction to hear matters arising 
under customary international law.15  The ICJ rejected this argument and held that it 
had jurisdiction to hear matters arising under customary international law, including 
Germany’s claim of diplomatic protection.16  However, the Court saw no need to decide 
on the question of diplomatic protection.17 
On the substantive legal issues, the Court decided in favour of Germany. The ICJ held 
that the failure of the United States to notify Germany of the custody of its citizens and 
to inform the LaGrands of their right to contact the German consulate was a breach of 
the VCCR. The Court ordered review and reconsideration as the remedy.18  The Court 
also adjudged that article 36 of the VCCR created individual rights.19  International 
lawyers showed great interest in the ICJ case.20  The Court’s use of binding provisional 
measures was a significant development in the use of the Court’s powers.21  
Germany’s interventions on behalf of Karl and Walter LaGrand  
Interventions by Germany can be divided into actions taken before and after 1998. This 
date corresponds with elections in Germany resulting in a change of government. 
Routine consular actions were taken by Germany on behalf of the brothers prior to 
1998. However, after 1998, the actions taken by Germany included a range of consular, 
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diplomatic and political measures. 22   In addition to routine consular measures 
Germany made ‘energetic moral and political appeals’.23  These appeals included: 
every diplomatic means at its disposal in order to prevent the carrying out of the 
death sentences … Both the President and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany appealed to the President of the United States, the latter also to the 
Governor of Arizona. Foreign Minister Fischer and Minister of Justice Däubler-
Gmelin raised the issue with their respective counterparts in the United States 
Administration and with the Governor of the State of Arizona. Démarches were 
undertaken by the German Ambassador to the United States. A further démarche 
followed on behalf of the European Union. Both the German Ambassador and the 
German Consul-General in Los Angeles explained the German position to the 
Board of Executive Clemency of the State of Arizona on the days prior to the 
execution of the brothers. In his second letter to United States Secretary of State 
Albright dated 22 February 1999, the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, 
raised the issue of a violation of the Vienna Convention - to no avail. [references 
omitted].24 
German officials and politicians attended and made representations in the clemency 
hearings.25  Claudia Roth, President of the Green Party and chair of the Bundestag 
Human Rights Committee, travelled to Arizona in 1999 to attend the LaGrand hearings 
in person, along with civil society representatives and a local German lawyer.26  
Germany’s efforts to save the LaGrands were frustrated by the allocation of powers 
between the state of Arizona and the federal government of the United States. Arizona 
had jurisdiction for state-based criminal matters, including decisions on clemency. The 
United States government faced a domestic deadlock with Arizona whose judiciary and 
politicians disregarded the VCCR and the LaGrand’s claim that it had been breached. 
The government of the United States did not have the power to prevent the application 
of the death penalty to Karl and Walter LaGrand or force Arizona to review the matter.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This was a point of criticism raised by the United States in the ICJ case, where it noted that Germany’s 
efforts escalated after 1998. See ‘Counter-Memorial of the United States of America,’ LaGrand 
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23 ‘Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany’, LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) 
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24 Ibid [2.11]. 
25 Ibid [2.10].  
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II. Networks  
State and non-State actor participation 
State actors 
In the German bureaucracy the two major ministries concerned, the Federal Ministry 
of Justice and the Federal Foreign Office, did not agree on whether Germany should 
proceed with judicial action against the United States.27  Concerned with maintaining 
Germany’s relationship with the United States, the Federal Foreign Office opposed the 
idea of taking its ally to the ICJ.28  Use of the ICJ mechanism contributed to elevating 
the matter from the privacy of diplomacy to the publicity of international legal action. 
Moreover, in the view of the Federal Foreign Office the public nature of the case risked 
endangering United States-Germany relations. However, the Ministry of Justice was 
more concerned with the legal case and the technical grounds available to Germany 
under the VCCR.29   In each German ministry, the United States was both a military ally 
and legal foe. On one front Germany had a military alliance with the United States and 
on another it was challenging domestic death penalty values in a public and 
international forum. The conflicting positions of the ministries was ultimately resolved 
by the Federal Chancellor’s office, which instructed the ministries to proceed with an 
action in the ICJ.30  
This decision by the political classes of government may be explained by reference to 
political forces present in Germany in 1998-1999. The political environment in 
Germany contributed to elevating the LaGrand brothers’ situation from a matter of 
consular concern to a matter of international judicial concern. In 1999 the Social 
Democrat and Green parties ousted the Conservatives from power in the German 
federal election, making it the first time that these parties formed government in 
Germany. Prior to the right-of-centre Christian Democrat-led government handover to 
the incoming Social Democrat and Greens government, the German Parliament 
(Bundestag) voted to commit Germany to participation in Kosovo as part of the 
broader NATO intervention.  The consequence of this decision by the Bundestag was 
that it would be the first occasion that Germany would participate in an armed conflict 
since the Second World War. The incoming Social Democrat/Greens government 
upheld the decision to join the NATO forces – a decision that was hugely unpopular 
with the German public. In their examination of Germany’s policy in Kosovo, Aubrey 
Hamilton and Engjellushe Morina situate this decision in its domestic context:  
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28 Ibid.   
29 Interview with German Official #1 (Berlin, August 2013).  
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This decision was made at a time when the center-left - Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) still distinguished between measures to preserve peace, which were 
considered good, and measures to create peace, which many rejected. Ready to 
normalize Germany’s military role in geopolitics and “create peace” in Kosovo, the 
coalition government of the SPD and Greens pushed through a positive vote for 
German intervention in Kosovo.31  
As a result of the government’s decision to participate in the armed conflict in Kosovo, 
the newly formed government lost support from its core constituency early in its 
incumbency.32  Germany’s support for military participation was unpopular with voters 
in light of the government’s historically pacifist orientation.33  The controversy of the 
government’s decision echoed in the media and public – it manifested in protests and 
physical attacks on Greens ministers, including Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.34 
The decision to intervene on behalf of the LaGrands may have been an attempt to win 
back the coalition’s base in a strong move towards human rights protection and anti-
death penalty values (values more akin to their political ideology and that of their 
voters).35  
Non-State actors 
The ICJ memorials and judgment reveal little about the participation of non-State 
actors in Germany’s interventions on behalf of the LaGrand brothers. Non-state actors, 
however, played a critical role in attracting public attention to the situation of the 
LaGrands and mobilising an existing network of anti-death penalty actors. The 
involvement of non-State actors in Germany pivots on the attention generated by the 
media around the sentencing and executions of the brothers. The LaGrands’ plight 
came into German public consciousness sometime in 1999. Steffen Ufer, a German 
lawyer from Munich, was involved in the LaGrand criminal cases in Arizona. Some 
suspected that Ufer leaked the German government’s reluctance to bring an action to 
the German media in order to raise the profile of the issue and to apply some pressure 
on the German government to act.36  Ufer’s actions changed the case from a distant 
Arizona criminal trial to an internationalised contest of values relating to the death 
penalty. The prospect of the executions generated a great deal of public attention in 
Germany, including debate about Germany’s values as a rule of law State. It led to 
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33 ‘Schröder on Kosovo: “The Goal was Exclusively Humanitarian”’, Spiegel International (online), 26 
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34 Joschka Fischer was attacked with cans of red paint by protesters, resulting in a burst eardrum. 
‘German Greens Avoid Political Crisis’, BBC news (online), 14 May 1999 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/343503.stm>. 
35 Interview with Germany’s Legal Counsel #2 in LaGrand (Göttingen, July 2013). 
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several developments for the LaGrands: the mobilisation of an existing global anti-
death penalty campaign, the formation of a network of State and non-State actors and 
public support for action.  
One group of civil society actors that influenced the intervention on behalf of the 
LaGrand brothers was the European anti-death penalty campaign. The anti-death 
penalty campaign gained momentum, within Europe, with the entry into force of 
Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (‘Protocol No. 6’),37 and beyond Europe, with the entry into 
force in 1991 of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (‘Second Optional 
Protocol’).38  Germany is a party to both treaties, having ratified Protocol No. 6 on 1 
August 1989 and the Second Optional Protocol on 18 August 1992. Following 
ratification, Germany formed part of the broader European campaign against the death 
penalty, which served as a springboard for a larger global campaign for the abolition of 
capital punishment. Girling describes the transition of the anti-death penalty campaign 
from a European to a global phenomenon as the point when ‘a very vocal and 
evangelical European voice gained prominence on the international stage.’39  Civil 
society organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch launched 
specialised international campaigns addressing the death penalty as part of the 
momentum.40  Germany also took part in the campaign for the abolition of the death 
penalty, drawing attention to its actions and campaign activities in its memorial 
submitted to the Court.41 
Once the imminence of the brothers’ executions became apparent, the German section 
of Amnesty International received daily inquiries from the public about actions the 
organisation could take to prevent the LaGrands from being put to death.42  In response, 
it launched the ‘National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty’ (NCADP), a national 
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campaign addressing the use of the death penalty globally. As the domestic public 
mobilisation campaign gained momentum, so did Germany’s advocacy on behalf of the 
LaGrands in the United States. Karen Bagge, a representative of Amnesty International, 
was sent to Arizona to conduct appeals on behalf of the LaGrands. She appeared 
alongside Steffen Ufer, the German ambassador Jürgen Chrobog, Claudia Roth, lawyer 
Carla Ryan (counsel for Karl LaGrand) and Bruce Burke (counsel for Walter LaGrand) 
in the LaGrands’ clemency hearings in 1999. Prior to the clemency appeals, Bagge 
recounted that she met with the lawyers for the brothers, the German ambassador, 
Steffen Ufer, Claudia Roth and Matthias Lemphul (representative of the NCADP). Both 
State and non-State actors strategised together about their collective approach and the 
role that each actor would take in the clemency hearings.43  This multi-actor group also 
presented 50 000 signatures from the German public petitioning the Governor of 
Arizona for clemency for the LaGrands.  
There were three networks of anti-death penalty actors: the transnational or global 
network, the European network and the German network. Domestic non-state actors in 
Germany harnessed existing network advocacy at the European and global level to 
further their own campaigns. Simultaneously, German civil society actors localised the 
transnational anti-death penalty campaign through the LaGrands. With the prospect of 
two German citizens being executed, civil society actors in Germany could capitalise on 
the imminent and proximate threat of the death penalty to mobilise public support and 
apply pressure on the German government. The local network of anti-death penalty 
advocates harnessed existing expertise and experience from the European anti-death 
penalty campaign to raise awareness and put forward a policy position of intervention. 
Meanwhile, the global anti-death penalty network applauded Germany’s decision to 
bring legal action in the ICJ as an example of how States could respond to the death 
penalty. 
The actors in the intersecting anti-death penalty networks can be described as 
epistemic communities (networks of experts) that the government relied upon. Peter 
Haas argues that ‘[e]pistemic communities may introduce new policy alternatives to 
their governments, and depending on the extent to which these communities are 
successful in obtaining and retaining bureaucratic power domestically, they can often 
lead their governments to pursue them.’44 Haas suggests that regimes can contribute to 
the empowerment of new groups of actors. In the case of Germany, the existing 
international and European human rights regime, coupled with the success of the 
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international campaign against the death penalty served as a platform for the 
empowerment of civil society and individual actors to lobby for the LaGrands’ case to 
be juridified.  
	  
Germany’s constitutional and legal framework for the protection of citizens 
Another source of pressure on the German government to intervene on behalf of the 
LaGrand brothers may be found in Germany’s domestic legal framework for protection 
of citizens. The provision of consular assistance and the protection of citizens abroad 
are governed by Germany’s constitution, the Basic Law of 1949 (Grundgesetz) and the 
Consular Law (1974).45  The Consular Law sets out a number of the arrangements 
relevant to the protection of German citizens, including that assistance may include 
legal protection.46  Framed in general terms, the Consular Law creates a conditional 
obligation on consular officers to ‘help Germans in their consular district requiring 
assistance if the state of distress cannot be resolved in any other way.’47  The generality 
of the language in the legislation ensures a wide margin for consular officers to exercise 
discretion in the provision of assistance to German citizens.  
The Basic Law contains a number of protections for citizens, which are binding law.48 
The Basic Law creates a foundation for Germany as a rule of law and democratic State, 
which is reflected in its constitutional provisions.49  With a rigorous and active court 
system, this constitutional document is an important component of government 
decision-making and civic participation.  The Basic Law in Germany guides a range of 
government action. Werner Ebke and Matthew Finkin describe the Basic Law as 
setting minimum goals and that these standards ‘have to play a role in decision-making 
on all levels of State action.’50  Eberle argues that human dignity is at the centre of the 
German constitutional framework: ‘it infuses throughout the whole constitutional 
order, obligating the state both to protect and realize it.’51  He goes on to argue that: 
the systematization of German legal science, centers around the human person as a 
‘spiritual-moral’ individual, and her dignity, including especially her ability to 
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realize human capacity and satisfaction. Human values are thus the focal point of 
the legal order.52 
Article 2(2) of the Basic Law titled ‘Rights of Liberty’ states that, ‘[e]veryone has the 
right to life and to inviolability of his person. The freedom of the individual is inviolable. 
These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law.53  Within this right is the 
obligation on the German government to protect the life of nationals, including the 
provision of consular assistance. There is an important role for German courts in 
interpreting the Basic Law in accordance with the protection of human dignity and the 
right to life.54  In the case of Rudolph Hess the Federal Constitutional Court held that 
the German government is ‘constitutionally obliged to a duty to protect German 
nationals and their interests against foreign States... .’55  While the judgment does not 
specify to which articles this obligation would apply, it would seem that it confers a 
general obligation on the government to protect the rights of its citizens, particularly 
those fundamental rights such as the right to life. Some scholars have interpreted this 
judgment to be a constitutional enshrinement of the right to diplomatic protection by 
Germany.56 
In the case of the LaGrand brothers, the threat of a domestic constitutional challenge 
may have motivated the German government’s response to their plight.57  This may also 
explain the Ministry of Justice’s approach to the case as a legal necessity and its 
attribution of more weight to the constitutional legal obligations to protect the right to 
life than to the political considerations raised by the Foreign Ministry about the 
Germany-United States relationship.  
	  
III. Networked Governance, Values and Law in LaGrand  
The commencement of the LaGrand case in the ICJ cannot be explained through the 
actions of State actors alone. The case implicates a network of State and non-State 
actors relying on different mechanisms to achieve the goal of intervention. Actors 
including non-governmental organisations, judicial institutions, public constituencies, 
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media and individuals influenced the decisions of the government through moral 
pressure, political mechanisms and law. This section will consider three things: how 
those networks formed, the use of law as a technique of protection, and the nature and 
function of those networks.  
	  
The LaGrand protection network: formation, function and techniques  
Network formation 
How did the network between State actors and non-State actors in the LaGrand action 
form? One explanation is that changes in government policy can occur when States 
become ‘porous’ to civil society influence.58  Christopher Pallas and Anders Uhlin argue 
that civil society organisations are not able to achieve change without access to the 
State and alignment to its interests.59  Pallas and Uhlin also observe that in order for 
there to be success in civil society efforts to influence a State, they must offer ‘technical 
expertise or constituent support’.60  The civil society and private actors involved in the 
LaGrand proceedings in the United States were able to offer the German government 
expertise on United States domestic law, international human rights law and the anti-
death penalty campaign and to deliver the support of the mass public in Germany. 
Another important aligning interest that contributed to forming the network was a 
desire by different actors to gain legitimacy with their respective audiences. Mark 
Suchman notes that legitimacy affects the way that people respond, relate and 
understand an organisation or entity.61  He identifies two dimensions related to seeking 
legitimacy: one of continuity versus credibility, and another of active versus passive 
support.62  Organisations that have legitimacy are considered by their target audience 
to be more trustworthy and more meaningful. This legitimacy may be gained through 
active approval of the decisions or directions or acquiescence (active/passive 
support).63  After the newly elected government’s decision to commit Germany to the 
Kosovo War contributed to a deficit in its moral legitimacy, the government needed to 
display its capacity to ‘do the right thing.’64  In the face of falling popularity, the 
German government sought to assert its human rights credentials, particularly with its 
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disenchanted voters, through the LaGrand action. Even after the execution of both 
German citizens by the United States, the ICJ case served as a ‘hollow symbolic gesture’ 
to the German public about Germany’s values.65  Human rights civil society in Germany 
was seeking legitimacy within their broader anti-death penalty regime as the leader in 
the transnational and global campaign. The ICJ translated into a concrete ‘win’ for the 
campaign and reinforced the moral legitimacy of the anti-death penalty message.  
 
Function 
The network of protection in the LaGrand action challenges pre-existing notions of 
what ‘protection’ is and its characterisation as an exclusive State function. The LaGrand 
example helps to separate the protection of citizens abroad into two components or 
tasks. The first component relates to value-generation (the motivation to intervene) 
and second relates to the practical modalities of intervention (the acts of protection).  
The motivation to intervene on behalf of an injured national may be fuelled by a range 
of factors. Moral or political values including political expediency, national values, 
human rights, security or the rule of law, can emerge as driving normative forces. In the 
case of the LaGrands, the aim or value of intervention on behalf of the brothers was 
complex. As discussed earlier in the chapter, prior to 1998 Germany provided routine 
consular assistance to the LaGrand brothers. It was not until domestic criticism of the 
German government intensified that Germany’s political classes became motivated to 
protect the brothers more robustly. Civil society actors, however, were motivated by the 
global publicity an ICJ case would attract for the anti-death penalty effort, as well as the 
prospect of obtaining a binding judgment to bolster their campaign. The alignment of 
interests that helped form the network also aided in generating the very purpose of the 
network, which was to mount an intervention.  
The second component of protection is a practical one relating to the modalities of a 
protective action. These practical aspects include representations, consular visits and 
negotiations. In the LaGrand protection network, actors undertook these tasks 
(classically understood as State functions) irrespective of their status as a State or non-
State actor. For example, throughout Germany’s active period of intervention after 
1998, civil society organisations were simultaneously coordinating efforts with the 
German government and making representations directly to the Governor of Arizona 
and the United States government.  




State and non-State actors distribute and claim these classical State capacities for a 
range of reasons. Within a multi-actor network, nodes can determine which actors will 
fulfil certain tasks based on the circumstances. For example, the node of actors that 
participated in the LaGrand brothers’ clemency hearings in the United States 
strategised about how to make the most from each actor. Amnesty International’s 
representative conveyed the political and moral messages related to human rights and 
morality of Arizona’s use of the death penalty. German State actors, on the other hand, 
were restrained by the requirement to show respect for United States sovereignty and 
therefore focused on breaches of the VCCR. Plural participation in a protective action 
facilitates burden sharing between actors and allows nodes to target specific messages 
and behaviours for the specific situation. The strategic approach of the German/human 
rights node maintained Germany’s political neutrality, while simultaneously expressing 
human rights concerns. In this case, the actors were able to harness existing expertise 
and political capital effectively to win popular support in Germany and achieve 
leadership in the anti-death penalty movement.66  
Braithwaite and Drahos have explored this phenomenon in global business where 
States and business corporations (and other actors) act as agents for one another. This 
reflexive agency reconstitutes both agents and principals continually.67  The idea of co-
agency may also be applied to the protection of citizens abroad. The traditional State 
functions of protecting citizens abroad (both generating motivation and the modalities) 
are reassigned to civil society, media and individual actors within a multi-actor network 
depending on the shared objectives of the network. Actors may perform tasks 
interchangeably to achieve the goals of the network.  
Law as a technique of protection: law to mobilise, law to neutralise 
Studies on the protection of citizens abroad often fail to interrogate the different ways 
in which law manifests itself in protective actions. The LaGrand case reveals how law 
operates as a tool for actors to achieve their aims and gain power. Law is deployed as a 
technique of protection in two ways: law as an instrument of mobilisation and law as an 
instrument of neutralisation. Civil society actors advocating for the LaGrand brothers 
relied on international human rights law standards to campaign for increased German 
intervention. Civil society mobilised the public, media and parts of the German 
government around the LaGrands’ plight on the grounds that it was based on, 
supported, and required by law. In this respect, human rights law functions as a 
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mobilising force where actors engage the authority of law, through litigation, to pursue 
claims and enforce rights. These actors drew on the perceived authority of law to 
compel action and negotiate standards for State behaviour.  
Various German government actors relied on law as a neutralising force. Counsel for 
Germany in LaGrand emphasised the technicality of the case under article 36 of the 
VCCR noting in Germany’s memorial that the case was not one about values.68 
Germany’s reliance on the formality and objectivity of law in the LaGrand case occurs 
for a number of reasons. The first is that the United States conveyed to Germany that it 
did not want the case to turn into a global anti-United States platform.69  By framing 
the dispute in a technical manner the German government could preserve the bilateral 
relationship between Germany and the United States, and Germany and the NATO 
alliance. Germany deployed the law as a neutral and mediating force focused on 
technical treaty compliance rather than a comparison between national human rights 
values. Germany and the United States attempted to strip the case of culture, moral 
norms and national values by situating the ICJ proceedings in a realm of technical legal 
interpretation, far from the perils of values or politics. By presenting the case with this 
aura of technical neutrality Germany discouraged other States from joining the claim 
thus avoiding the risk of politicising the action.  
The technicality of the legal action also served to neutralise its characterisation as a 
political or national claim. While diplomatic protection is understood as a claim based 
on nationality, the case did not linger on points of nationality or nationalism. Instead, 
the action was framed as a legal requirement, based on the values entrenched in the 
German Basic Law. This sensitivity around nationalism in Germany can be explained 
by what German scholars refer to as ‘constitutional patriotism.’70   This substitution of 
values, from the national to the constitutional, is evident in the manner in which 
Germany avoided making a nationalistic claim about the treatment of its citizens.  
Simultaneously, LaGrand served as a vehicle for Germany to express its political and 
moral values about the death penalty, even though the ICJ case specifically addressed 
consular notification. An anti-Americanism was embedded in German society at the 
time of LaGrand and grew at the announcement of participation in Kosovo. 71   Karen 
Bagge’s article (Amnesty International’s representative) on the treatment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ‘Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany’, LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) 
[2001] ICJ Pleadings [1.08]. 
69 Interview with Germany’s Legal Counsel #1 in LaGrand (The Hague, June 2013).   
70 See generally, Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton University Press, 2007); Ralf 
Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (Anchor 1967); David Abraham, ‘Constitutional 
Patriotism, Citizenship, and Belonging’ (2008)(6) International Journal of Constitutional Law 137. 
71 Interview with Germany’s Legal Counsel #1 in LaGrand (The Hague, June 2013).   
Chapter 4 
86 
LaGrand brothers was titled ‘The Arrogance of the Super Power’ and exemplifies this 
anti-United States sentiment in Germany prior to the case.72  The ICJ case allowed the 
contestation of values to occur under the guise of law as a neutral arbiter. While at the 
international level and within its memorials Germany claimed the pursuit of a legal 
technicality under the VCCR, the message for Germany’s domestic audience conveyed a 
contest of values about the death penalty. Germany’s rule of law orientation and its 
constitutional protection for the right to life were juxtaposed with the United States’ 
pro-death penalty stance. The ICJ’s decision was a success for Germany’s values and an 
opportunity to distinguish itself from the United States in the view of the German 
public.  
 
State sovereignty and participation 
The LaGrand case provides two disaggregating lenses for State sovereignty. Tensions 
arose among German government actors, including the bureaucracy, executive and 
individual politicians. These cleavages are a regular occurrence in the way that many 
democratic and developed States resolve policy issues domestically. What seems even 
more interesting is that German sub-State actors formed alliances with actors outside 
of the State structure. The German Foreign Ministry aligned itself with NATO and the 
German Ministry of Justice aligned itself with civil society and the public – each 
respectively forming their own network of resistance and protection. Federalism 
appears as a second fracture in the classic paradigm of sovereignty.  The source of the 
dispute between Germany and the United States can be traced to the disunity between 
the United States government and the state of Arizona. The disaggregation between the 
state and federal governments created an opportunity for the United States to exploit 
limitations on its ability to act, arguing that power resided with Arizona. 
Implementation of the ICJ’s decisions in relation to the VCCR in LaGrand and Avena 
(discussed in chapter 5) continue as a point of contention between the United States 
government and its states. Both these examples demonstrate how plural networks 
endeavour to harness and repudiate political claims and achieve governance outcomes.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





The situation of the LaGrand brothers reveals plural participation of State and non-
State actors in pre-international litigation action and the generation of an international 
legal case to protect nationals abroad. It also demonstrates how the modalities of plural 
participation or shared action can occur. Once interests between the non-State actors 
and State actors aligned, juridification of the death penalty value emerged as a course 
of action. While non-State actors cannot initiate legal proceedings in the ICJ this case 
study shows how, through networks and nodes, civil society organisations can motivate 
States to commence legal action. Germany’s government also benefited from its 
relationship with civil society actors by capitalising on their moral authority with the 
German public and the transnational anti-death penalty campaigns on foot at the time. 
Actors shared information and developed strategy, showcasing how expertise exchange 
can benefit different actors and contribute to the shared objectives of the network. An 
assessment of the existence and operation of networks cannot be limited to a 
consideration of their coordinating aspect alone, but must include a substantive 
analysis of norm and value generation. The co-agency displayed by the multi-actor 
network in LaGrand demonstrates that States are not solely responsible for the 
modalities of protection. The LaGrand case exemplifies the manner in which actors 
deploy the law in different forums to mobilise support or to neutralise political and 
moral concerns, often in contradictory ways.  
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Chapter 5  
Mexico  
 
This chapter investigates Mexico’s protection programmes in the United States and 
Avena and Others (Mexico v United States).1  Mexico’s policies to protect its citizens 
are based on targeted consular and legal programmes in the Unites States. The aim of 
this chapter is to analyse how networked action can facilitate the participation of a 
broader range of actors in the protection of citizens abroad and how multi-actor 
networks transform the protection of citizens abroad into local action. Section one 
examines Avena, the third ICJ case against the United States concerning consular 
notification under the VCCR. Section two analyses Mexico’s suite of programmes and 
policies for the protection of its nationals in the United States. Then, I examine the role 
of nodes and techniques they employ at the national and international level. Finally, the 
chapter considers the relationship between Mexico’s model of protection and the rules 
of diplomatic protection in international law.  
	  
I. Avena and others  (Mexico v  United States )  (2004) 
In 2004, Mexico instituted legal proceedings in the ICJ against the United States. 
Mexico alleged a breach of the Vienna Convention and of its right of diplomatic 
protection under customary international law. Mexico brought the Avena case on 
behalf of 54 Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death in various 
jurisdictions in the United States. On 9 January 2003, Mexico made an application to 
the Court for provisional measures to prevent the execution of three Mexican nationals 
in anticipation of the Court’s judgment on the merits.2  The Court granted provisional 
measures on 5 February 2003.3  Mexico sought review and reconsideration of the cases 
affected by the United States’ failure to provide consular notification under article 36(1) 
of the Vienna Convention.  
The Court considered several issues in its judgment. First, the Court defined the phrase 
‘without delay’ in article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention. The Court noted the use of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) (Judgment) [2004] ICJ Rep 
12. 
2 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) (Provisional Measures) [2003] 
ICJ Rep 77 [11].  
3 Ibid [55]. 
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different phrases to describe the content of article 36 of the Vienna Convention. The 
Court clarified and distinguished: 
As regards the terminology employed to designate the obligations incumbent upon 
the receiving State under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), the Court notes that the 
Parties have used the terms “inform” and “notify” in differing senses. For the sake 
of clarity, the Court … will use the word “inform when referring to an individual 
being made aware of his rights under that subparagraph and the word “notify” 
when referring to the giving of notice to the consular post.4 
Furthermore, the Court identified three ‘separate but interrelated’ elements in the 
obligations under article 36(1)(b): the individual’s right to be informed without delay of 
the right to contact and communicate with his or her consulate, the sending State’s 
right to be notified without delay of the individual’s custody through its consular post, 
and third, the obligation of the receiving State to forward without delay any 
communication for the consular post from the individual if she requests.5  The Court 
also observed that the violation of the individual’s rights under the Vienna Convention 
could also result in a violation of a State’s rights and in doing so, the Court 
acknowledged the interdependence of the elements it identified in article 36.6  The 
Court revisited the distinction between an individual injury and a direct injury to the 
State arising from a breach of article 36. The Court recounted that should States 
experience a direct injury under international law, the requirement to exhaust all 
domestic remedies is no longer applicable. In its judgment, the Court decided it was not 
necessary to consider Mexico’s claim on the ground of diplomatic protection, but 
instead proceeded on Mexico’s direct injury.7  
The Court also specified when the obligation to inform and notify without delay in 
article 36 arises. Mexico argued that for the right in article 36(1) to have effect, the 
person must be informed of their right to contact their consulate immediately and prior 
to any interrogation or questioning.8  The Court rejected Mexico’s interpretation. After 
consulting the travaux to the Diplomatic Conference, the Court concluded that the 
obligations in article 36 of the Vienna Convention accrue ‘as soon as it is realized that 
the person is a foreign national, or once there are grounds to think that the person is 
probably a foreign national.’9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) (Judgment) [2004] ICJ Rep 
12, 26.  
5 Ibid 43 [61]. 
6 Ibid 36 [40]. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid 47 [79]. 
9 Ibid 49 [88]. 
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In the Court’s decision on the merits, it held that the United States had breached its 
obligation under the Vienna Convention to advise 51 of those detained Mexican 
nationals of their right to receive consular assistance from Mexico without delay. The 
Court held that the United States was required to provide review and reconsideration as 
a remedy for the breach, but that, ‘the concrete modalities for such review and 
reconsideration should be left primarily to the United States.’10  
	  
United States-Mexico relationship and the protection of Mexicans 
The history of the United States-Mexico relationship provides political context for the 
initiation of the Avena case. The Mexican community in the United States has been 
estimated to be over 11 million11 and undocumented Mexican migrants at over six 
million.12   A shared history between the United States and Mexico has shaped Mexican 
migration to the United States, particularly to the southern states. The Mexican-US war 
in the 1800s was fought over territories now forming part of the United States (Texas, 
California and New Mexico). The border changed in 1847, but the presence of Mexicans 
in those territories did not. Mexicans have consistently been connected to those 
territories, contributing to the ongoing movement of people from Mexico into the 
United States. However, social discrimination, economic hardship and a lack of security 
related to migration status has led to a situation of systemic vulnerability for many 
Mexicans in the United States, including poor health and education outcomes.13 
Moreover, the United States introduced policies in the 1990s to discourage both 
documented and undocumented migration across the US-Mexican border.14  
Mexicans in the United States embody Mexico’s national interest, particularly in the 
form of economic support for the domestic Mexican population. In 2010, Mexico 
received approximately $22 billion USD in remittances from Mexican nationals in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid 62 [131]. The ICJ’s decision on remedies faced criticism, see, eg, Natalie Klein, ‘Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals’ (2004) 11 Australian Journal of International Law 143, 153-55.  
11 Sierra Stoney and Jeanne Batalova, ‘Mexican Immigrants in the United States’ (28 February 2013) 
Migration Policy Institute <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/mexican-immigrants-united-states#1>. 
12 Pew Research, ‘US Unauthorised Immigration Population Trends, 1990-2012’ Hispanic Trends Project 
(23 September 2013) <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/unauthorized-trends/#Mexico>.  
13 See generally Barbara Schhneider, Sylvia Martinez, and Ann Ownes, Hispanics in the Future of 
America (National Academies Press, 2006); Darrell Steffensmeier and Stephen Demuth, ‘Ethnicity and 
Sentencing Outcomes in US Federal Courts: Who is Punished More Harshly?’ (2000) 65(5) American 
Sociological Review 705.  
14 Douglas S Massey, Jorge Durand and Nolan J Malone, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican 
Immigration In An Era of Economic Integration (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002) 2.  
Chapter 5 
92 
United States.15  Mexico’s effort to protect its citizens is linked to a broader domestic 
consensus that Mexicans settling in the United States require support and protection.16  
Ricardo Ampudia reflects on the connection between protecting nationals in the United 
States with Mexico’s foreign policy: 
The defense of Mexicans abroad, and the promotion of respect for the human rights, 
for years have been two of the main pillars of Mexican foreign policy, upon which is 
based the task of protection performed by the Mexican government. Consular 
protection, especially that provided to migratory workers who go to the United 
States, has a long tradition in the history of Mexican diplomacy. 17  
Systemic hardship combined with the economic importance of remittances from 
Mexicans in the United States inform Mexico’s protective activism and the support that 
government policies enjoy from the public and civil society.18  Mexico has also tied its 
protection policies to a campaign against the use of the death penalty on Mexican 
citizens by the United States, another area in which there is support from the Mexican 
public.  
Some have suggested that Mexico’s attitude towards the death penalty is informed by 
domestic human rights reforms made by the government prior to the Avena case.19 
Mexico’s domestic human rights situation came under international scrutiny in the 
1990s. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights reviewed allegations of flagrant 
human rights abuses in Chiapas (a state of Mexico) and electoral irregularities.20  A 
report by Human Rights Watch in 1990 outlined the significant shortcomings of 
Mexico’s approach to human rights and contributed to focusing the Mexican 
government’s attention on human rights issues.21  Following this criticism, Mexico put 
in place a number of reforms.22  The Mexican government accepted recommendations 
made by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.23  On 6 June 1990 the National 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Steve Brito, Ana Corbacho and René Osorio, ‘Remittances and the Impact on Crime in Mexico’ (May 
2014) Inter-American Development Bank Paper Series 2.  
16 Interview with Mexican Government Official #2 (Mexico City, February 2014).  
17 Ricardo Ampudia, Mexicans on Death Row (Arte Público Press, 2010) 105.   
18 Roundtable with Directorate of Protection, SRE (Mexico City, February 2014).  
19 Ibid.  
20 ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico’ (Country Report, Doc 7 rev 1, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 24 September 1998) 
<http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Mexico98en/table-of-contents.htm>.  
21 Human Rights Watch Report on Mexico: Americas Watch, Human Rights in Mexico: A Policy of 
Impunity (June 1990) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/Mexico906.pdf>.   
22 For a more detailed investigation of human rights in Mexico see Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Human Rights, 
Principled-Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America’ (1993) 47 International Organization 411, 
428-435.  
23 See ‘Final Recommendations and Conclusions’ in ‘Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico’ 
(Country Report, Doc 7 rev 1, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100, Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 24 
September 1998) <http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Mexico98en/table-of-contents.htm> [673]. 
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Human Rights Commission was established by Presidential decree.24  The Mexican 
government also introduced reforms to the death penalty. Initially, the government 
imposed a moratorium on the application of the death penalty, followed by a 
constitutional amendment in 2005 prohibiting the death penalty.25  With the domestic 
moratorium on the use of the death penalty in place, there was frustration from the 
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (‘Mexican Foreign Ministry’ or ‘SRE’) that 
executions of Mexican nationals continued in the United States.26  
	  
Background to the case 
The strategy and momentum for the ICJ case was generated, predominantly, within the 
Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Individuals within the SRE served as catalysts for 
the Avena and the development of Mexico’s protection policies. SRE Deputy Legal 
Advisor Joel Hernández, and Legal Advisor Juan-Manuel Gómez Robledo, shared a 
frustration about Mexico’s limited ability to intervene on behalf of Mexican nationals 
on death row in the United States.27  Both Hernández and Gómez Robledo had been 
posted to the United States as diplomats and had witnessed first-hand the difficulties 
faced by Mexicans within the US criminal justice system.28  Inspired by the Court’s 
judgment in LaGrand in 2001, Joel Hernández and Gómez Robledo proposed initiating 
proceedings against the United States in the ICJ for breaches of the Vienna Convention. 
Based on their personal experience in the United States as consular and diplomatic 
officials, combined with the momentum created by the LaGrand case, Hernández and 
Gómez Robledo embarked upon convincing their government to institute legal 
proceedings against the United States.  
Once Luis Derbez, Mexico’s Foreign Minister, granted his approval, the SRE undertook 
consultations with domestic stakeholders prior to commencing the case in 2004.29 
Internal government consultations included both houses of congress, chambers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos <http://www.cndh.org.mx/Antecedentes>.  
25 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Constitution of Mexico 1917]. Amendments 
to articles 14 and 22 were made on 23 June 2005. See generally Hands Off Cain, Mexico Factsheet 
<http://www.handsoffcain.info/bancadati/schedastato.php?idcontinente=24&nome=mexico>. Note, 
however, that Mexico has a limited prohibition, with the death penalty still being applicable in 
circumstances of treason.  
26 Roundtable with Directorate of Protection, SRE (Mexico City, February 2014). 
27 Interview with Mexican Government Official #1 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
28 Interview with Sandra Babcock (Chicago, February 2014).  
29 It is not clear precisely when consultations took place, only that they occurred in advance of the case 
being filed in the ICJ.  
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commerce, ministers and President Vincente Fox.30  Consultations aimed to achieve a 
critical mass of support for legal action. Informal consultations were also conducted 
with Sandra Babcock, an American lawyer. Babcock’s involvement in the Avena case 
began with her legal practice in the United States on Vienna Convention consular 
notification requirements and the death penalty for foreign nationals.31   Babcock had 
experience arguing Vienna Convention claims when representing Mexicans and other 
foreign nationals on death row in the United States. The SRE invited Babcock to 
participate in the Avena case as a link into the United States legal system by ‘providing 
the US expertise that was required for the Avena case.’32   Babcock also suggested that 
Mexico needed a legal team to assist with conduct of the litigation. Donald Donovan of 
Debevoise and Plimpton (a New York law firm) had previously assisted Germany in the 
LaGrand case and agreed to take on the matter pro bono.33  
Some Mexican stakeholders feared economic or political reprisals by the United States 
in response to the ICJ proceedings.34   The SRE argued that the ICJ was an apolitical 
forum for resolving international law disputes between States. Furthermore, the SRE 
contended that the authority of the Court neutralised any political sentiment that the 
United States could have attributed to Mexico’s case.35  The SRE’s position is consistent 
with broader Latin American sentiment about the role of international courts. Ximena 
Fuentes observes that Latin American States have a commitment to international 
adjudication for the resolution of disputes. Fuentes suggests that ‘they have confidence 
in international law and in the capabilities and impartiality of the Court,’ which she 
argues is reflected in an increased tendency to use the ICJ.36  Hernández and Gómez 
Robeldo countered stakeholder fears by framing the ICJ action as part of Mexico’s duty 
to protect its citizens abroad.37  Coupled with the argument about the neutrality of 
international legal adjudication, Hernández and Gómez Robeldo appealed to a deeper 
nationalistic sentiment about the treatment of Mexican nationals within the United 
States discussed earlier in this chapter.  
The approach of catalyst actors in the lead up to Avena highlights a tension between 
nationalism and internationalism. Some scholars have reflected on how the training of 
international lawyers shapes the normative agenda of their goals and expertise, in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Interview with Mexican Government Official #1 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
31 Interview with Sandra Babcock (Chicago, February 2014).  
32 Interview with Mexican Government Official #2 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
33 Interview with Mexican Government Official #1 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.   
36 Ximena Fuentes, ‘Latin American States and the ICJ’ in Natalie Klein (ed), Litigating International 
Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 79, 80 and 105. 
37 Interview with Mexican Government Official #1 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
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case, one of internationalism.38  Oscar Schachter, for example, described the stratifying 
effect of education on international lawyers as a ‘general phenomenon of 
internalization of social values shared by those brought up and educated within the 
same national society.’39  
Government officials in the SRE described Gómez Robledo as the ‘engine-room’ for 
Mexico in Avena.40  Babcock and others characterised Gómez Robledo as ‘human-
rights oriented’ and possessing a commitment to the international rule of law.41  Gómez 
Robledo was educated in France and served in a number of capacities in international 
organisations including the International Law Commission and as Chairman of the UN 
Sixth Committee in New York.42  Hernández was educated at New York University and 
served as Director-General of the United Nations.43  Anne Orford notes that ‘the belief 
in the role of international law is embodied in the everyday life of those who imagine 
themselves as agents of humanitarianism and human rights’.44  The duty to protect, as 
promulgated by Hernández and Gómez Robledo, fuels both nationalist and 
internationalist tendencies. Protection is embodied as part of the national interest, yet 
because of the education and humanitarian orientation of key figures in the SRE, the 
appropriate forum for its contestation is at the international level.   
Internationalism was not a feature of the United States’ response to Mexico’s claim, 
however. A series of meetings between the Mexican and United States governments 
were held in Washington DC to resolve the matter, however diplomatic and political 
efforts were not successful.45  Following these efforts, Mexico reached the view that it 
had exhausted all its avenues.46  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Anne Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers’ (1998) 19 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 1, 14.  
39 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’ (1977) 72 Northwestern University 
Law Review 217, 219. 
40 Interview with Mexican Government Official #2 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
41 Interview with Sandra Babcock (Chicago, February 2014). 
42 ‘Juan Manuel Gómez-Robledo Chairman of Sixth Committee: Biographical Note’ (UN Press Release, 
BIO/3806-GA/L/3294, 13 September 2006).   
43 ‘Ambassador Joel Hernández is elected to the Inter-American Judicial Committee’ (Embassy of 
Mexico in Malaysia Press release, 11 June 2014) see 
<http://embamex.sre.gob.mx/malasia/index.php/mexico-today/440-ambassador-joel-hernandez-of-
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44 Orford, above n 38, 9.  
45 Interview with Mexican Government Official #2 (Mexico City, February 2014); Avena and Other 
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46 Interview with Mexican Government Official #2 (Mexico City, February 2014).   
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Reception of the International Court of Justice judgment of Avena  by the 
United States 
Despite the legal success of the case, outcomes flowing from Avena in the United States 
have been mixed. There has been one instance of review and reconsideration arising 
from the ICJ’s ruling. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and 
reconsideration to Osbaldo Torres in the form of a new hearing.47  Many US states, 
academics and practitioners, however, have rejected the Avena judgment on the basis 
that it inserts ‘international and foreign law into U.S. judicial decision-making’, and 
that the decision of the ICJ was an ‘intrusion on U.S. sovereign authority’.48  Domestic 
rejection of the ICJ judgment was manifested by executions of Mexicans listed in Avena. 
For example, Edgar Tamayo was executed in Texas in January 2014.49  In similar 
circumstances to the aftermath of LaGrand, US states like Arizona and Texas have 
guarded their criminal jurisdiction fiercely.  
In 2005, United States President George W Bush issued an Executive Order requiring 
states to comply with the Avena decision to provide review and reconsideration.50  The 
US government’s attempt to resolve the domestic impasse was met with resistance. In 
the 2006 case of Sanchez-Llamas, the United States Supreme Court considered the 
question of treaty implementation arising from the VCCR and held that the procedural 
default rule of states overruled the judgment of the ICJ.51   Moreover, in a challenge to 
the President’s Executive Order in the case of Medellin v Texas, the Supreme Court 
held that an Executive Order was not sufficient to implement the VCCR because it is 
not a self-executing treaty and that legislation was required to implement the Avena 
judgment.52  These Supreme Court decisions provided some relief for the United States 
government – there was nothing more that the United States could do directly to 
implement the ICJ’s decision in Avena. Since the judgment in Medellin the United 
States government has expressed the view that the matter can only be resolved by the 
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legislature not the executive.53   This political deadlock in the United States has relieved 
the government from the pressure of implementing Avena and has left Mexico’s 
international legal efforts without a substantive outcome.  
The Directorate of Protection in the SRE has not succeeded in its campaign to secure 
the legislative amendments required for implementation of the ICJ decision by the 
United States.54   A bill brought before the United States congress in 2014 did not 
pass.55  Mexico established a working group, Mexican Civil Rights Advisory Group 
(MCRAG), to address the issue of implementing legislation and to strategise with local 
actors about other concerns related to Mexican nationals in the United States. In 
response to the resistance of the United States to the ICJ rulings in LaGrand and 
Avena, Mexico invests in the local level by allocating more resources to pre-trial 
procedures and programmes.  
 
 II. Mexico’s Protection Framework in the United States of America 
Mexico’s policy-oriented approach to the protection of its citizens in the United States 
is manifested by a series of programmes intended to provide individual and structural 
intervention. These programmes provide four avenues for protecting and assisting 
Mexican citizens: a referral to an attorney from the Mexican consulate’s consultant 
attorney list; Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program (MCLAP); Programa de 
Asistencia Jurídica a Mexicanos a través de Asesorías Legales Externas (referred to as 
PALE or the External Legal Assistance Program), and finally, Proteje, a programme 
that previously funded class action cases on behalf of Mexican nationals.56   Mexico has 
put in place a number of governance arrangements to deliver targeted protection for 
Mexican nationals through these programmes. This part of the chapter focuses on the 
MCLAP and PALE programmes. It considers the objectives of the programmes and 
outlines their operation.    
The aim of Mexico’s consular programme is to provide ‘assistance and advice to 
Mexicans in their dealings with local authorities, visiting Mexicans in detention, prison, 
hospitals, or assistance in any other difficult situation, and representing Mexicans who 
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are incapable of handling their own affairs’.57   Representation is central to Mexico’s 
protection regime. Prior to the introduction of the MCLAP and PALE programmes, 
Mexico’s consular officers participated in the domestic criminal trials of Mexican 
citizens. Mexican diplomats and consular officers attended court hearings and even 
presented statements to courts on behalf of Mexico and Mexican nationals on trial. 
Consular officials presented mitigation arguments and registered Mexico’s national 
interest in the treatment of its nationals in US court proceedings. In-court statements 
were coupled with out-of-court diplomacy by way of letters to judges, governors and 
district attorneys, and Third Person Notes to the Federal government. These 
representations did not lessen the instances of Mexican nationals being sentenced with 
the death penalty or reduce the systemic discrimination experienced by Mexicans in the 
US criminal justice system.58   Mexico needed more expertise in the US legal system to 
increase its impact. In response to this problem, Mexico developed legal programmes 
embedded in the US criminal justice system by employing US lawyers to run cases for 
Mexican nationals at risk of receiving a death penalty sentence. This strategy changed 
the face of Mexico’s interventions on behalf of its nationals in the United States.59  
	  
Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program (MCLAP) 
The SRE introduced MCLAP in 2000 as part of a suite of measures to assist Mexicans 
in the US criminal justice system. The programme is centrally administered and funded 
by the SRE in Mexico City and implemented by the consulates and the MCLAP Director, 
a United States lawyer. Through the MCLAP, Mexico retains lawyers in the United 
States to represent and assist Mexican nationals at risk of receiving a death sentence. 
Since its inception, MCLAP has identified and accredited lawyers with expertise in the 
death penalty or ‘capital cases’ in each state. Mexican consulates work in conjunction 
with lawyers in the United States to defend Mexican nationals. 
Despite two ICJ rulings against the United States, consular notification in accordance 
with article 36 of the Vienna Convention occurs inconsistently.60   Mexican consulates 
receive notification through different avenues and at different stages of the legal 
process (pre-arrest, arrest, pre-charges, post-arraignment etc). Members of the MCLAP 
network assist the consulates to monitor court lists and media for the names of 
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Mexican nationals accused of serious crimes, particularly where there is the possibility 
that the death penalty could be applied. Once the consulate is informed of the pending 
charges, an MCLAP attorney is appointed and funded by the consulate to follow the 
case, even though the individual may already have been appointed a lawyer by the court 
in that jurisdiction.  
Throughout the process, the consulate and the MCLAP attorney coordinate their efforts. 
To ensure efficiency and a harmonised approach, the national attends a meeting in the 
Mexican consulate, together with the MCLAP attorney and their court-appointed 
lawyer (should he/she wish to attend). Consulates request Mexican nationals to 
complete a standard questionnaire, which is designed to extract mitigation information, 
including early identification of mental illness and special circumstances. The answers 
to the questionnaire help the consulate to retrieve further information on the national’s 
Mexican antecedents for their defence. With both consulate officials and the MCLAP 
attorney attending hearings and participating in the case, the MCLAP programme 
embeds a strategic element throughout the process by ensuring consistency and 
providing experience.  
MCLAP has an important role to play in capital (death penalty) criminal cases in 
several ways. The MCLAP attorney serves as an adjunct lawyer to the case, depending 
on the appointed lawyer’s experience and willingness. Some court-appointed lawyers 
are eager to accept additional resources and assistance from MCLAP, while others do 
not wish to have their case shadowed.61  MCLAP provides background information, 
documents from Mexico, research, motions and prepares letters to the prosecutor and 
District Attorney.62   The programme also hires investigators or ‘mitigation specialists’ 
depending on the case and the jurisdiction. MCLAP does a Preliminary Mitigation 
Investigation (PMI), whereby an investigator is hired to do a skeletal investigation.  
This will include meeting with family members, collecting documents and background 
research.63   MCLAP, the consulate and the SRE follow cases from their inception until 
they are concluded.  
	  
External Legal Assistance Program for Mexicans (PALE) 
Another programme, PALE, addresses a wider range of issues concerning Mexican 
nationals in the US legal system.  The PALE focuses on immigration, labour, human 
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rights, family law and criminal law not involving the death penalty. The consulate 
assesses applications received from Mexican nationals for assistance and can provide 
up to $US5000 for a lawyer appointed from the consulate’s list of local attorneys. Based 
on criteria developed by the SRE, each consulate compiles lists of lawyers, law firms 
and civil society organisations in their jurisdiction or state. These criteria include 
Spanish language ability, accessibility of their offices to Mexican nationals, extensive 
litigation experience, successful history of Mexican advocacy cases, an interest in 
representing Mexican nationals demonstrated by previous pro bono assistance, and a 
commitment to service of multiple cases through a fixed fee (flat fee) or preferential 
hourly rate.64  
Each Mexican consulate determines eligibility for funding and may develop its own 
criteria for case eligibility under the PALE.  Consulates may consider cases concerning 
Mexican national interests, humanitarian concerns (such as immigration), public 
interest cases where there is scope to develop an important legal precedent and 
politically controversial or sensitive matters.65  If the consulate regards a matter as 
falling within this general guide, it is referred to an attorney from the consulate’s list 
and the consulate funds legal costs from within their budget. Unlike the MCLAP, the 
PALE is not centrally administered by the SRE. It is a self-funding program, whereby 
revenue raised from visa, passport and other applications is redirected into the PALE 
program.66  This approach of devolved funding and decision-making enables Mexican 
consulates to be responsive to the needs of the Mexican citizens in their constituency.  
Most State-based protection and consular approaches are focused on civil and political 
rights, particularly fair trial rights. Labour rights, cultural rights and gender/LGBTI 
rights do not attract the same attention from States as the death penalty, torture and 
due process rights. The position under international law however is that claims may be 
espoused on behalf of an individual in the commission of any internationally wrongful 
act. A unique feature of the PALE is that its scope extends to victims of crime and 
systemic discrimination. Consular officers are able to identify matters where Mexican 
nationals face systemic issues that do not involve due process rights through this 
programme. PALE-funded cases have also been brought against police officers for 
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police brutality and wrongful death, as well as to protect labour rights of Mexican 
nationals.67  
	  
III. Networks of Participation 
Mexico’s approach to protecting nationals is contingent upon two significant features. 
The first is that the delivery of protection is based on networks of actors. One of these 
networks is Mexico’s fifty consulates in the United States – more than any other State 
with a diplomatic presence in the United States. Mexico’s consular network, and its 
associated local contacts, provides the infrastructure for Mexico to pursue its protection 
policies. The second feature of Mexico’s approach is the inculcation of values within its 
networks, a role performed by protective and legal nodes in both the United States and 
Mexico. This aim of this part is to analyse the technologies of Mexico’s protection 
network and appraise the advantages of a formal networked approach to the protection 
of citizens abroad.  
	  
Expertise: cultural, technological and technical 
Mexican nationals in the US criminal justice system experience a number of cultural, 
linguistic and technical obstacles. Kuykendall, Amezcua-Rodriguez and Warren identify 
the cultural impediments facing foreign nationals in the United States:  
Foreigners facing the death penalty in the United States may be especially 
vulnerable and often suffer from a range of inherent disadvantages, such as 
ignorance of important cultural and legal norms, lack of trust in the attorney-client 
relationship, inability to consult with familial confidants, and significant physical 
and cultural barriers to a competent mitigation investigation.68 
Mexican nationals accused of crimes in the United States rely upon the cultural and 
legal expertise of their MCLAP attorneys to overcome these barriers. Actors in the 
MCLAP and PALE programmes perform a number of knowledge brokerage and 
translation roles. MCLAP bridges the linguistic divide between Mexican nationals and 
US officials with the provision of Spanish-speaking attorneys. Programme attorneys 
also operate as a cultural bridge. As local lawyers in the United States, MCLAP 
attorneys can explain the legal processes and concepts to Mexican nationals and 
cultural issues to United States officials. Their ability to easily access and translate 
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information within and around the court system is of immense value to the success of a 
Mexican national’s case. As domestic legal experts, MCLAP attorneys also provide 
procedural knowledge and substantive legal expertise of each jurisdiction. Coupled with 
their broader experience as criminal lawyers, MCLAP attorneys specialise in capital 
cases and mitigation.  
The Mexican consulate and its officers also play a role as cultural brokers. Victor Uribe, 
a Mexican diplomat, writes that ‘[t]he consul … represents familiarity. The presence of 
a fellow national who speaks the same language gives great psychological relief to 
distressed nationals detained in a strange environment.’69  The cultural connection 
between consular officers and Mexican nationals in these circumstances facilitates 
mitigation. Mexican consular officers provide the antecedents and context of the 
individual’s life from within Mexico as part of mitigation processes. MCLAP lawyers 
have reflected on how beneficial partnerships with consulates are for defending cases:  
Working with consular authorities from a foreign client’s country of origin can lead 
to a culturally and linguistically competent life-history investigation that would 
otherwise be difficult or even impossible to achieve.70  
Through this cultural proximity to the national, consulates can facilitate the provision 
of information to MCLAP attorneys who in turn translate those details into mitigation 
arguments within the relevant criminal jurisdiction in the United States. 
Criminal mitigation in the United States is one area of domestic law where the legal 
norms are especially complex. Unlike some systems where mitigation involves 
expressions of remorse and characterisations of the criminal behaviour as an aberrance, 
mitigation in the United States relates to showing a life-course consistent with criminal 
behaviour.71  Defence lawyers in United States criminal proceedings try to showcase a 
defendant’s family history that demonstrates mental illness or behavioural issues. 
Mitigation aims to show that the criminal behaviour was consistent with the mental 
diagnosis and social antecedents of the defendant. Greg Kuykendall, Director of the 
MCLAP, notes that mitigation ‘is very easy to misunderstand and collecting statements 
and affidavits showing that the defendant behaved out of character is a disservice to the 
client.’72  The MCLAP attorney mediates the challenging terrain of mitigation through 
their court experience and legal expertise in the various criminal justice systems of the 
United States. 
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Coupled with the expertise of domestic lawyers in the United States, the political and 
issues-based expertise of civil society allows for a broad range of interventions. Civil 
society organisations identify systemic issues and access the political and public policy 
sphere. Local community organisations in the United States also play a role. 73 
Community organisations communicate information about Mexico’s programmes and 
services provided to Mexicans in the United States. The role of community 
organisations is an important one, particularly for generating local support and 
managing expectations.74  The involvement of community organisations allows the 
consulates to delegate the management of some of the community’s expectations and 
the dissemination of information.  
Communication and distribution of information are fundamental techniques of 
Mexico’s protection network in the United States. The MCLAP Director in the United 
States collates information and uses statistics as a tool to manage the programme and 
direct funding.75  Digitalised files in an electronic system streamline processes, allowing 
for a better flow of information between the SRE and MCLAP attorneys in each case. 
Kuykendall has emphasised the importance of digitalising the MCLAP’s workflow as a 
way of ‘increasing the statistical relevance’ of MCLAP’s work.76  MCLAP has been able 
to aggregate relevant data to drive policy and influence various actors in the United 
States. For example, in jurisdictions where Mexicans have been sentenced to death in 
the past (for example, Texas, Arizona, and Los Angeles and Harris counties in 
California) a Mexican national is 13 times less likely to receive the death penalty with 
MCLAP involvement than an identically placed American.77   The MCLAP Director’s use 
of statistics helps to chart a track record of success, rather than relying on anecdotal 
evidence. Kuykendall also uses the statistical evidence to communicate to the Mexican 
government that ‘this is well-spent money and can often mean the difference between 
life and death.’78  Kuykendall argues that ‘money is the single most important factor’ in 
the success of the regime.79   
The benefit of MCLAP’s data collection goes beyond resource allocation. Wendy 
Espeland and Berit Vannebo note that numbers, in the form of quantification, perform 
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an important function in accountability narratives.80  They argue that quantification 
makes for easy comparison, it communicates efficiency as moral value, it directs 
attention to improve outcomes and it interacts with the authority of law.81   Espeland 
and Vannebo’s conclusions resonate with the way in which MCLAP harnesses 
quantification as a strategy. Statistical evidence of the success rate of the programme 
helps to mobilise and recruit actors into MCLAP, particularly local lawyers. 
Quantification also informs the programme’s goals. The Director uses the statistics to 
highlight where more attention/money is required. The statistical accounts provide a 
metric to base the validity of the programme for Mexico and to make a more 
authoritative claim to funding. Therefore, quantification serves as an important 
technique of the network: both as a directive force, a claim for funding by the MCLAP 
Director and a justification for funding to the Mexican executive by the SRE.82  
MCLAP has a budget of over $3.5 million USD, largely within the discretion of the 
Director. 83   Reliance on local expertise for knowledge of court processes, expert 
litigators and investigators allows the Director to form a targeted programme for the 
provision of legal representation within the United States. The structure of the 
programme and its investment in the expertise offered by the US lawyers means that 
the Director of MCLAP has enough discretion/flexibility to make decisions related to 
the cases without consulting the SRE on every decision on each case.84  The SRE 
devolves much of its power into the local networks to conduct the casework, 
appearances and to exercise legal judgment and strategy in each case.  
The ICJ cases of Avena, LaGrand and Breard add weight to MCLAP claims related to 
breaches of the consular notification requirement earlier in the criminal proceedings. 
Kuykendall, Amezcua-Rodriguez and Warren note that ‘[t]he diplomatic and legal 
conflict generated by the treaty violation was instrumental in convincing the 
prosecution not to seek death against the client.’85 With death penalty cases costing as 
much as $1 million USD, early intervention transforms the MCLAP into a cost-saving 
programme for Mexico.86 The experience of the Programme demonstrates that there is 
more flexibility in the pre-trial phase for MCLAP attorneys to convince a prosecutor not 
to consider the death penalty.87  A pre-trial emphasis has produced results. Less than 
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one percent of pre-trial cases in which MCLAP is involved will have the death penalty 
applied.88 Moreover, cases involving the MCLAP are more likely to be resolved before 
trial. Therefore, procedural knowledge of the system enables MCLAP attorneys to exert 
their influence in the most malleable phase of proceedings. By addressing the treatment 
of Mexican nationals prior to trial, the programme can avoid entrenched judicial 
outcomes that must then be appealed through courts in the United States.  
 
Nodal governance: orchestrating protective values 
Several nodes in Mexico’s protection networks direct goals and guide collaboration in 
the protection of Mexican nationals in the United States. The Mexican Civil Rights 
Advisory Group, briefly discussed in section one of this chapter, formalises the 
relationship between Mexico and US civil society organisations. The MCRAG forms a 
‘fundamental component of the efforts of the Mexican government to protect the 
interests of its nationals in the United States.’89  Civil society organisations with a focus 
on a range of civil liberties, human rights, and litigation meet regularly with the 
Mexican government. The Advisory Group identifies possible test cases, provides 
updates on pending cases and coordinates strategy. Some of these CSOs include the 
American Immigration Council, American Civil Liberties Union and the National 
Immigrant Justice Center. The MCRAG is intended to  
provide a channel to exchange views and develop collaborative strategies to 
maximize resources in order to provide Mexican nationals with needed legal 
orientation and services and to take comprehensive approaches to face upcoming 
challenges and to promote policies that benefit immigrant communities.90  
In combination with the strong professional network with lawyers in the United States, 
the working group adds another arm to Mexico’s expertise network, particularly in the 
form of campaigning, public awareness and identifying suitable test cases. This 
connection between civil society and the Mexican government extends Mexico’s anti-
death penalty campaign to the domestic political context of the United States. MCRAG 
formally incorporates non-State actors into the Mexico’s decision-making and, by doing 
so, forms an important node for generating the political strategy of the network.  
Alliances are integral to Mexico’s protection regime. In this respect Mexico’s outreach is 
not limited to organisations and institutions in the United States. The SRE visits other 
countries to talk about their policies and programmes, establish civil society networks 
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and to connect with international organisations.91  For example, in 2013 the SRE’s 
Diplomatic Protection Directorate attended a Consular Forum in London where they 
participated in information sharing between States and other actors.92  The SRE node 
cultivates relationships that have a practical role in Mexican advocacy on behalf of its 
citizens. Edgar Tamayo’s case in Texas exemplifies the SRE’s outreach strategy. In 
anticipation of Tamayo’s execution in January 2014, Mexico was able to procure letters 
from the European Parliament, civil society organisations, thirteen States, UN bodies, 
and the Vatican to the Texas Governor expressing concern over the application of the 
death penalty in the case.93  While international pressure did not ultimately succeed in 
preventing the execution, the SRE’s strategy contributed to improving and expanding 
Mexico’s global alliances.  
The MCLAP Director, along with senior MCLAP attorneys, function as a separate node 
that focuses on building alliances with local legal communities in the United States.94 
Human rights arguments and organisations struggle for resonance in death penalty 
states, such as Arizona and Texas, where Mexicans are being tried. Kuykendall notes 
that in some states it is extremely difficult to convince the state executive to grant 
clemency because of the strong pro-death penalty stance of many state Governors and 
their constituencies.95 The presentation of death penalty cases through the lens of 
human rights is a disservice to defendants in pro-death penalty jurisdictions, 
particularly if the individual is accused of violent crime. Instead of pursuing a human 
rights angle in cases, the MCLAP Director engages with communities of legal 
practitioners and the judiciary in order to raise the profile of the programme and 
improve awareness of the structural disadvantages Mexican nationals face in the US 
criminal justice system. This includes presentations at legal conferences and 
participation in legal associations and societies. The approach of this node is on local 
action in legal networks. It aims to use the language and concepts of the jurisdictions in 
which MCLAP functions to normalise the existence of the programme and to put a local 
face on what is ultimately a foreign State intervention.  
A nodal approach also preserves and consolidates expertise within various levels of the 
network. The presence of local US lawyers trained in specific jurisdictions provides 
consistency, an aspect of protection that is often frustrated by consular officers in 
diplomatic service. As with most diplomatic posts, most SRE staff rotate every three 
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years between the central agency in Mexico City and other international postings. Prior 
to the introduction of MCLAP, the expertise and networks formed by individual officers 
was lost when they completed their posting and returned to the SRE or to moved on to 
another posting. Through the MCLAP model, however, local legal practitioners on the 
MCLAP attorney list, the MCLAP Director, the SRE, and civil society participation in 
the MCRAG node maintain expertise. Moreover, each member of the SRE team in 
Mexico City has served in a US consulate, which aids understanding of challenges at the 
coalface of Mexico’s protection work. Nodes rely on continuity as a tool to nurture local, 
national and transnational relationships and to consolidate procedural and substantive 
knowledge in the different legal systems of the United States.  
Mexico’s protective regime is driven by a normative agenda to protect Mexican citizens 
from harm or discriminatory treatment in the United States. To achieve this objective, 
nodes perform the function of populating each network with values and goals. This may 
include opposition to the death penalty, minimising the vulnerability of Mexican 
nationals in the United States, due process or compliance with international law. Each 
node caters to a specific audience of actors. The SRE node focuses on international 
outreach and civil society networks. The MCLAP Director addresses local legal 
networks. Together the MCLAP and SRE devise and endorse due process values and 
other goals for the transnational MCLAP network. MCRAG and the SRE node cultivate 
strategy and messages for political networks in the United States. Finally, each 
consulate has the capacity to function as a node. Consulates communicate Mexico’s 
support to its nationals in the jurisdiction, and its values, such as fairness, due process 
and rule of law, to the wider community.  
Competing values emerge and are contested in the operation of these networks. 
Mexico’s anti-death penalty and protection impulses must be balanced with respect for 
domestic legal processes in the United States. Through the MCLAP, Mexico has been 
able to balance this contest by participating within the domestic legal system, electing 
to be a part of forums in the United States, rather than competing against it or 
attempting to circumvent it through political and diplomatic efforts. Another contest of 
values arises between the treatment of Mexico’s domestic constituency and the 
perception of privileged treatment for Mexicans in the United States. Serious concerns 
related to the economy, employment, education, health care and the drug wars in 
Mexico contribute to a tension between domestic politics and foreign policy. The SRE 
Chapter 5 
108 
faces some, albeit limited, pressure to justify spending on the programme in the face of 
potential criticism.96  
Mexico’s protection programmes have come under growing domestic scrutiny in recent 
years. The first freedom of information (FOI) request was lodged in relation to the 
programme in 2013.97  The FOI request inquired into Mexico’s campaign to prevent the 
execution of Mexican national, Edgar Tamayo in January 2014 by Texas. The request 
related to how much money was spent on his case, the nature of actions taken, and 
whether compensation had been awarded to his family.98  Criticism of the Mexican 
government in relation to Tamayo’s case fell into two categories: criticism for not doing 
enough to save a Mexican citizen and criticism for spending money on Mexicans 
convicted of serious crimes outside of Mexico when the money could be better spent 
domestically.99  The FOI request signals some resistance against Mexico’s foreign 
programmes to protect citizens. The domestic challenges to Mexico’s policies and their 
funding heighten the need for nodes to orchestrate the values of the programmes across 
a range of networks. 
	  
IV. Local protection and international law 
The Mexico case study reveals three developments of the protection of citizens abroad 
in a policy-oriented setting. The first relates to the formal incorporation of State and 
non-State actors into the strategy and delivery of the protection of Mexican nationals in 
the United States. Non-state actors, particularly domestic lawyers and civil society 
organisations in the United States, play an important role in the Mexican protection 
programmes. The success of the programmes relates to the technologies of protection, 
particularly the way in which nodes delegate and assign protection tasks to actors 
within each network. Nodes may take advantage of the formal status or identity of a 
particular actor to achieve goals. Mexico distributes its sovereign function to protect its 
citizens across a range of actors in each of its networks. The model of protection in 
MCLAP and the PALE explored in this chapter may be described as ‘polycentric 
regulation’ where ‘the state is not the sole locus of authority’.100  Black notes that in 
some networks the presence of multiple actors and normative goals can fragment the 
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objectives of the regime.101  A networked, nodal approach to protection helps to harness 
and develop subject-matter expertise, standardise objectives, and deliver harmonised 
interventions through coordination between State and non-State actors.  
The second development is the predominantly local character of the intervention. The 
participation of domestic criminal lawyers in the United States who are sympathetic to 
the cause of Mexican nationals puts a local or ‘American’ face on the programme and 
partially masks Mexico’s participation in each criminal jurisdiction. As a technology of 
the programme, masking or giving a local identity to the intervention has a 
depoliticising influence, albeit a limited one, on the protection programmes. The 
expertise of domestic criminal lawyers has aided the MCLAP to shift its efforts to early 
intervention within the local criminal justice system. As the most effective mechanism 
for protecting nationals from a death sentence, early intervention can minimise public 
exposure and politicisation of cases.   
Finally, Mexico’s practice of protection marks a departure from classically remedial 
foundation of diplomatic protection flagged in chapter two. As part of a more systemic 
strategy, both the PALE and MCLAP networks shift protection from being reactive, 
awaiting violation and seeking a remedy subsequently, to a more aggressive stance of 
pursuing categories of rights and using resources to anticipate and prevent violations. 
Christian Tams acknowledges that the ICJ has shifted its approach ‘away from a largely 
remedial understanding of international responsibility, whose main focus is the 
reparation of past wrongs.’102  The Mexico case study provides an example of how there 
is a disjuncture between the rules of diplomatic protection and the contemporary 
practice of protection.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Neither LaGrand nor Avena secured the lives of the German and Mexican citizens at 
the centre of those cases. While the ICJ proceedings were legally successful, they raise 
the question: how effective can international litigation be in protecting the human 
rights of citizens abroad? Some scholars have reported that ‘formal international law is 
stagnating not only in quantity but also quality.’103  Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters 
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suggest that States are moving away from formal law towards softer mechanisms, or 
what they term ‘informal international law’.104   In Mexico’s case, reliance upon formal 
international law may be diminishing in some respects. However, the Mexican 
protection network’s strategy does not jettison formal law altogether, but instead 
combines several fields, including United States’ domestic law and politics, to achieve 
its aims. In widening the scope of its activities, the Mexican protection network also 
simultaneously facilitates broader participation from a range of actors, blurring the 
demarcation between State and non-State actors.  
Beneath the surface of a macro international law analysis, the Mexican regime of 
protection is a manifestation of international law that is not accounted for within the 
traditional paradigm. Because MCLAP is embedded in the United States’ domestic legal 
system, a macro international law approach would not detect any international legal 
activity in the Mexican model, or perhaps account for it as mere consular assistance. 
However, Mexico’s interventions are based entirely on the idea that Mexico is entitled 
to protect its citizens from violations by another State, an international law concept. 
The programmes are based on principles of international law, which include explicit 
rights and obligations in the VCCR.105   Through a micro international law analysis it is 
possible to observe how the actors rely on different legal concepts or values, and when 
international law is invoked. Shifting focus away from analyses of the formal invocation 
of diplomatic protection can reveal how power relations are managed and how different 
objectives are achieved in the protection of citizens abroad.  
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Legal scholarship suggests that international litigation is the main avenue for 
addressing the protection of citizens abroad. The reality of international litigation is 
that it is costly, time-consuming and public in nature. While there have been many 
cases dealing with diplomatic protection, few cases have been brought before the ICJ in 
relation to the protection of individual rights. Thus, participants in the international 
system employ other strategies and modes of protection. Many protective actions will 
commence or come in contact with consular forms of protection or assistance. In some 
States, consular tasks are no longer limited exclusively to State officials: private actors 
may be contracted to provide consular services or civil society organisations may take 
up this role.1 In this chapter, I explore consular action as a mode of protection, focusing 
on Australia’s approach to the protection of its citizens abroad. This chapter also 
examines the practical and structural tensions between consular assistance and 
protection. Despite academic focus on legal cases of protection, consular action remains 
the most likely avenue for resolving issues related to the treatment of citizens abroad. 
Section one considers the case of Van Tuong Nguyen, where the Australian government 
employed consular and diplomatic means to protect. Section two examines the 
formation and role of networks in Van Nguyen’s case. Section three details the 
framework and modalities of the Australian consular system, with a focus on values of 
welfare and regulatory flexibility.  
	  
I. Background to Van Tuong Nguyen’s Situation 
Australian national, Van Tuong Nguyen, was convicted for trafficking just under 400 
grams of heroin by Singapore in March 2004. Subject to Singaporean law, Van Nguyen 
was sentenced to a mandatory penalty of death. The Australian government made a 
range of diplomatic and political representations to the government of Singapore on 
behalf of Van Nguyen prior to his execution. 2  These representations urged the 
Singaporean government not to apply the death penalty and to impose a lengthy 
custodial sentence in its place. However, these representations were ultimately 
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unsuccessful. The Australian government also considered the option of bringing a case 
before the ICJ, but decided not to institute proceedings on the basis that there was no 
jurisdictional grounds to do so.  
On 2 December 2005 Van Nguyen was executed in Singapore. While the Australian 
government was criticised by legal practitioners, the public and academics for not 
making strong enough representations or taking action early enough on Van Nguyen’s 
behalf,3 robust consular and diplomatic measures were taken in an effort to prevent his 
execution. 
 
State and non-State actor interventions 
The Australian government and other actors took a range of actions to halt Van 
Nguyen’s execution. While Van Nguyen had legal representation in both Singapore and 
Australia, the Australian government, given the increasing public profile of the matter, 
made a number of high-level representations to Singapore in relation to the application 
of the death penalty. These representations included seven written representations 
from the Prime Minister, Governor-General and Foreign Minister in relation to Van 
Nguyen to Singapore.4  There were also a number of oral representations made by 
Australian ministers, the Prime Minister, Governor-General, the Parliamentary 
Secretary, senior Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) officials and the 
Australian High Commissioner in Singapore to Singaporean officials and ministers.5 
Various Australian parliaments urged Singapore, through parliamentary motions, to 
commute Van Nguyen’s sentence to a custodial one in which the death penalty would 
not be applied. 6   One example of Australia’s early representations prior to Van 
Nguyen’s trial included written correspondence from the Australian Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, to his Singaporean counterpart:   
I wish to convey formally to you the Australian Government's support for Mr 
Nguyen's lawyers' request that he be tried on charges that do not carry a mandatory 
death sentence. Australia is opposed to capital punishment and outlawed the death 
penalty in 1973. I understand that Nugyen [sic] has agreed to plead guilty to a non-
capital offence which would involve a very substantial prison sentence. If Singapore 
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were able to accept that plea, Australia would be ready to explore all possible 
avenues for Mr Nguyen to serve his sentence in Australia rather than in Singapore 
at Singaporean expense.7 
The content of other representations by the Australian government was not made 
public, however representations continued even after Van Nguyen’s conviction.8  The 
Foreign Minister made numerous representations on behalf of Van Nguyen and 
publicly campaigned for the death penalty not to be applied. In early November 2005 
however, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, concluded that Australia had 
exhausted all available avenues to prevent the execution of the 25-year-old Australian.9  
On 21 November 2005, the same day as the Prime Minister’s claim that there were no 
other options available to the government, media outlets began reporting that lawyers 
for Van Nguyen believed that there was a possible avenue for relief against the death 
penalty at the ICJ. 10   Two Melbourne-based lawyers, Lex Lasry QC and Julian 
McMahon, represented Van Nguyen in Australia. Lasry and McMahon worked with 
local lawyers in Singapore on different stages of Van Nguyen’s case, including clemency 
proceedings following his conviction. Lasry and McMahon, both domestic criminal 
specialists, retained two public international lawyers to advise them on the available 
options: Donald Rothwell, a legal academic at the Australian National University and 
Christopher Ward, a barrister specialising in international law.  
Rothwell and Ward argued that not all international avenues had been exhausted. They 
devised a legal strategy for a case to be brought by Australia against Singapore in the 
ICJ. Unlike the Breard, LaGrand, and Avena cases, which were based upon the VCCR, 
there was no clear internationally wrongful act giving rise to jurisdiction before the ICJ 
in Van Nguyen’s case. Initially, Rothwell had proposed the forum prorogatum 
principle, which would allow a matter to be brought to the ICJ without a specific 
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jurisdictional ground being identified.11  The lawyers also suggested another basis for 
jurisdiction under the Single Convention on Narcotics 1961 (‘Single Convention’).12  
Both Australia and Singapore were parties to the Single Convention at the time of Van 
Nguyen’s conviction.13  Article 48 of the Single Convention provided jurisdiction for 
disputes between States parties to be brought before the ICJ for resolution.14  Rothwell 
and Ward argued that under the Single Convention States were required to apply the 
penalties listed, which did not include the death penalty. They suggested that the 
application of the death penalty was not foreseen by the Single Convention and 
identified that the Convention only stipulates custodial sentences. Therefore Van 
Nguyen’s death sentence was a breach of Singapore’s obligations as a party to that 
Convention.15  Rothwell and Ward also argued that the Single Convention ought to be 
applied in conjunction with the norms of international human rights law prohibiting 
the death penalty. The strategy of finding a ground for jurisdiction was a gateway to 
applying for an order of provisional measures from the ICJ. It was envisaged that if the 
ICJ granted an order for provisional measures it would create time for a diplomatic 
solution to be negotiated before the merits stage, assuming compliance by Singapore of 
the Court’s order for provisional measures.16  The strategy of seeking provisional 
measures before the ICJ was informed by the other death penalty matters brought 
before the ICJ.  
Once Van Nguyen’s lawyers made the announcement in the media, Alexander Downer 
contacted Rothwell and Ward to discuss the avenues that had been put into the public 
domain. The Foreign Minister, Rothwell and Ward discussed over the telephone what 
international legal options were available.17  On the instruction of the Foreign Minister, 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade along with the Attorney-General’s 
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Department, met with Rothwell and Ward to discuss the options.18  At this meeting, 
Rothwell and Ward presented their proposals to the government legal advisors. 
The legal prospects of a case brought under the Single Convention were in contention.19 
The first significant legal issue was that the Single Convention did not explicitly 
prohibit the application of the death penalty. A case would therefore need to argue that 
the treaty either impliedly prohibited the death penalty, or that there was another 
binding rule of international law preventing Singapore from applying the death penalty. 
Singapore was not a party to the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR prohibiting 
the death penalty or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.20 
Therefore, the argument that applying the death penalty would be a breach of the 
Single Convention was contingent on a successful claim that there was an obligation 
not to conduct the death penalty in customary international law or that it had achieved 
jus cogens status, as a non-derogable norm of international law. These arguments, 
especially in relation to a customary prohibition of the death penalty, were speculative, 
particularly given that a number of States continue to apply the death penalty. Another 
issue was that an order for provisional measures from the ICJ did not ensure that 
Singapore would comply by suspending the execution. The ICJ had issued orders to 
halt executions in the past, but these produced mixed results. In the case of the 
LaGrand, the ICJ’s order for provisional measures failed to prevent Walter LaGrand’s 
execution.21   
Rothwell and Ward suggested that external counsel be approached for independent 
legal advice on the issue. James Crawford, an Australian academic and practitioner 
based at Cambridge, was asked to provide advice on the prospect of success. Overnight, 
he advised that the avenue and arguments proposed were unlikely to be successful 
before the ICJ. In a public interview Downer noted that:  
I spoke the night before last to a couple of lawyers, Chris Ward and Professor Don 
Rothwell, about some ideas they had on how we could use the International Court 
of Justice to try to assist Van Nguyen and stave off his execution. The first thing I 
did was arrange for the Attorney-General's Department and my Department to 
examine their ideas, which seemed at least, prima facie, to be at least worth 
examining. And I'm sorry to say that their examination was pretty negative; they 
didn't think that there was any realistic way, even on the basis of the ideas put 
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forward by Chris Ward, that we could go to the International Court of Justice 
without Singapore accepting the jurisdiction. … [B]earing in mind that this is a 
question of life or death, it was worth referring these ideas one stage further to 
Professor James Crawford … [H]e has emailed back today saying that on the basis 
of the ideas that have been put forward there simply was no basis for going to the 
International Court of Justice.22 
Following the announcement that the legal arguments and jurisdiction to bring a case 
before the ICJ were not strong enough to commence litigation, the Australian 
government was criticised for not taking further measures, particularly trade sanctions, 
against Singapore. A member of the government argued that economic threats ought to 
have been made against Singapore in an attempt to save Van Nguyen’s life and that the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) also should have been used 
as a forum to apply pressure on Singapore.23  
The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister made it clear that Australia was not prepared 
to use trade or other substantive aspects of the bilateral relationship to negotiate a 
more favourable outcome for Van Nguyen. The Foreign Minister and Prime Minister 
rejected that trade was an appropriate tool to negotiate with: 
Obviously it would do Singapore damage if we imposed trade sanctions, and 
obviously it would do us a lot of damage as well. The consequence of it would be 
absolutely zero in relation to helping Van Nguyen. It would only harden 
Singapore’s resolve.24  
This reflects a common tension that States face when balancing competing interests of 
protecting a citizen with maintaining or insulating a bilateral relationship.  
	  
II. Networks in Van Nguyen 
Networks influenced the participation of State and non-State actors in Van Nguyen’s 
case, albeit in a different form to the examples in Germany and Mexico. In this case, 
networks were forged along traditional groupings of formal status. Two networks 
appear in Van Nguyen: a network of government lawyers and a network of non-
government lawyers. In contrast with the preceding chapters, here the government and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




23 Michelle Grattan and Ian Munro, ‘Airline Row Linked to Nguyen’, The Age (online), 24 November 
2005 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/11/23/1132703253004.html?from=top5>.  
24 ABC Canberra, Interview with Foreign Minister The Hon. Alexander Downer, 21 November 2005 
(Ross Solly).  
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non-government networks interacted with one another, but did not merge, incorporate 
one another into their activities, nor take shared action.  
	  
Government networks 
Government lawyers serve an important decision-making function as a community of 
specialists. They possess and harness technical knowledge and may enable protection 
in the form of legal action. In Van Nguyen’s case, the network of decision-making 
actors was comprised of international lawyers from the International Legal Branch of 
DFAT (DFAT-Int), the Office of International Law in the Attorney-General’s 
Department (OIL) and the Foreign Minister.  
The government network in the Van Nguyen case exemplifies the flexibility of the 
Australian system in responding to the protection of citizens abroad. A network of 
government experts can be assembled to respond to the citizen’s need in each case. This 
approach creates different nodes of power for each matter, particularly when different 
geographic, political and legal issues are involved. Van Nguyen’s case required 
international law expertise, an in-depth knowledge related to the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
and the prospects of a legal case before the Court. This expertise was harnessed when 
the network of lawyers from DFAT and AGD formed to address this issue. In this way, 
government networks dealing with protection in the Australian system are constituted, 
disassembled and reconstituted in accordance with the demands that arise and the 
expertise required. This fluidity, however, also creates certain tensions between the 
bureaucracy and the political classes of government. The flexibility of forming 
responsive government networks or nodes on a case-by-case basis can create 
opportunities for the political classes to intervene in departmental processes or demand 
outcomes from the government network. In Van Nguyen’s case, the Foreign Minister’s 
intervention marshalled the government network into action, creating an ad hoc 
network to consider legal options available to protect Van Nguyen.  
Australia’s relationship with international dispute resolution mechanisms has 
influenced the modalities of protection and the way in which government networks 
relate to the use of international litigation to resolve protection issues. Some note that 
Australia does not have a propensity to litigate issues internationally. 25  Henry 
Burmester suggests that Australia’s litigation history in international law has been 
based on the environment and natural resources, or matters before the World Trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Interview with former Australian Government Official #2 (Canberra, June 2014). 
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Organisation.26  James Crawford describes Australia’s relationship with litigation in the 
ICJ as one of divergence. He states that there are two narratives to explain Australia’s 
involvement with the Court:  
one … in which Australia approaches the ICJ as a friend, supportive of the effective 
operation of a rules-based system of international relations, and another, where the 
same approach is made in order to promote an agenda of national self-interest.27  
This vexed relationship with international dispute mechanisms and international law 
more broadly has resulted in Australia’s increased systemic emphasis on means other 
than litigation to protect citizens abroad, particularly consular and diplomatic action.  
	  
Public lawyer networks 
The network formed by Lasry, McMahon, Rothwell and Ward exemplifies the 
connections formed between lawyers conducting public work (either public law work or 
public international law work) in Australia. These lawyers mobilised on Van Nguyen’s 
behalf to apply pressure on the government, using the media as a vehicle to achieve 
their objectives.  However, the role of public lawyers is not limited to their formal 
function of representation or using the media to support their client’s case.  
This case study illustrates a central role that public lawyers play in Australia in the 
advocacy of international law and human rights in the public sphere. In the Australian 
context, lawyers and legal academics take responsibility for bringing matters to the 
attention of the public, often advocating legal positions as part of a network. Rosanne 
Kennedy’s examination of the Van Nguyen case stated that ‘Australian lawyers, Lex 
Lasry and Julian McMahon, played a powerful mediating role in shaping 
representations of Van Nguyen and mobilising protest against his execution.’ 28 
Additionally, Lasry and McMahon’s recruitment of public international lawyers 
Rothwell and Ward steered Van Nguyen’s narrative away from drug-related 
transnational criminality to an international human rights issue connected to the death 
penalty.  
An important tool this network employed in the Van Nguyen case was the use of the 
media. Rothwell noted that McMahon, Lasry and Ward had collectively agreed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Henry Burmester, ‘Australia’s Experience in International Litigation’ in Natalie Klein (ed), Litigating 
International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 61, 62. 
27 James Crawford, ‘Australia and the International Court of Justice’ (2003) 14(2) Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 1, 30.   
28 Rosanne Kennedy, ‘The Media and the Death Penalty: The Limits of Sentimentality, the Power of 
Abjection’ (2007) 14(2) Humanities Research 29, 33.  
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approach the media in order to apply pressure on the government and possibility to 
create an opportunity for an audience with Downer.29  In the case of Van Nguyen, 
Kennedy noted that: 
His lawyers kept his case out of media, fearing negative coverage would alienate the 
Singapore government and endanger his chance of a reprieve. After legal appeals 
had failed however, his case became a media sensation, and featured prominently 
in newspapers, on current-affairs programs, and on Internet sites for several 
weeks.30  
Modern discourses on consular affairs and protection observe that media attention can 
translate into government attention in a specific case.31  Media attention can give issue-
networks the opportunity to drive their clients’ cases up on a government’s priority list 
by putting the matter in public view. Public pressure and negative media are 
mechanisms for issue-networks trying to confront or alter government policies in the 
absence of a clear legal structure addressing consular and protection action by Australia. 
Yet these networks must also balance the need to advance their causes using the media 
with the imperative to build and maintain trust with government officials and 
politicians. In this respect, the Germany and Mexico case studies testify to the 
connection between the positive participation of government agencies and a successful 
intervention by civil society and public lawyers.  
Public lawyers, including academic lawyers, in Australia come together in issue 
networks, often to offer alternatives to the government view in the media and the public. 
Prominent public international lawyers, particularly legal academics, along with public 
law advocates and barristers, work with organisations and professional associations to 
advocate on controversial issues, particularly in relation to Australia’s human rights 
record. Past examples have included the detention of David Hicks without charge in 
Guantánamo Bay, the treatment of asylum seekers and the introduction of a bill of 
rights.32  
Australia’s conservative approach to human rights and international law has created 
opportunities for non-government issue-networks to form and lobby the government. 
Hilary Charlesworth et al., reflect on the approach of the government in power at the 
time of the Van Nguyen case: ‘[t]he present Coalition government has retreated from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interview with Donald Rothwell (Canberra, April 2014). 
30 Kennedy, above n 28, 29.  
31 Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy’ 
(2010) Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No 26) 5. 
32 See, eg, Law Council of Australia, ‘Legal Advice In the Matter of the Legality of the Charge Against 
David Hicks’ (Media Release, 8 March 2007) <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-
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high level of engagement with international law, displaying particular ambivalence 
about the international human rights system.’33  They also note that the attitude of the 
Australian government was selective: the government was cautious in relation to 
human rights, but showed enthusiasm for trade liberalisation and bilateralism.34  Sarah 
Joseph observes a similar tendency under the Howard government, where human 
rights in foreign policy shifted from a multilateral to a bilateral emphasis.35  Particularly 
in the area of human rights, non-government lawyers have been galvanised by 
government reluctance or inaction.  
Another driving force for the involvement of public lawyer networks in policy debates 
on human rights and international law in Australia is the absence of a strong civil 
society influence. Cynthia Banham argues that Australia’s human rights culture and 
civil society institutions remain weak relative to other liberal democracies.36  Some 
organisations, such as the Human Rights Law Centre focus on a range of issues related 
to Australia’s performance on international law and human rights.37  Global civil society 
organisations, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, lack the presence they 
possess in other States in Europe or the United States. Moreover, few organisations 
address the protection of Australian citizens abroad. One organisation specifically 
focused on the treatment of Australians in foreign criminal justice systems, Australians 
Detained Abroad, was launched in 2014.38  It focuses on providing services to detained 
Australian nationals, including interpreting services and assistance with finding local 
counsel for those detained in a foreign jurisdiction. 39  Public lawyers and legal 
academics fill the lacuna. As issue activists, public lawyers take up advocacy and 
campaigning as a network or epistemic community.40  
This function that public lawyers in Australia serve is consistent with the findings of 
Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth who describe the role of lawyers as that of ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’.41  Dezalay and Garth argue that the persuasiveness of lawyers, in this 
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35 Sarah Joseph, ‘The Howard Government and the International Human Rights System’ (2008) 27 
Australian Yearbook of International Law 45, 65. 
36 Cynthia Banham, The Responses of Liberal Democracies to the Torture of Citizens: A Comparative 
Study (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2015) 109-114. 
37 Human Rights Law Centre <http://hrlc.org.au>.  
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39 Interview with Dan Mori, Australians Detained Abroad (Canberra, September 2014).  
40 See Peter M Haas, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’ 
(1989) 43(3) International Organization 377. 
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case public lawyers, is linked to ‘[t]he social capital and charisma (and even idealism) of 
elite lawyers respected for their careers and accomplishments.’42  Burmester identifies 
that ‘the promptings of outside international lawyers appear to be important in raising 
litigation as a core strategy in seeking resolution of a particular dispute and forcing 
government to consider it carefully as an option.’43  In the absence of a strong civil 
society history or human rights culture in Australia, academics such as Rothwell and 
public interest barristers such as Lasry, McMahon and Ward perform the function of 
holding the government to account for its decisions and policies, particularly in the 
media and public forums.44 
	  
The relationship between consular action and protection 
The tension between consular assistance and diplomatic protection punctuates all the 
case studies in this thesis, particularly Van Nguyen. In practice, the difference between 
consular assistance and protection in international law is not as clear as legal scholars 
suggest. Case law provides a clear example of an invocation of diplomatic protection: in 
LaGrand and Avena, Germany and Mexico respectively invoked their right of 
diplomatic protection in international law in conjunction with their claims under the 
VCCR. In Van Nguyen’s situation however, the absence of formal legal action before an 
international court or tribunal makes the case more difficult to assess. How can 
protection be identified in the absence of legal proceedings and why is this issue 
important?  
Distinguishing between consular assistance and protection goes to the question of what 
kind of action constitutes the protection of citizens abroad. As discussed in chapter two, 
there are scholars who argue that States ought to protect their citizens more often.45 
Some even argue that there is a duty upon States to protect their citizens abroad.46 
Understanding which behaviour is included in or excluded from the definition of 
protection sets the parameters of debates about invocation of the concept.  The Special 
Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection excluded consular forms of action from the 
definition of diplomatic protection: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid, 60. 
43 Burmester, above n 26, 68.  
44 Charlesworth et al, above n 33, 433. 
45 See, eg, John Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights: The Draft Articles of the 
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Diplomatic protection may be exercised through diplomatic action or other means 
of peaceful settlement. It differs from consular assistance in that it is conducted by 
the representatives of the State acting in the interest of the State in terms of a rule 
of general international law, whereas consular assistance is, in most instances, 
carried out by consular officers, who represent the interests of the individual, 
acting in terms of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Diplomatic 
protection is essentially remedial and is designed to remedy an internationally 
wrongful act that has been committed; while consular assistance is largely 
preventive and mainly aims at preventing the national from being subjected to an 
internationally wrongful act.47 
This position of the Special Rapporteur implies that there is no distinction between 
routine assistance and more robust consular intervention. Annemarieke Künzli, offers 
three grounds for distinguishing between consular assistance and diplomatic 
protection.48 These are: the parameters on consular activities set within the Vienna 
Convention, the level of representations made, and the nature of consular activities as 
‘preventative’ versus that of protection as ‘remedial’.49   
The categorisation of protection based on these parameters, particularly the 
prescription of consular activities in the VCCR and the preventative/remedial 
dichotomy, do not resonate with scholarly developments or with State practice. 
Diplomacy scholars contest that there is a clear distinction between consular and 
diplomatic functions,50 while others postulate that there are muscular forms of consular 
assistance that are directed towards the protection of nationals.51  
The diminishing distinction between consular acts and diplomatic protection 
corresponds with shifting attitudes about the best forms of protection. The preceding 
chapters discuss and demonstrate that distinguishing between preventative and 
remedial action does not allow for an accurate examination of a State’s protective 
actions. In the Australian context, the framework for consular services and the 
significant funding allocated to this area of government activity suggests that consular 
action is intended to be the primary mode for the protection of Australian citizens 
abroad. Perhaps it is these complexities that have led legal scholars writing on 
protection to conceive of diplomatic protection through the lens of legal proceedings 
where ‘[i]nterventions outside the judicial process on behalf of nationals are generally 
not regarded as constituting diplomatic protection but as falling under consular 
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assistance instead.’52  This approach, however, eclipses other legitimate manifestations 
of protection. 
How can cases of diplomatic protection be distinguished from cases of consular 
assistance? Diplomatic protection reflects a situation where the State ‘adopts’ the injury 
of its citizen as its own, or as more recent legal scholarship suggests, it is the 
individual’s injury but the State brings an action in the absence of an avenue that the 
individual can bring in his or her own right. For this to occur in practice, there is a 
point when a State makes this decision, either implicitly or explicitly to adopt its 
citizen’s injury or commence proceedings. This turning point is a moment of 
transformation when a claim changes from an individual injury to a State injury, or 
when a State takes carriage of a matter on a national’s behalf. Therefore, in order to 
determine whether or not diplomatic protection has been invoked in the absence of 
legal proceedings, the moment of transformation must be identified.  
The other case studies in this thesis do not provide an example of when a State 
‘declared’ the transformation or adoption of a claim prior to legal proceedings in the 
ICJ. Nor is there a custom by States of declaring the adoption of an individual’s injury 
or commencement of a claim. In the previous case studies, consular forms of protection 
were part of a trajectory of international legal action. Had there been a basis for 
jurisdiction before the ICJ in Van Nguyen’s situation, then Australia’s consular and 
diplomatic representations on his behalf could be commensurate to the trajectory of 
action in LaGrand and Avena. Where consular action appears in isolation, it can be 
difficult to characterise it as a form of protection in the absence of further State action.  
Did the actions Australia took in anticipation of Van Nguyen’s execution constitute 
diplomatic protection? Rothwell argues that Van Nguyen’s case was an example of 
diplomatic protection by Australia because Van Nguyen exhausted his domestic 
remedies in Singapore and the Australian government was considering further options 
for action.53  The law on diplomatic protection requires that the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act occur prior to an invocation of diplomatic protection by a 
State, yet it is contentious whether Singapore committed an internationally wrongful 
act in Van Nguyen’s case. If the legal argument proposed by Rothwell and Ward based 
on the Single Convention (discussed in section one of this chapter) met the threshold of 
an internationally wrongful act, there still remains the question of whether the 
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Australian government’s actions of considering an option to bring an action could be 
considered diplomatic protection in accordance with international law.  
The Van Nguyen case illuminates the complexity of identifying a moment of 
transformation in the absence of formal legal proceedings. Moreover, the demarcation 
in the rules of diplomatic protection is not clear enough to distinguish acts of protection 
from routine consular assistance. Therefore, other factors need to be considered.  
There are other factors that contribute to whether a behaviour, policy or action can be 
characterised as protection. Some of these factors include the language and 
mechanisms employed, the actors who are engaged, and the protective intent of the 
behaviour. Language, whether explicit or implicit in its intent, can convey the level of 
commitment a State or network gives to an individual’s situation. The language used by 
the Australian Foreign Minister, for example, displayed commitment to protecting Van 
Nguyen from execution: 
I'm open to suggestions from people, and I have read very carefully what different 
people have said. I have listened to the argument very closely, because I feel very 
pained about this case, and I'm - like all Australians, I don't like to give up.54 
The Australian Foreign Minister’s public communication and official correspondence 
conveyed Australia’s position in relation to Van Nguyen’s treatment, which indicated 
that the government’s efforts were of a higher order than mere consular assistance or 
routine diplomatic representations. Who is involved, the ways in which those actors are 
involved, and the manner in which action is taken, are factors that lend themselves to 
identifying the substantive attributes of a protective action. The alternative, an 
arbitrary line of whether the action is preventative or remedial and whether domestic 
remedies have been exhausted, leads to uncertainty about the character of an action as 
assistance or protection. 
	  
III. The Australian Framework for the Protection of Nationals Abroad  
Australia offers a comprehensive consular service aimed at maintaining and securing 
the welfare of Australian citizens abroad. The Van Nguyen case demonstrates the 
benefits of flexibility in the Australian protection regime, where government networks 
can assemble to address issues as they arise. This section provides a general overview of 
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Australia’s regime of protection and considers some of the challenges that a consular 
regime of protection may present.  
	  
Constitutional and legislative framework 
Like many States, Australia does not have explicit constitutional or legislative 
arrangements related to the protection of citizens abroad. The legal rights of 
Australians abroad have often arisen without recourse to the Australian courts. These 
cases have primarily attracted public interest through media attention. One category of 
these cases has involved Australian nationals and their corporate and commercial 
transactions. Stern Hu, a corporate executive of Rio Tinto and a dual Australian-
Chinese national, was arrested in China and convicted in 2010 on grounds of stealing 
commercial secrets and accepting bribes.55  Another example is the case brought 
against Matthew Joyce and Marcus Lee, Australian businessmen detained in the United 
Arab Emirates in relation to corruption charges connected with a commercial property 
transaction.56  Another category of cases has involved political rights and freedom of 
speech issues. Australian journalist Peter Greste was sentenced and convicted in 
absentia in Egypt for several charges including spreading false news and detained for 
over a year without appropriate due process.57  Julian Assange, head of the organisation 
WikiLeaks has been threatened with charges by the United States for information leaks 
related to national security.58  More recently, death penalty cases of Australians in 
South East Asia have attracted a great deal of attention.59  
There have been few instances in which Australian domestic courts have heard 
challenges to government decisions in relation to the provision of consular services or 
protection arising under the Australian Constitution. Section 75 of the Australian 
Constitution vests original jurisdiction in the High Court and other federal courts to 
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consider all matters arising under treaty60 and all matters affecting consuls or other 
representatives of other countries.61  Two cases that challenged executive discretion 
were brought by Australian citizens detained at Guantánamo Bay by the United States 
in connection with the ‘War on Terror’, David Hicks and Mamdouh Habib. Both Mr 
Hicks and Mr Habib commenced proceedings against the Australian government on 
different grounds. 62   Neither case was concluded: David Hicks was returned to 
Australia to serve the remainder of his sentence and Mamdouh Habib’s claim reached 
an out of court settlement.63  
In the matter of Hicks v Ruddock, David Hicks sought judicial review of the 
considerations that the Australian government took into account in its decision not to 
intervene or seek his repatriation to Australia from Guantántamo Bay.64  The Federal 
Court considered the Australian government’s application to dismiss Mr Hicks’ action 
on the basis that there was no case to answer (an application for summary judgment). 
The action was brought while Mr Hicks was still in detention. At the time of the Federal 
Court judgment, Mr Hicks had not been charged and had spent over five years in the 
custody of the United States. Mr Hicks argued that the Australian government had a 
duty to lawfully consider his request for protection and that when taking the decision 
not to intervene on his behalf, the government took into account irrelevant 
considerations, namely that there was no crime under Australian law for which he 
could be prosecuted.  
The Australian government argued that the matters Mr Hicks raised were non-
justiciable because they concerned foreign relations and the act of state doctrine, which 
prevents the courts of one country from adjudicating on the actions of another country, 
applied in the case. The Australian government argued that there was no case to answer 
and that the matter ought not proceed on the ground that Mr Hicks’ case had no 
prospect of success. The relevant issue before the Court, for the purpose of this chapter, 
was whether the refusal of the Australian government to request the United States to 
repatriate Mr Hicks was a decision that could be set aside by the Federal Court on the 
ground that the decision-maker took into account irrelevant considerations.65  
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Mr Hicks argued that under section 61 of the Australian Constitution the Australian 
government had a duty to consider the exercise of power to protect an Australian 
citizen, particularly ‘a citizen in the predicament of Mr Hicks’.66  Mr Hicks submitted 
that while this duty was not legally enforceable, it was an ‘imperfect obligation’ on the 
government to consider the request. 67   He also argued that while the duty did not give 
standing for an individual to challenge the government’s decision, irrelevant 
considerations could not be taken into account that would be inconsistent with the duty, 
such as the prospect of his prosecution in Australia.68  
The Federal Court decision considered only admissibility and justiciability, not the 
substantive grounds of the case. The Court agreed with the arguments put forward by 
Mr Hicks, stating that ‘the law is far from settled’ on the issue of justiciability of 
executive action related to protection.69   The Court also held that the application for 
habeas corpus was justiciable and the act of state doctrine did not justify a finding of no 
case to answer as per the government’s request, even though there were implications 
for foreign policy.70   Mr Hicks was released from Guantánamo Bay before the matter 
could proceed to the merits. The question of whether or not there is a duty to consider a 
request for protection by an Australian citizen is thus still unresolved by Australian 
courts. 
After his release from Guantánamo Bay Mr Habib brought an action against the 
Australian government for the tort of misfeasance in public office.71   This tort requires 
that there be an invalid or unauthorised act done maliciously by a public officer in the 
purported discharge of his/her public duty and which causes loss or harm to the 
plaintiff. Mr Habib alleged that Australian officers were complicit in his detention and 
torture in Egypt.72   However, the case was settled prior to the Federal Court decision.  
The absence of constitutional or legislative protection in Australia has prompted 
scholars to lobby the Australian government to secure a legal right to consular 
assistance. In the review of DFAT’s consular strategy in 2014, some public submissions 
suggested legislative amendments to achieve this. The argument in favour of legislative 
changes runs as follows: in order to deal with increasing demands on DFAT, as well as 
to ensure consistency across cases, legislation could create a legitimate expectation in 
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law that a request for assistance will be considered by the government. Rothwell’s 
submission argued that:  
the time has come for a right of consular assistance to be enshrined in Australian 
law so that governments have a standard which they are required to meet in 
providing assistance to Australians overseas, and in the most egregious cases can 
be held accountable. A Consular Services Act should be enacted … [to] make clear 
the capacity of the Australian government to represent Australians overseas, but 
also the legal entitlement of citizens to that representation.73 
The submission by Ben Saul and Alexandra Horne also made the same argument:  
providing a strong, substantive right, additionally recognises that Australian 
governments should not be entitled to ‘trade off’ an Australian’s right to secure 
their government’s protection from foreign human rights violations in favour of 
other Australian governmental interests, such as economic or political interests.74  
Part of the reason for the suggested legislative change by these scholars is the lack of a 
transparent framework in the provision of consular services. Justin Brown, the First 
Assistant Secretary of the Consular Services and Crisis Management Division at DFAT 
has publicly noted that ‘while we're happy to assist in most cases the level of the 
intensity of our interaction is something which varies from case to case.’75  The 
stakeholder responses to DFAT’s Consular Strategy, coupled with the domestic legal 
cases, suggest that there is growing pressure on the Australian government to make 
consular protection more muscular. However, there has, so far, been no indication that 
the introduction of legislation addressing consular rights is likely.  
	  
Australia’s consular service 
Australia has a network of consular and diplomatic posts around the world that help to 
service millions of Australians who travel, work and live overseas. The protection of 
citizens abroad by Australia structurally and procedurally falls within general consular 
operations (i.e. routine consular assistance).76  The vast majority of the requests for 
assistance received by DFAT are routine consular matters and do not relate to serious 
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human rights violations or breaches of international law. Consular assistance is 
administered jointly by Australian consular and diplomatic posts and centrally 
coordinated by the Consular Services and Crisis Management Division within DFAT. 
Other government stakeholders that support DFAT’s lead role include the AGD and the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C). The aim of Australia’s consular 
services programme is: 
to support and assist Australian travellers and Australians overseas through high-
quality consular service, including accurate and timely travel advice, practical 
contingency planning and rapid crisis response.77  
The delivery of consular services is guided by two documents: the Consular Services 
Charter (‘the Charter’) and the Australian Consular Operations Handbook (‘the 
Handbook’). These documents outline the framework for the assistance of Australian 
nationals and the protocols by which that assistance is delivered. The Charter is the 
public document that sets out the rights and responsibilities of travelling citizens and 
DFAT. As a public engagement tool, the Charter is designed to inform public 
expectations of the role that the Australian government will play in the provision of 
assistance and protection. The Handbook outlines the practical policies and procedures 
for the provision of consular services by consular posts.78  
	  
Welfare as a protective value 
Values help to guide the policy settings of different protective regimes. In Germany, 
constitutional protection of the right to life is central. In Mexico, the protection of 
Mexicans from systemic discrimination and the death penalty in the United States is 
paramount. In Australia, ‘welfare’ is the guiding value in the delivery of consular and 
protective action.  
The Handbook emphasises the welfare of Australians abroad, stating that one of 
DFAT’s aims is to ‘give humanitarian assistance to Australian citizens and permanent 
residents whose welfare is at risk abroad … . [m]any issues are covered by the concept 
of welfare.’79  While ‘welfare’ is not defined explicitly in either the Handbook or the 
Charter, the idea of the ‘consular role’ is defined in relation to each area of the 
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Handbook (for example, the consular role in welfare of Australians abroad,80 arrest or 
detention of an Australian,81  medical evacuations82 or the death of an Australian 
overseas.83   The concept of welfare emphasises a facilitative or pastoral form of 
consular assistance. This is supported by the type of services that can be provided 
including the provision of a list of local lawyers, doctors and hospitals; assisting with 
contact of Australian agencies; assisting with contact of family members in cases of 
emergency; providing emergency financial loans and providing notarial services.84  
The consular role in relation to detentions and arrests envisages that detained 
Australians will have access to a consular officer to receive assistance; access to 
appropriate legal defence and a fair trial under local law; treatment that is no less 
favourable than locals would receive in similar circumstances; and humanitarian 
standards of prisoner welfare.85  The Handbook refers to the Vienna Convention, 
noting the obligations in article 36 to inform and notify discussed throughout this 
thesis. It also refers explicitly to the obligations under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) including articles 9(3), 9(4), 10, 14(3)(c), 14 (3)(f) 
and 14(7).86  While international human rights standards are an important aspect of the 
delivery of consular services, the absence of a breach will not necessarily preclude 
increased attention. Situational matters, for example, the treatment of journalists, or 
personal attributes of the individual may attract more attention due to the 
circumstances.87  
Consular posts and DFAT’s Consular Operations have a limited role in ensuring access 
to legal representation. Posts are required to compile a list of local lawyers offering 
services in English.88 In contrast to the attorney lists prepared by Mexican consulates in 
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the United States, these lists do not attest to the quality of representation offered or the 
standard of the local lawyer’s proficiency in English.89  
There are few references to protection as a distinct area of responsibility in the 
Handbook or the Charter. In the only general mention of ‘protection’ in relation to 
Australian citizens in the Handbook, it states that: 
When travellers enter a foreign state, they become subject to its laws and are legally 
accountable for acts they commit on its territory. In the event of Australians finding 
themselves in difficulty, consular officers seek to ensure that they receive the 
benefit of the same laws, administration, protection and means of redress for 
injuries which the foreign state affords its own subjects.90 
In this reference to protection, the Handbook does not refer to protection provided by 
the Australian government, but rather domestic protections afforded by the foreign 
State. This emphasis on the need to respect local processes by showing deference for 
the national standard in the receiving State is also replicated in the Consular Training 
that DFAT officers receive prior to going on posting abroad. This concept of protection 
in the Handbook reflects a number of competing demands, particularly the need to 
respect the sovereignty of the foreign State while also ensuring appropriate due process 
standards are applied to the Australian national. However, they do not relate to a 
substantive right to protection, but to the facilitation of procedural standards in the 
foreign State.  
As a concept, welfare remains vague. It provides a degree of regulatory flexibility, 
allowing the Australian government to determine which cases warrant the most 
attention. As the Handbook foreshadows, welfare can take on a range of meanings 
depending on the circumstances. However, there are also challenges attached to the 
adoption of such a general framing value. In an inquiry by the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in 1997, DFAT revealed that ‘consular officers have 
been asked to procure opera tickets, to provide official cars, and in one case, to take a 
social security recipient to the bank to pick up a Department of Social Security (DSS) 
cheque.’91  While leaving the concept of welfare undefined enables the Australian 
government to determine what situations fall into the category of welfare and which do 
not, such a general concept also leaves scope for the public to adopt its own meaning, 
thereby increasing the pressure on government to provide consular services.  
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The manner in which cases are classified and handled is an important aspect of how the 
Australian government identifies and addresses protection. Within DFAT, two Consular 
Operations Teams (part of the Consular Services and Crisis Management Division) are 
allocated regions of the world. Each team addresses requests based on the geographical 
location of the individual requesting assistance. Cases entering DFAT’s case 
management system are classified in relation to the categories specified in its Annual 
Report.92 These classifications include hospitalisation, arrest or detention, crisis or 
evacuation, deaths abroad (including disposal of remains), detained Australians and 
general welfare and guidance.93  Cases may receive an additional classification of 
‘special interest case’ if it is anticipated that the matter will gain media or public 
attention, the matter involves the death sentence, it involves hospitalisations of several 
Australians, it relates to a celebrity, it involves the death of several Australians or 
unusual circumstances surrounding deaths (location or cause), and cases with national 
security implications.94  While consular officers may choose to treat cases with more 
attention based on the circumstances, the case classifications, like the team structures, 
do not reflect a distinction between consular assistance and the protection of nationals 
abroad.  
If a matter concerning a citizen abroad warrants more detailed attention from the 
government, an Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) may be formed to address the 
issue.95  This IDC or ‘consular group’ will include relevant agencies like DFAT, the 
Office of International Law (AGD), Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the 
Department of Defence. There are no formal guidelines for the establishment of the 
consular group IDC. The establishment of a consular group IDC is an ad hoc process 
instigated at the bureaucratic level and is contingent on the circumstances of the case 
and the stakeholders involved. The IDC can meet up to three times a day in order to 
address an issue facing a citizen abroad.96  As a governance mechanism, IDCs function 
as strategic and expertise nodes. IDCs allow government officials to respond flexibly to 
problems that arise, addressing a citizen’s situation from a number of agency 
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perspectives. They also facilitate the formation of governmental networks that recruit 
actors across the government and beyond. These IDC’s have a critical role in advising 
the political level of government about the courses of action available and the legal 
parameters surrounding any recourse Australia may take to assist or protect a citizen 
abroad.  
There is no specific classification in the consular management system that labels 
breaches of international law, human rights or protection (to reflect different forms of 
consular action). Team structures and case classifications within the Australian 
bureaucracy do not substantively preference certain categories or injuries to 
Australians abroad, other than special interest cases attracting media attention. How 
behaviours that relate to breaches of international law against individuals are labelled 
is an issue debated among scholars. Philip Alston suggests that:  
It is now widely accepted that the characterization of a specific goal as a human 
right elevates it above the rank and file of competing societal goals, gives it a degree 
of immunity from challenge and generally endows it with an aura of timelessness, 
absoluteness and universal validity. 97 
I do not suggest that cases in the Australian system should be labelled as human rights 
claims in order to gain the elevation that Alston identifies, especially as labels may also 
inflame expectations. However, there is a point to be made about the declaratory value 
in structuring teams or classifying cases using language that embraces protection and 
its goals. Both Mexico and Germany government bureaucratic structures reflect 
elevated forms of consular services. By having specific teams addressing more complex 
cases related to the death penalty and human rights violations abroad, resources can be 
directed specifically to these areas, expertise can be built and retained, and protocols 
can be developed to provide consistency between cases.  
Current developments 
There is a perception that public expectations are changing in relation to the level of 
attention and the nature of the assistance being provided by States in their consular 
services.98  Maaike Okano-Heijmans notes that consular affairs have moved towards 
assisting citizens in distress, but that this change has been coupled with the increasing 
participation of political classes in the direction and decision-making related to 
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protection.99  She also notes that as public interest and expectations rise in relation to 
the treatment of nationals abroad, this can lead to ad hoc responses which are 
contingent upon the level of media attention a matter can generate.100   
An analysis of the Van Nguyen case combined with a review of the Australian consular 
system echoes Okano-Heijmans’ finding. The dominant emerging value of Australia’s 
consular and protection regime is political latitude. Without legislative or constitutional 
provisions related to the protection or consular access, there is space for maximum 
political judgment to be applied on a case-by-case basis by government and the political 
classes. There are two reasons to explain why this architecture emphasises regulatory 
flexibility. The first is the importance of Australian bilateral relations. Bilateral 
relations are expressly mentioned in the Handbook as a factor to be addressed by 
consular officers in the delivery of the consular function. Bilateral relations were also a 
feature of the Germany and Mexico case studies, however, the weight that bilateral 
relations carry is most evident in Van Nguyen’s case, particularly given the timing of 
CHOGM and the trade sanctions suggested by members of Parliament. 
The second issue relates to a concern from the Australian government that 
interventions create precedents in the public eye. Interventions raise public 
expectations about a State’s performance in the protection of citizens abroad, therefore 
limiting political latitude and a government’s ability to consider each matter on a case-
by-case basis. The Australian government and its actors place greatest weight on 
ensuring that they can respond to cases flexibly and in accordance with the 
circumstances.  
In response to the changing dynamics and expectations of consular affairs, DFAT 
instituted a broad review of Australia’s consular policy. The Consular Strategy 2014-
2016 invited comment on consular service delivery by the Australian government, 
specifically DFAT.101   The review of Australian consular strategy began with a closed 
roundtable of stakeholders followed by public consultation on several questions, where 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, invited submissions from interested 
persons and organisations.  The Foreign Minister described the aim of the review:  
Major issues for the Strategy are how to encourage Australians to be more self-
reliant when travelling and reduce risks to themselves and their safety; how to 
direct consular resources to individuals in greatest need; whether to reduce 
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consular services for some people or in certain circumstances; and how to deliver 
the best services with the resources available.102 
Some of the questions in the issues paper included ‘who should be able to access 
consular assistance?’ and ‘what consular services should continue to be delivered and 
what services could be reduced or withdrawn?’103  There were a range of submissions 
from academics, individuals and organisations such as the Law Council of Australia. 
The Foreign Minister made public statements in early 2014 that the Australian 
government was actively considering cost-recovery options for the provision of 
consular assistance to citizens abroad, including charging a fee to citizens when they 
accessed consular services.104  
On 3 December 2014, the Australian government released its revised consular strategy 
for 2014-2016. It was presented in the form of a short report (the Report) and a revised 
Consular Services Charter. The Report outlines four themes that emerged from the 
public consultation: the need to encourage Australians to better help themselves abroad; 
a misconception by the public about the meaning of consular assistance; the need to 
access the expertise of other organisations; and the scope for modernising the delivery 
of consular assistance.105   A significant outcome from the Report is that DFAT will 
develop a ‘vulnerability matrix’ that will assist the Department to identify cases that 
require the most attention.106   The Strategy intends to better address trauma suffered 
by victims of crime and to address cases related to children and women.107  The strategy 
also aims to improve ‘cooperation and dialogue with private sector groups to expand 
our messaging and to build better partnerships.’108   A move towards public/private 
partnerships will facilitate participation from a broader range of actors in the 
protection of citizens abroad.  
Civil society organisations, such as Australians Detained Abroad, are already providing 
services to Australian citizens that Australia cannot or does not provide within its 
consular regime.109  A more networked approach to the protection of citizens abroad 
could help the Australian government with sharing the responsibilities of protection 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Invitation to Comment’ Consular Strategy 2014-2016, 
December 2013. 
103 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Issues Paper: Development of a New Consular Strategy 
2014-2016’ Consular Strategy 2014-2016, December 2013.  
104 Georgie Stone and Robert Upe, ‘Julie Bishop Wants Aussies in Trouble Overseas to Pay for 
Government’s Help’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 5 January 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/julie-bishop-wants-aussies-in-trouble-overseas-to-pay-for-governments-help-
20140104-30arv.html>.  
105 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Consular Strategy 2014-16, (December 2014) 8. 
106 Ibid 11. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid 14. 
109 Australians Detained Abroad, above n 38. 
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through consular services as well as supplement the existing pool of expertise available 
for protective actions.  
	  
IV. Conclusion 
The Van Nguyen case demonstrates how State and non-State participation in the 
protection of citizens abroad can intersect, but still remain parallel in many respects. As 
a case study it illustrates some of the advantages of regulatory flexibility in a system of 
protection. Expertise can be harnessed within government based on the situation at 
hand. However, it also highlights some of the drawbacks: ad hoc decision-making in 
response to public scrutiny, media pressure or political interference.   
Australia’s consular system performs a general function for all Australians in need of 
assistance abroad. It does not structurally or morally preference specific situations, 
people or rights, instead focusing on welfare as its gauge. The bureaucracy and consular 
staff at the coalface may, in a perfect world, apply consistent approaches and preference 
the most serious situations that arise for Australian citizens abroad. However, with the 
increasing involvement of political figures in issues related to the treatment of 
Australian citizens by foreign States, there is space for political forces to thwart the 
bureaucracy’s efforts. Political latitude is built into the system through a series of 
policies and practices that are not legal in nature, but rather create flexibility for 
consular officers, government officials and politicians to address matters on a case-by-
case basis. The consular framework is only intended to be facilitative, leaving protective 
action to be taken by public lawyers, advocates and occasionally civil society.  
Most protection will be resolved through consular action or negotiation, without the 
commencement of legal proceedings. Yet scholars have rarely examined practical 
examples where the line between protection and other forms of action not constituting 
protection may blur. As States move away from formal dimensions of international 
law,110 protection is even more likely to be delivered through mechanisms outside of 
international legal proceedings. While it may not be the case in Australia, there are 
more providers of consular services than just States.111   As other actors compete with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research Questions’ in 
Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 13, 15. 
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the State to protect citizens abroad, where possible, States need to harness this 




Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the nature of participation in the protection of citizens abroad 
and the significance of this practice for international law. It has challenged the State-
centric view of protection by analysing the way in which other actors motivate, perform 
and influence the protection of citizens abroad. Each case study has presented the ways 
in which State and non-State actors interact with one another in networks, the power 
relations between them, and the mechanisms they employ. The purpose has been to 
understand the practice of protection not just in the form of international legal 
proceedings, but also as a range of legal and political actions. A micro international law 
analysis of the values, actors and actions, refined the concept of protection and its 
techniques in each case study. In Germany, the involvement of non-State actors, 
particularly civil society, in the generation of a legal case and its strategy was critical. 
Mexico’s programmes challenge the notion of protection as a formal international 
intervention by the State and demonstrates how State and non-State nodes influence 
networks to protect. The Australian case study reveals the tension between consular 
assistance and protection, as well as how networks can reflect the traditional legal 
subjectivity of the actors. In this chapter, I analyse features of participation in the 
protection of citizens abroad drawn from the case studies. I then consider what a 
renewed idea of participation means for international law. I outline the limitations of 
existing accounts of participation in international legal scholarship and offer the 
concept of distributive sovereignty as a way to understand participation in the 
international legal system.  
	  
I. Features of Participation in the Protection of Citizens Abroad 
Studies of protection have typically limited their concern to the way that States exercise 
diplomatic protection. However, the nature of participation in the protection of citizens 
abroad is diverse. Several features of participation stand out. The generation or delivery 
of protection, in whatever form, is not confined to the State. The enterprise of 
protecting nationals abroad can, in fact, be a joint endeavour between State and non-
State actors. In shared or joint enterprises of protection, networks are a fundamental 
factor in determining the level and nature of actor participation. Networks with both 
State and non-State actors facilitate new technologies and techniques of protection, 
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including exercising classic forms of protection in new ways. Here, I analyse these 
developments. 
	  
Mechanisms of protection 
Law and litigation 
Litigation, or its prospect, appeared in each of the case studies. While historical and 
academic emphasis has been on international case law, litigation in the ICJ for the 
purpose of protecting the human rights of citizens abroad is infrequent. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of ICJ litigation in preventing or responding to violations of international 
law against individuals remains unclear. In the case studies, almost all the individuals 
seeking protection were executed.1  However, complainant States in the ICJ cases 
received longer-term benefits other than saving the individual lives at stake. For 
example, since LaGrand, no German citizen has been executed abroad.2  Avena 
achieved mixed results for the individuals nominated in the ICJ hearing, but the 
MCLAP has managed to produce a tangible reduction in the executions of Mexican 
nationals in the United States.3  Through ICJ litigation processes, Mexico and Germany 
publicly defined their values, gained legitimacy and secured long-term funding to 
address systemically the protection of citizens by litigating their nationals’ interests. 
ICJ litigation therefore has an inconsistent record of success (if success is defined as 
saving lives or preventing violations of individual human rights) but it can deliver 
broader gains for complainant States.  
The use of local or domestic litigation in the case studies modifies traditional ideas 
about the level of litigation in protection. Mexico’s approach to protection exemplifies 
the use of targeted local litigation as a policy of protection. Other States, such as 
Indonesia, the Philippines and El Salvador, also use local litigation as a mechanism to 
protect their citizens abroad through similar funding programmes to Mexico.4  The 
technique of local litigation provides several advantages. The restrictive rules on 
participation in the international law of State responsibility do not apply as stringently 
at a local level, therefore enabling broader participation from a range of actors bringing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note that in Avena there were 52 Mexican nationals listed, some of whom have been executed. Others 
are at different stages of their criminal processes in the United States.  
2 Interview with German Official #3 (Berlin, July 2013).  
3 Interview with Greg Kuykendall, Director of MCLAP (Telephone, April 2014). 
4  See, eg, Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare Administration <http://www.owwa.gov.ph/>; Law on 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Abroad (Indonesia), Law No. 39/2004, (Statute Book of 
the Republic of Indonesia of 2004 No. 13).  
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cases. Multi-actor participation in local litigation can also mask the involvement of a 
State in the internal affairs of the host State prior to the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, which is contrary to the rules of diplomatic protection.5  
Distinct from litigation, actors used law as a mechanism of protection in a number of 
competing and sometimes contradictory ways. Some actors and networks deployed law 
as a mechanism to neutralise a moral claim or the politicisation of a claim. For example, 
the Australian Foreign Minister relied on law to establish parameters around the level 
of action available in Van Nguyen’s situation while excluding the use of non-legal 
measures, such as trade sanctions. With a focus on whether or not jurisdiction for an 
ICJ case was present, it was ‘law’ that ultimately determined the threshold of action in 
Van Nguyen’s case after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The LaGrand brothers’ 
case is another example of law’s neutralising effect on a political decision. Germany cast 
its claim against the United States in LaGrand as a technical exercise under the VCCR. 
This technical dimension softened a perception that Germany’s claim was a moral 
challenge to the United States’ domestic laws on the death penalty. In both Van 
Nguyen’s situation and LaGrand, government actors used law as a mechanism to 
neutralise politics and to preserve State bilateral relationships.  
The case studies also illustrate how some actors engaged law and its discourse to 
mobilise action, particularly in relation to international human rights law. Civil society 
actors and legal scholars rely on human rights obligations enshrined in a range of 
international instruments to argue that there are legal and moral obligations on States 
to protect citizens abroad.6  Several examples arise in each of the case studies: civil 
society organisations such as Amnesty International in Germany used international law 
to persuade domestic constituencies of the illegality of the death penalty by the United 
States; Mexico’s engaged the language of the VCCR and anti-death penalty to recruit 
international support for its citizens in the United States; and Australian lawyers 
Donald Rothwell and Christopher Ward’s attempted to use the ICCPR to prompt an ICJ 
case. 
Actors promoting human rights protection in the case studies were more likely to 
invoke international law. Those actors in favour of intervention used law to bolster 
their position through a claim of legal obligation to create pressure on detaining or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Non-intervention or non-interference in the internal affairs of a State is a general principle in 
international law. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (A/8082) GA Res 
2625XXV, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 25th sess, Agenda Item 85, Supp No 18, UN Doc A/Res/25/2625 (24 
October 1970) annex I.  
6 The Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection’s position on diplomatic protection as a mechanism of 
human rights is discussed in chapter 2. See First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 32.   
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injuring States to act in accordance with law or to convince a State to take action. The 
authority of law offers credibility for moral claims about human rights. David Kennedy 
describes the mobilising potential of international human rights law as an invocation of 
law’s ‘emancipatory vocabulary’.7  In the context of protection, an argument based on 
respect for human rights can be an influential tool for civil society organisations to 
mobilise public opinion or to pressure States to behave consistently with international 
values.  
Structure and resources 
A State’s bureaucratic structures can influence the formation of networks and nodes of 
protection. For example, both Mexico and Germany have dedicated teams to deal with 
protection of citizens abroad as a separate service from routine consular assistance. 
Within the Mexican Foreign Ministry there is a ‘Directorate of Protection’ to deal with 
policy development, programme management (MCLAP and PALE) and the provision of 
legal advice.8  These teams target Mexicans in the United States’ criminal justice system 
and they specialise in the application of the death penalty. Germany’s Ministry of 
Justice has a team to provide legal advice on Germans detained abroad and the death 
penalty. There is an equivalent team in the German Foreign Office to deal with the 
consular and diplomatic aspects of those cases. Australia, by contrast, does not have 
specialised teams addressing detention or the death penalty.  
Specialised teams can function as enabling nodes of protection in two ways. First, 
formal structures within the bureaucracy can depoliticise the decision to intervene in 
each case by embedding decision-making away from political actors. Specialised teams 
facilitate intervention on behalf of detained citizens as a matter of course, thereby 
building protective values into bureaucratic processes. A protection team can develop 
protocols for responding on behalf of citizens in situations of concern and build 
substantive expertise which can be circulated within the network. For example, 
Germany and Mexico’s teams enable a structural response to the protection of citizens 
abroad, focusing on the detention of nationals and due process, whereas in the 
Australian context, the decision to elevate a matter beyond routine consular assistance 
is more likely to require approval from the political classes. The second way that a 
specialised team may function as an enabling node of protection is that non-State 
actors can identify a contact point within State structures to form a multi-actor network. 
Non-State actors focused on specific values (death penalty, freedom of speech, women’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 David Kennedy, ‘International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 15 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 101, 101. 
8 Roundtable with Directorate of Protection, SRE (Mexico City, February 2014). 
Conclustion 
143 
rights, etc) can develop relationships with State actors with the aim of influencing the 
course of action to be taken and contribute to State efforts to protect citizens abroad, as 
was the case in Germany. State structures can provide consistency across cases, 
improve transparency and facilitate the formation of multi-actor networks.  
State resources and regional power also influence the mechanisms available to protect 
and the networks that may form. For States facing global power imbalances and 
resource limitations, this may mean developing programmes targeted at the most 
significant national issues. For example, Mexico has concentrated its resources on a 
limited geographic scope (the United States) with emphasis on fewer international law 
violations (the death penalty and consular notification). Other States have adopted 
similarly targeted approaches. Indonesia and the Philippines have programmes to 
protect the labour rights of their nationals working abroad, focusing their attention, 
energy and resources on a specific class of rights. Smaller States also use networks to 
deliver better protective strategies, particularly by leveraging power and resources from 
transnational advocacy networks (labour rights, human rights and the anti-death 
penalty movements).9  A targeted protection programme enables less powerful States to 
borrow and build expertise and to protect specific rights within the national interest. 
This trend demonstrates how networked action can overcome issues related to power 
and resources.  
	  
Actors 
Despite the fact that diplomatic and consular officers are at the coalface of interaction 
with citizens overseas, international lawyers play a crucial role in decision-making and 
norm generation in the area of protection. In each case study, international lawyers 
acted as enablers or disablers of action. In Mexico, a government lawyer motivated 
Mexico to bring a legal case. In Germany and Australia, non-government lawyers 
prompted State actors to consider litigation. Even in the absence of consular assistance 
offered by the State of nationality, civil society organisations staffed by lawyers have 
driven action to protect individuals.10  Moreover, these legal actors formed part of 
larger legal networks.   
The idea of lawyers as norm entrepreneurs in international law is not new. Oscar 
Schachter described the network of international lawyers as a ‘kind of invisible college 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See John Braithwaite, ‘Methods of Power for Development: Weapons of the Weak, Weapons of the 
Strong’ (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 297, 317. 
10 See, eg, Reprieve project on the death penalty <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/topic/death-penalty/>.  
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dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise’.11  Schachter observed that international 
lawyers were equipped with the technical expertise required for developing 
international law: ‘individually and as a group, [international lawyers] play a role in the 
process of creating new law and in extending existing law to meet emerging needs.’12 
Schachter’s account emphasised the role of international lawyers in collecting and 
organising information, as well as providing scrutiny of developing international law.13 
However, the role of international lawyers in the three case studies of protection does 
not correlate fully with Schachter’s analysis. The invisible college model minimises the 
role of international lawyers to one of coordination and execution of technical tasks, 
with lawmaking and norm-generation emerging as a by-product.  
Lucien Karpik and Terence Halliday have also engaged with the concept of lawyers as 
an epistemic community. They describe the ‘legal complex,’ which is comprised of a 
collective of legal actors, usually trained lawyers, academics, civil servants, private 
lawyers, judges and law firms.14   Karpik and Halliday attribute more political judgment 
to lawyers in networks than Schachter. In the legal complex, lawyers are connected 
through action, particularly the manner in which they mobilise for political action.15 
While Schachter’s invisible college emphasises educational background and values, the 
legal complex emphasises the networks that lawyers form and the way that lawyers 
‘mobilize on a given issue at a given historical moment, usually through collective 
action that is enabled through discernible structures of ties.’16  
Collective action by networks of lawyers is a defining feature of protection in this thesis. 
In Germany, Mexico and Australia, lawyers in each case tried to instigate action on 
behalf of citizens abroad. Yet their capacity to manifest that action was based on their 
ability to recruit other actors into their networks. For example, in the Van Nguyen case 
Donald Rothwell and Christopher Ward brought the Australian government’s attention 
to the idea of ICJ litigation, however, they were not able to enrol government actors in 
their network of non-government lawyers. In Mexico, Juan-Manuel Gomez Robledo 
and Joel Hernandez generated the idea of international proceedings following 
Germany’s success in LaGrand. They recruited other actors into a network focused on 
protecting the rights of Mexicans in the United States and inculcated the actors in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Oscar Schachter, ‘The Invisible College of International Lawyers’ (1977) 72 Northwestern University 
Law Review 217, 217.  
12 Ibid 223.  
13 Ibid 224.  
14 Lucien Karpik and Terence C Halliday, ‘The Legal Complex’ (2011) 7 Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 217, 220. 




network with values of international justice. In Germany, lawyers in the Ministry of 
Justice argued in favour of legal proceedings in the ICJ because there was a legal basis 
to do so under the VCCR. These lawyers formed part of a broader political movement 
invested in ICJ litigation as the best course of redress for advancing international 
human rights law standards.  
Nodes function as a site for lawyers to exercise power and influence action. In nodes, 
lawyers transform their technical expertise into moral authority.17   Halliday describes 
this phenomenon:  
…the exercise of moral authority in the name of expert, technical advice works best 
when it is out of the public glare … [a]lso it works more readily when the law itself 
is highly technical.18  
Another technique that international lawyers use is to convert moral concern, typically 
about human rights, into a technical exercise. The conversion of technical matters to 
moral issues, and vice versa, occurs in the two ICJ cases. In both LaGrand and Avena, 
the cases appeared to be technical legal exercises related to a breach of the VCCR. 
However, both these cases embodied Germany and Mexico’s opposition to the death 
penalty. International lawyers in decision-making nodes translated the moral concern 
about human rights into technical legal cases about the application of a treaty. Lawyers 
in nodes can also influence which values or legal principles are to be pursued or 
protected. The work of the Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection, John Dugard, 
exemplifies this: Dugard transformed the task of codification into a normative concern 
about the application of diplomatic protection as a human rights remedy.19  The 
conversion between the moral and the technical occurs because there is an assumption 
that the law is neutral, but in the hands of lawyers it becomes a device for translating 
values into action or inaction.  
 
Values 
The practice of protection of citizens abroad operates as a litmus test: it can illustrate 
the values a State, network or group of actors possess, and the characteristics of 
individuals worthy of protection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Terence C Halliday, ‘Politics and Civic Professionalism: Legal Elites and Cause Lawyers’ (1999) Law 
and Social Inquiry 1013, 1033. 
18 Ibid 1034. 
19 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries, 25 [4].  
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The case studies in this thesis reveal some patterns in the values and principles that 
actors are most interested in protecting. Civil and political rights were the objects of 
protection. Thus, all the case studies involved application of the death penalty. Other 
interventions follow this pattern. Australia, for example, recently mounted 
interventions on behalf of three nationals in relation to the death penalty, due process 
and freedom of speech rights. As discussed in chapter six, an Australian journalist tried 
without proper due process in Egypt and two Australian nationals who faced the death 
penalty for drug smuggling convictions in Indonesia, received protection from the 
Australian government.20  Australia requested Indonesia to accept the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ in order to bring an action for an alleged breach of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.21  This pattern of protecting civil and political rights 
signals the absence of protection for other kinds of rights and for other kinds of 
victims.22  
Action on behalf of citizens abroad showcases the friction between different legal, 
political, and moral values in practice. An area where such a collision occurs is between 
the legal principles of diplomatic protection and new techniques of intervention, 
specifically the requirement to exhaust all domestic remedies prior to intervention. The 
case studies exemplify how States and other networked actors are active in the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies phase. Formal representations in domestic courts 
(Germany) or funding and designing a domestic legal challenge (Mexico) are examples. 
The pre-ICJ narratives of LaGrand and Avena suggest that protective networks do not 
wait for individuals to exhaust domestic remedies before intervening in one form or 
another, particularly where the matter relates to national interests or a network’s values.  
This approach to the exhaustion phase suggests that the values underpinning 
protection are shifting from remediation to prevention. Mexico’s approach displays this 
shift. Mexico’s programmes combine consular efforts with local litigation to protect 
Mexican nationals. Mexico’s approach is not foreseen by or susceptible to the 
framework of diplomatic protection in international law because it is embedded in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 ‘Australian Journalist Peter Greste Among Al Jazeera Reporters Detained by Egyptian Police’, ABC 
News (online), 31 December 2013 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-30/australian-journalist-peter-
greste-among-al-jazeera-reporters-d/5179070>; ‘Bali Nine: Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran 
executed by Indonesian Firing Squad’, ABC News (online), 29 April 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-29/andrew-chan-and-myuran-sukumaran-executed/6426654>. 
21 ‘Law Experts Say Indonesian Death Penalty is Illegal’, ANU News (online), 27 April 2015 
<http://www.anu.edu.au/news/all-news/law-experts-say-indonesian-death-penalty-is-illegal>.  
22 Responses to sexual violence, for example, do not consistently attract the same response from 
protection networks as the death penalty. There have, however, been instances of robust responses: 




domestic system of the United States. Yet Mexico’s policies and suite of measures are 
deeply protective and preventative in their nature.  
The inclusion of a wider variety of protective actions challenges aspects of the legal 
regime governing diplomatic protection. Activity prior to the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is not regarded as diplomatic protection under the Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection.23  Scholars have treated consular assistance and other kinds of 
preventative actions as falling outside the category of protection precisely because they 
are exercised before the exhaustion of domestic remedies.24   However, this legal 
position does not reflect consular and diplomacy literature, which attests to the 
blurring of boundaries between consular and diplomatic action, or the case studies. In 
essence, this means that the rules of diplomatic protection are not fully aligned with the 
practice of States in this area.  
	  
II. The Significance of Networked Participation for International Law  
The examination of protection in this thesis shows that the relationship between State 
and non-State actors is complex and their participation is intertwined. The protection 
of citizens abroad functions as a site for actors to form and join networks to achieve 
their goals. Different actors enhance their participation through networked action to 
secure resources, gain legitimacy and capitalise on expertise. Yet there is no way of 
capturing this activity through a macro international law lens, which would ultimately 
focus on rules and only the practice of States.  
One of the challenges for international legal scholars is how to account for new modes 
of cooperation and participation beyond traditional legal forms.25  International legal 
scholarship has framed cooperation between State and non-State actors narrowly. By 
limiting analyses of shared or joint action to violations of international law, as the 
liability literature has done, considerable area of international legal behaviour is 
overlooked.26  Lawmaking, as discussed in chapter three, has also been an area in which 
legal scholars have tried to understand joint participation in the creation of legal rules, 
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25 Philipp Dann and Marie von Engelhardt, ‘Legal Approaches to Global Governance and Accountability: 
Informal Lawmaking, International Public Authority, and Global Administrative Law Compared’ in Joost 
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Chapter 7 
148 
standards or norms. However, performance and participation in the international legal 
system are not limited to liability and lawmaking. Joint or shared enterprises between 
State and non-State actors are also part of the fulfilment of international rights, duties 
and the pursuit of claims.  
Some scholarship contemplates the significance of increased actors and cooperation for 
the concept of sovereignty in international law. The relationship between these changes 
and sovereignty has been understood in two ways. The first is that increased 
participation by non-State actors diminishes the classical sovereign model of State 
power. The second is that the increased participation of other actors in the 
international system occurs by virtue of the consent of States, thereby affirming State 
sovereignty.27  These approaches leave a gap in thinking about the relationship between 
participation and sovereignty. I argue that multi-actor participation in the global order, 
particularly in the form of networked cooperation, is a part of the evolution of 
sovereignty. 
 
Sovereignty debates   
Derived from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Westphalian concept defines 
sovereignty as ‘supreme authority within a territory.’ 28  Louis Henkin described 
sovereignty as the ‘oldest subject in international law.’29  Ian Brownlie distinguished 
between jurisdiction (powers, rights and claims of the State) and sovereignty (legal 
competence or legal personhood).30  Recognising that these terms were often used 
interchangeably, Brownlie criticised the inconsistent usage of terms related to 
sovereignty.31  Henkin, however, rejected the term sovereignty, opting instead for the 
phrase ‘political independence’ to describe the status of States in international law.32 
Despite rejecting the term, Henkin described sovereignty as:  
… status, personhood, rights and duties, equally with other States. Its rights include, 
notably, autonomy – the legal power to consent, to assume and receive obligations, 
to make treaties and contracts and therefore to make law, as well as the power to 
acquire, own and dispose of territory and other forms of property. The State retains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Luigi Condorelli and Antonio Cassese, ‘Is Leviathan Still Holding Sway Over International Dealings?’ 
in Antonio Cassese (ed), Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012) 14, 14.  
28 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press Online, 2011) [1].  
29 Louis Henkin, ‘The Mythology of Sovereignty’ in Ronald St John MacDonald (ed), Essays in Honour 
of Wang Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 351.  
30 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th ed, 2008) 106. 
31 Ibid 106-107.  
32 Henkin, ‘The Mythology of Sovereignty’, above n 29, 352. 
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its internal autonomy, its ‘privacy,’ its right to be let alone by other States, its 
territorial integrity and its political independence… .33 
A central aspect of sovereignty – what it takes to be a State – is the set of legal 
conditions required for an entity to qualify for Statehood. This legal concept, what I 
refer to as sovereign conditionality, has been a primary concern of legal scholars in 
international law.34  Another area international legal scholars show interest is the status 
of Westphalian sovereignty in relation to State consent and lawmaking. This has taken 
shape in inquiries about the ability of States to express absolute authority over their 
affairs in the context of globalisation and the creation of regional, intra-State and 
international organisations.35  
Rosalyn Higgins observes that since the Montevideo Convention the concept of 
statehood has not been seriously revised, however she suggests: ‘it should not be 
thought that, because the formal definition of statehood has remained unchanged, the 
concept of statehood is rigid and immutable.’ 36   While Higgins focuses on the 
conditions for statehood, particularly political independence, there seems to be a more 
pressing issue that flows from a mutable concept of the State: the natural corollary of a 
changing concept of statehood is an evolving concept of sovereignty.  
Sovereignty is hotly contested, especially in the fields of political science and critical 
international law. 37   International legal scholars from the post-colonial school of 
thought, such as Antony Anghie, argue that the sovereignty concept in international law 
serves to perpetuate colonial and imperial impulses, therefore reproducing and 
maintaining power structures of disadvantage.38  Jean Cohen contemplates changing 
discourses of sovereignty in international law, particularly arguments that sovereignty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Ibid 355. 
34 See Brownlie, above n 30, 105-110; James Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law’ 
(1977) 48(1) British Yearbook of International Law 93, 93. 
35 See, eg, Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav, ‘A Reappraisal of the State of Sovereignty Debate: The 
Case of Migration Control’ (2000) 33(2) Comparative Political Studies 163.  
36 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 39: Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States, opened for signature 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into 
force 26 December 1934). 
37 As noted in chapter three, political scientists and some international legal scholars have adopted a wider 
lens for analysing sovereignty. See generally, Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New 
Sovereignty (Harvard University Press, 2009); Steven D Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 
(Princeton University Press, 1999); Saskia Sassen, Losing Control: Sovereignty in the Age of 
Globalization (Columbia University Press, 2013); Carl Schmitt and George Schwab, Political Theology: 
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Political Theory (Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed, 2004).  
38 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005) 6.  
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ought to be jettisoned in favour of legal cosmopolitanism.39  Cohen argues that a 
concept of sovereignty is critical to a counter-project to empire and a system of human 
rights.40  These views on sovereignty, while approaching the idea from different fields, 
respectively contemplate the effect of sovereignty and the conditions or content of 
sovereignty.  
Timothy Endicott defines the content of sovereignty as ‘a complex of various forms of 
power and independence that is complete for the purposes of states.’41  It is this idea of 
‘various forms of power’ that raises questions about the way that sovereignty is 
expressed or manifested, not just its content or effect. Endicott’s observation implies 
that various forms of power constitute sovereignty and that therefore, it can be 
expressed differently. One of those powers is the capacity to regulate, a form of power I 
will refer to as ‘regulatory sovereignty’. This idea of the various powers of regulatory 
sovereignty is coupled with a rejection of the absolutist model of sovereignty and the 
notion of absolute power of the State.42  Many scholars, including Endicott, reject an 
absolutist form of sovereign power, noting that such a concept is incompatible with 
international law.43   In recognising that sovereign power is not absolute, Cohen 
suggests that modern sovereignty is ‘associated with arbitrary and rapacious power 
politics’.44  Thus, as various forms of power change, so too does the sovereignty concept.  
Douglas Howland and Luise White suggest that there can be no single definition of 
sovereignty which spans all places and all times.45  Two things stand out in Howland 
and White’s study of sovereignty. First, they contemplate sovereignty as a set of 
practices. Second, they acknowledge that there are numerous entities that practice 
sovereignty.46 Howland and White set out the purpose of their approach:  
we want to move beyond contested meaning … and demonstrate that sovereignty 
consists of unfixed practices within States - practices that are struggled over, just as 
the international relations of states are struggled over. Sovereignty is contested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Jean L Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law’ (2004) 18(3) Ethics and 
International Affairs 1, 3.  
40 Ibid 4. 
41 Timothy Endicott, ‘The Logic of Freedom and Power’ in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), 
The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 246, 252.  
42 Jean L Cohen, Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization: A Constitutional Pluralist Perspective’ in 
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 261, 263. 
43 Ibid 264. 
44 Ibid; Endicott, above n 41, 252.  
45 Douglas Howland and Luise White, ‘Introduction: Sovereignty and the Study of States’ in Douglas 
Howland and Luise White (eds), The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws Populations (Indiana 
University Press, 2009) 1, 1.  
46 Ibid; John Jackson, ‘Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept’ (2003) 97(4) 
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because it is continually negotiated on the ground - over what a state does, to whom, 
and where… .47 
Slaughter argues that one practice of sovereignty is the disaggregation of a State’s 
power. Slaughter posits that as the sub-units of States take on governance 
responsibilities, they exercise a level of State sovereignty.48  Additionally, she argues 
that disaggregated sovereignty provides sub-units of States with the ‘capacity to enter 
into international regulatory regimes of different types, rather than as the negative 
right to be left alone.’49  Slaughter’s gaze falls upon lawmaking capacities of State sub-
units to dismantle the centrality of State sovereign power. While disaggregated 
sovereignty engages with the idea of interdependence and cooperation, its scope is 
limited to understanding those interactions between States only. Disaggregated 
sovereignty, along with Slaughter’s theory of transgovernmentalism discussed in 
chapter three, focus on State-to-State interactions without fully acknowledging that 
non-State actors influence and contribute to the shape of the international order. It 
may be the case that in some areas of international law a State may express its 
sovereignty in a disaggregated and transgovernmental form. However, there are many 
ways in which sovereignty can be manifested: Slaughter’s model presents one such 
expression.  
Multi-actor participation in the global order, particularly in the form of delegation and 
cooperation, can be seen as part of the evolution of sovereignty. For example, non-State 
actors can perform or contribute to State functions in international law.50  States can 
coopt non-State actors into formal State-based processes.51  Non-State actors may also 
assume functions traditionally characterised as State functions, like making 
representations on behalf of an individual to protect them from State harm. The case 
studies of protection in the preceding chapters demonstrate that within multi-actor 
networks actors delegate their functions, rights and responsibilities to one another. The 
Mexico case study exemplifies this behaviour. States perform their obligations by 
recruiting other actors to assist them, and in most circumstances non-State actors 
achieve their goals with varying levels of cooperation from State actors.  
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and Dynamics in International Lawmaking’ (2014) 25(3) European Journal of International Law 733, 
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Shared action and multi-actor networks can frustrate lines between the conduct of 
State and non-State entities. Susan Marks suggests that the distinction between State 
and non-State actors is artificial. She argues that: 
phenomena that are enmeshed are made instead to appear separate. … [w]hen we 
counterpose the non-state to the state, we tend to obscure the extent to which each 
is already present within the other, governing its existence and defining its 
meaning.52 
With networks blurring the line between the formal statuses of actors, a network may 
express the power that is traditionally associated with State actors.  
Many international legal scholars are preoccupied with preserving the State and its 
power in a traditional form, perhaps because they fear that adjusting the conceptual 
framework might cause the entire system to collapse. This scholarly scrambling around 
the edges of Westphalian sovereignty attempts to fit non-State actor participation in the 
international system around an out-dated idea of the State. Like Cohen, I argue that the 
sovereignty concept is necessary for understanding changes in the global order.53 In 
this respect, an analysis of how non-State actors may contribute to and shape 
sovereignty in international law has yet to receive scholarly attention.  
	  
Distributive sovereignty and participation 
A micro international law approach can facilitate an examination of sovereignty as a set 
of practices by a range of entities, as Howland and White suggest above. What can the 
practices of networks explored in this thesis illustrate about the expression of 
sovereignty?  
The existence of multi-actor networks in Germany and Mexico reflect a high level of 
strategic coordination and cooperation between State and non-State actors in relation 
to the fulfilment of duties or the pursuit of rights in international law. Particularly in 
the area of protection, a core sovereign right of intervention, the participation of State 
and non-State actors signals a shift in the way that sovereign power may be manifested.  
I propose a model of distributive sovereignty to explain collaborative activity and the 
distribution of regulatory power between a range of actors. Distributive sovereignty is 
an expression of sovereign power where rights and duties in international law are 
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delivered through highly integrated plural participation of State and non-State actors in 
networks. Distributive sovereignty has three elements. First, action must relate to the 
fulfilment of duties or the pursuit of rights in international law. Second, multi-actor 
nodes, composed of State and non-State actors, develop strategy and influence the 
behaviour of networks. Third, the nature of the relationship between the actors in the 
nodes and associated networks reflects aligned objectives or interests manifested in a 
high level of integrated behaviour or task delivery.  
Distributive sovereignty enables an account of how State and non-State actors interact 
with one another to produce outcomes and share responsibility in international law. 
The tasks associated with pursuing a claim, such as protection, or compliance with 
international duties, often involves both State and non-State actors. Distributive 
sovereignty explains how States engage actively with non-State actors to strengthen, 
diversify and perform different actions in international law. It clarifies the participation 
of non-State actors in State enterprises, projects, policies and activities. In this 
expression of sovereignty, the manner in which State and non-State actors enrol one 
another to complete tasks related to rights and obligations in international law are in 
full view.  
The existence of multi-actor nodes is a critical component of a model of distributive 
sovereignty. Specifically, nodes combining State and non-State actors develop strategy 
and policy, allocate tasks and enrol actors. Decision-making power of the State 
(regulatory sovereignty) is vested in the node, which may have access to resources and 
to networks of other actors.54  An example of this kind of multi-actor node is the 
MCLAP node (the Mexican SRE and the Director of the MCLAP in the United States, 
discussed in chapter five). In this node, the actors influence and direct the policies and 
objectives of Mexico’s protection regime. It has carriage of financial resources and 
allocates tasks to other networks and actors. The formal status of the actors in this node 
is of less importance: their expertise and capacity to influence the course of events is 
central to their interaction. Unlike a contractual relationship where an external entity 
fulfils a task determined by the State alone, distributive sovereignty embodies strategic 
alliances where multi-actor nodes determine the course of action to be taken.  
Finally, the relationships between the actors must reflect a level of aligned objectives or 
interests. Collaboration between State and non-State actors can illustrate a deeper 
networked relationship, one in which goals can be set, tasks shared, and objectives 
aligned. The relationship between civil society actors like Amnesty International and 
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German diplomatic and consular officials prior to LaGrand provides an example of this 
kind of integrated relationship. During the clemency and appeal proceedings of the 
LaGrand brothers in the United States, State and non-State actors met to strategise, 
allocate tasks and speaking responsibilities. The actors involved were united by the goal 
of protecting the LaGrand brothers from execution.  
Distributive sovereignty emphasises how international law functions are performed 
and by whom. Most performance or conduct in the international order, for example 
standard setting, violation of norms, fulfilment of obligations or securing rights and 
remedies, is the product of joint enterprise between State and non-State actors. The 
concept of distributive sovereignty can explain the quality of a network formed between 
State and non-State actors. It reveals the mechanisms used by different actors and 
distinguishes between communication and when sovereign functions are manifested as 
a multi-actor phenomenon.  
The nature of how States operate is complex: sovereignty is formed and reformed by 
the relationships that States and non-State actors embrace, reject and nurture. 
Distributive sovereignty is one expression of how actors engage in networks to produce 
shared outcomes in the international legal order. It reflects the changing forms of 
sovereignty and rejects that sovereignty is a static concept.  
	  
Protection, sovereignty and allegiance 
The protection of citizens abroad today is, in many ways, an allegiance-building act. 
Citizens owe allegiance to their States and in return, States offer them protection. 
However, globalisation has contributed to the rise of many communities and 
movements that contest State power. States are competing with these communities for 
loyalty from citizens. The activities and goals of non-State actors can challenge 
traditional State sovereignty and thereby contribute to a ‘collision of loyalties and 
allegiances.’55  
There are numerous organisations and entities that provide protection to citizens. 
Private security companies provide protection services.56  Companies provide ‘consular 
services’ to fee-paying clients. Organisations and corporations have insurance policies 
in relation to the treatment of their members or employees abroad. Civil society 
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organisations litigate, run global campaigns on behalf of individuals, and provide 
consular and legal training to States.57 Non-State actor armed groups in different 
regions provide protection for groups and individuals by military or violent means. The 
participation of other actors can also provide regulatory relief to States, however, it can 
also limit the ability of the State to protect its interests through its citizens. Diane Davis 
notes that ‘[w]hen citizens bypass state channels and turn to non-state actors … the 
state itself loses a key function and some of its legitimacy’.58 Where States fail to 
intervene or the protection strategy used is not successful, it can contribute to an 
allegiance deficit, where citizens experience a shortfall of trust. The protection of 
citizens abroad becomes a site where allegiance is fought for by a range of actors.  
It is within this contestation to secure allegiance and loyalty that distributive 
sovereignty emerges as a governance tool. Multi-actor networks function as a 
mechanism for sustaining and obtaining power. States can minimise the challenge to 
their power and centrality in international law by enrolling non-State actors into their 
activities. Conversely, non-State actors can achieve their goals through cooperation 
with the State and set themselves apart from a wider contestation for power with other 
non-State actors. The reciprocity of legitimacy and power between actors suggests that 
the protection of citizens abroad is more likely to take its form as a joint enterprise 
between State and non-State actors in the future. 
	  
III. Conclusion 
While cases of protection are politically and legally complex, they reveal the values 
underlying action, and even give a flavour for some of the values populating the 
international order. The starting point of this thesis was that micro-processes, 
individual actors and values are important for an analysis of international law. While a 
macro international law approach focusing on macro actors and rule development is 
fundamental, micro international law can reveal the constitutive aspects of the 
international legal order and where power resides. A micro international law approach 
that maps the narrative of law, its events, and the actors that bolster and defeat certain 
values, is critical to a balanced understanding of the international system.  
In the area of protection, where contestations of allegiance, legal battles and 
competition between entities in the international legal order occur, there are 
individuals who face, or have faced, serious harm. Exposing an array of participants in 
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protection helps to identify who to reach out to and the avenues available when 
instances of protection arise. A more careful study of protection will, I hope, enhance 
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